Hartmann,  Henry  G. 

A Hew  Conception  of  Relativity  and 
Locke 


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UNIVERSITY 


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Series  11 


VOLUME  VIII  (Concluded) 


Part  4 


A NEW  CONCEPTION 
OF  RELATIVITY  AND  LOCKE 


BY 


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HENRY  G.  HARTMANN 


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(Concluded  on  Third  Cover  Page) 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CINCINNATI  STUDIES 


A NEW  CONCEPTION 
OF  RELATIVITY  AND  LOCKE 


BY 

HENRY  G.  HARTMANN 

University  of  Cincinnati 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CINCINNATI 
CINCINNATI,  OHIO 
1914 


\o-| 

V\i*337U 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CINCINNATI  STUDIES 


EDITORS 
Louis  T.  More 
John  M.  Burnam 
Henry  G.  Hartmann 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CINCINNATI 
CINCINNATI,  OHIO 


T 2453  7 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Introduction  5 

I 

GENERAL  SURVEY 

CHAPTER 

I.  The  Two  Fundamental  Steps  in  Locke’s  Philosophy 9 

II.  Relativity  Defined  and  Locke’s  Position  Indicated  in  Respect 

to  its  Various  Formulations 15 

II 

RELATIVISTIC  MOTIVES  IN  LOCKE 

III.  The  Simple  Ideas:  What  Are  They? 19 

IV.  The  Term-Relation  Motive 23 

V.  The  Part-Whole  Motive 32 

VI.  Locke’s  Conception  of  Relation 35 

III 

ANTI-RELATIVISTIC  MOTIVES  IN  LOCKE 

VII.  Ideas  versus  Knowledge  and  Meaning 41 

VIII.  Absolute  Knowledge:  The  Primacy  of  the  “Visible  Relation” 

and  of  Conduct 45 

IV 

CONSTRUCTIVE  RELATIVITY  IN  LOCKE. 

IX.  Doctrine  of  Sorts:  Mixed  Modes  and  Substances 58 

X.  Doctrine  of  Meaning  (“Ideas  of  Relation”) 74 

XI.  Conclusion  85 


^/// A^/ 


RELATIVITY  AND  LOCKE 

ClT:  0.-,rp’.T.-:., 


The  aim  of  this  study  is  twofold.  In  the  first  place,  I seek 
to  offer  a new  and  developed  formulation  of  relativity;  and 
secondly,  to  present  this  doctrine  in  connection  with  Locke,  for 
whom  I thereby  hope  to  gain  a renewed  and  revised  consideration. 

Relativity  has  for  so  long  a time  been  consigned  to  the  role 
of  scapegoat  in  the  history  of  thought  that,  not  unlike  the  appella- 
tion “heresy”  in  the  realm  of  religion,  a stigma  has  come  to 
adhere  to  relativity  not  any  more  easily  counteracted  or  dispelled. 
That  this  should  be  the  case  is  not  wholly  without  cause ; for  when 
we  look  more  closely  into  this  concept,  the  fact  that  it  has  never 
been  subjected  to  a critical  examination  is  but  one  of  the  many 
singular  and  surprising  features  to  be  enumerated  concerning  it. 
My  own  conviction  is,  that,  if  the  principle  of  relativity  be  given 
a full  and  proper  formulation,  not  only  would  a new  and  very 
fruitful  starting  point  in  metaphysical  inquiry  offer  itself,  but 
one  that  in  a way  effects  that  closer  connection  between  meta- 
physics and  science  so  generally  expressed  in  the  aspirations  no 
less  than  in  the  despair  of  current  thought.  The  meaning  attached 
to  the  term  relativity  must  abide  its  place.  I could  not  attempt 
its  definition  at  this  point  without  going  far  afield.  I,  therefore, 
leave  this  matter  for  the  present  to  speak  further  of  Locke. 

While  I attach  an  equal  importance  to  both  aspects  of  the 
study,  the  accurate  presentation  of  relativity  as  it  exists  in 
Locke  is  my  more  immediate  interest.  Nor  do  I aim  at  urging 
some  mere  side  doctrine  in  him,  but  one  that  in  the  slow  growth 
and  development  of  his  ideas  becomes  increasingly  central,  in- 
clusive, and  self-conscious.  I frankly  confess  that  this  is  not 
the  view  I held  of  him  a few  years  ago.  Nor  is  it  likely  that  my 
older  traditional  conception  of  him  would  have  undergone  its 
ladical  change  if  conditions  had  not  led  me  to  give  Book  III  of 
his  Essay  more  serious  reading  than  our  traditional  opinion  of 
it  seemed  to  invite.  This  Book,  supposedly  the  last  of  the  Books 
written,  in  turn  became  the  key  for  reading  the  others.  I submit 
the  outcome  in  these  pages  as  a real  discovery  of  Locke. 

Locke  tells  his  friend  Molyneux  that  Book  III  gave  him  more 
labor  in  the  writing  than  the  rest  of  the  Essay.  This  fact  does 


INTRODUCTION 


24537 


6 


University  of  Cincinnati  Studies 


not  of  necessity  insure  merit.  Yet  I mention  it  as  a fact  not 
without  its  significance,  and  further,  advance  the  contention  that, 
until  Book  III  was  written,  Locke  never  came  into  full  possession 
of  his  “new  way  of  ideas” — a philosophical  view  that  not  only 
embraces  what  is  most  distinctive  in  modern  pragmatism,  but  one 
that  presents  the  relevant  metaphysics  and  system  so  lacking  in 
pragmatism.  I admit  Book  III  does  not  at  first  appear  to  have  its 
specific  doctrines  writ  in  italics.  Locke  himself  confesses  in  re- 
spect to  this  Book : “I  should  not  much  wonder  if  there  be  in  some 
places  of  it  obscurity  and  doubtfulness  ....  though  the 
thoughts  were  easy  and  clear  enough,  yet  [it]  cost  me  more  pains 
to  express  them  than  all  the  rest  of  my  Essay.”  The  fact  is  that 
Locke’s  “new  way  of  ideas”  here  took  its  last  “new”  turn,  and  its 
consummate  character  once  clearly  grasped,  one  ceases  overnight 
to  view  Locke  traditionally. 

In  affirming  Locke  to  be  essentially  the  relativist1,  and  not 
essentially  the  reputed  sensationalist,  I expose  myself  to  mis- 
understanding. He  is  the  sensationalist,  as  reputed,  for  those  who 
will  not  consider  Locke  beyond  the  evident  sensationalistic  impli- 
cations of  his  doctrine,  and  who,  in  support  of  their  claim,  may 
turn  to  the  British  movement  in  philosophy  that  arose  out  of  Locke. 
But  let  it  be  remembered  that  Kant’s  philosophy  also  had  an 
origin  in  Locke,  and  do  I trespass  in  stating  that  perhaps  Pragma- 
tism owes  more  to  Locke  than  may  be  consciously  recognized  or 
accepted?  So  historical  outcome  pitted  against  historical  outcome 
avails  little  in  deciding  an  issue.  Nor  in  denying  Locke  to  be 
primarily  the  sensationalist,  am  1 unaware  that  T.  H.  Green 
(not  to  mention  others)  has  written  a critique  of  him  that  dare 
not  be  ignored.  His  aim,  however,  is  to  show  up  Locke  negatively, 
not  constructively ; to  show  him  up  in  the  light  of  the  exclusive 
sensationalistic  precursor  of  Berkeley  and  Hume,  and  in  so 
doing,  to  expose  in  him  as  absurd  any  departure  from  this  prin- 
ciple and  Green’s  self-imposed  dialectics.  This  sort  of  criticism 
is  not  helpful,  however  else  remarkable  the  critique  may  be  in  its 
superior  merits  and  mental  acrobatics. 

To  begin  with,  Locke,  instead  of  abandoning  “the  historical 
plain  method”  to  which  he  pledges  himself  in  his  Introduction,  in 
order  to  pursue  the  psychological  trend  of  which  he  stands  accused, 

1.  For  a serious  attempt  at  a proper  definition  of  this  term  I refer  the 
reader  to  Chapter  II. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


7 


is  in  the  main  so  consistent  with  his  original  design  that  I am 
almost  inclined  to  ignore  the  first  half  dozen  or  more  of  his  chap- 
ters in  Book  II  for  the  havoc  they  have  done  in  distorting  and 
eclipsing  the  far  more  central,  consistent,  and  evolved  doctrine 
existing  in  his  pages.  And  when,  in  addition,  I find  Locke  in  his 
psychological  digressions  expressly  acknowledging  a departure 
from  his  avowed  method,  I ask  myself  what  blame  for  all  this 
distortion  of  our  perspective  rests  with  Berkeley  and  Hume? 
There  is  no  need,  however,  for  all  that  to  lessen  the  value  of  the 
chapters  indicated.  Chapter  VIII  of  that  Book,  in  particular,  is 
not  the  only  instance  where  we  find  Locke  forcing  an  extreme 
view ; and,  hence  to  discount  the  exaggeration  of  his  views  in  this 
chapter  is  not  any  more,  nor  any  less,  valid,  than  to  do  so  with 
the  many  other  extreme  views  with  which  his  Essay  abounds. 
Read  him  where  we  will,  we  find,  as  I shall  endeavor  to  outline, 
the  most  one-sided  and  extreme  position  brought  face  to  face  in 
his  pages  with  others  equally  extreme  and  one-sided ; and  when 
we  ask  where  in  this  jumble  of  views  we  are  to  find  Locke,  it 
behooves  us  to  arrest  any  tendency  to  frame  a too  hasty  judg- 
ment concerning  the  matter,  and,  most  of  all,  at  the  outset,  to 
venture  the  assumption  that  Locke  did  not  know  his  own  mind.  It 
requires  no  great  discernment  to  perceive  that  Green  got  his  guid- 
ing thread,  not  from  Locke  himself,  but  from  the  traditional  view 
of  him.  But  Locke  remains  Locke,  work  the  veritable  gold  mine 
of  his  Essay  for  some  of  its  gold  only,  or  for  most  of  it,  or  merely 
for  its  dross. 

The  whole  matter  hinges  upon  the  role  of  the  simple  ideas. 
Are  they  at  bottom  to  be  taken  as  working  assumptions  or  as 
actual  facts  ? Here  Locke  in  the  growth  of  his  thoughts  decidedly 
vacillates,  although  tradition  has  obviously  failed  to  follow  him. 
“The  historical  plain  method,”  at  its  inception  as  well  as  in  its 
constant  application,  reflects  one  specific  problem : the  problem 
of  the  One  and  the  Many,  in  the  solution  of  which,  his  simple 
ideas  (namely,  his  sensationalism)  are  not  a problem  but  assumed 
facts.  When  he  inclines  to  consider  them  as  more  than  assump- 
tions, he,  with  confession,  ceases  to  be  the  metaphysician  and  turns 
psychologist,  and  then  the  simple  ideas  themselves  become  the 
problem.  Yet  he  writes  : “Every  mixed  mode,  consisting  of  many 
distinct  simple  ideas,  it  seems  reasonable  to  inquire,  ‘whence  it  has 
its  unity*  and  how  such  a precise  multitude  comes  to  make  but  one 


8 


University  of  Cincinnati  Studies 


idea,  since  that  combination  does  not  always  exist  together  in  na- 
ture?’ To  which  I answer,  it  is  plain  it  has  its  unity  from  an  act 
of  the  mind.”2  Whether  his  simple  ideas  are  in  fact  simple  or 
whether  complex,  the  problem  uppermost  with  him,  notwithstand- 
ing, will  persist : “how  such  a precise  multitude  comes  to  make 
but  one  idea.”  For,  as  he  would  say,  we  do  regard  charity  as 
one  idea,  however  multitudinous  its  parts,  and  so  with  our  notions 
of  man  or  gold.  They  have  no  unity  actually  existing  “in  nature 
then  “whence  do  they  have  their  unity?”  The  sensationalistic 
interpretation  of  Locke  would  imply  that  the  simple  ideas  rather 
than  the  complex  ideas  engrossed  his  interest.  I venture  the  op- 
posite contention. 

It  remains  to  add  that  the  present  study  had  its  initial  appear- 
ance under  the  title  of  “Locke  a Constructive  Relativist.”3  The 
original  study,  however,  has  been  subjected  to  a revision  so  general 
as  to  compel  a change  from  the  original  to  the  present  title. 
Chapters  II,  IV,  and  XI  may  be  read  for  the  more  exclusive 
treatment  of  relativity.  The  study  as  a whole,  however,  consti- 
tutes a unit. 

2.  Bk.  II,  ch.  22,  sec.  4. 

3.  Scientific  Press,  New  York,  1912.  It  appeared  as  “A  dissertation 
submitted  in  partial  fulfillment  of  the  requirements  for  the  Degree  of 
Doctor  of  Philosophy  in  the  Faculty  of  Philosophy,  Columbia  Uni- 
versity.” 


Relativity  and  Locke 


9 


I 

GENERAL  SURVEY 
CHAPTER  I 

THE  TWO  FUNDAMENTAL  STEPS  IN  LOCKE’S  PHILOSOPHY 

“It  is  past  doubt,”  says  Locke,  “that  men  have  in  their  minds 
several  ideas, — such  as  are  those  expressed  by  the  words  white- 
ness, hardness,  sweetness,  thinking,  motion,  man,  elephant,  army, 
drunkenness,  and  others : it  is  in  the  first  place  then  to  be  inquired, 
— How  he  comes  by  them  P”1  Locke’s  position  here  is  clear.  He 
takes  existing  distinctions  in  consciousness  as  the  starting-point 
in  his  attempted  “account  of  the  ways  whereby  our  understand- 
ings come  to  attain  these  notions  of  things  we  have.”2  This 
position  cannot  be  overemphasized.  He  accepts  the  reality  of 
thinking  and  the  reality  of  distinctions  within  thought,  and  his 
main  problem  is,  not  whether  such  distinctions  exist  apart  from 
thought,  nor  what  they  may  chance  to  be  apart  from  thought, 
but  how  such  distinctions,  as  commonly  recognized  in  our  exper- 
ience, come  about;  what  is  their  ground  or  basis?  And  it  is  my 
contention  that  this  problem,  although  given  its  most  specific  and 
most  evolved  solution  in  his  doctrine  of  sorts  in  Book  III,  receives 
no  less  profuse  elaboration  in  every  other  part  of  his  Essay. 

His  first  general  attempt  to  account  for  such  distinctions  con- 
sists in  his  well-knowrt  contention,  that  all  we  know  of  reality 
resolves  itself  into  ideas,  of  which  he  recognizes  two  sorts, — 
simple  ideas  and  complex  ideas.  Of  these,  simple  ideas  are  ulti- 
mate and  underived ; the  complex  ideas  a mere  aggregation  of  the 
simple  ideas.  Knowledge,  in  Locke’s  sense  of  the  word,  is  in 
no  way  involved  in  the  conscious  existence  of  simple  ideas,  al- 
though the  organism  is  involved  in  the  production  of  some  of  them 
(the  secondary  qualities) . Knowledge  begins  its  career  only  when 
the  simple  ideas  are  brought  into  union  or  connection  by  the 
mind,  and  terminates  in  such  products  as  (1)  Complex  Ideas, 

1.  Bk.  II,  ch.  1,  sec.  1. 

2.  Introduction,  sec  2. 


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University  of  Cincinnati  Studies 


(2)  Meaning,  (3)  Knowledge  proper,  and  (4)  Knowledge  as 
opinion  or  judgments  of  probability.  All  these  evolved  distinc- 
tions within  our  experience,  so  Locke  contends,  are,  notwith- 
standing, but  complications  or  modes  of  simple  ideas,  and  that 
they  approximate  reality  so  far  only  as  they  admit  of  a reduction 
to  their  source  of  origin  in  the  simple  ideas.  Hence  that  con- 
tention in  Locke,  that  complex  ideas  and  meaning,  considered 
apart  from  their  reduction  to  simple  ideas,  are  unreal,  and  that 
knowledge  in  general  is  unreal  and  irrelevant  except  where 
grounded  in  the  necessity  of  a “visible  and  necessary”  relation 
between  them ; that  is,  that  knowledge  remains  unreal  until,  as  a 
perceptive  meaning,  as  it  were,  it  resolves  itself  to  the  status  of 
a simple  irreducible  idea.  Here  the  principle  that  comes  to 
the  surface  is,  that  what  is  rational  is  real,  in  conformity  with 
which,  Locke  makes  the  a priori  modes  the  highest  and  most 
perfect  forms  of  reality.  But  the  simple  ideas,  as  just  indicated, 
were  also  made  the  supreme  forms  of  reality.  From  this  it 
would  follow  that  there  are  two  principles  of  truth  and  reality 
recognized  by  Locke,  and  not  one,  although  now  it  is  the  one  that 
gains  the  ascendancy  in  him,  and  then  the  other.  But  even  when 
we  ignore  this  dual  standard  and  confine  ourselves  to  the  empir- 
ical standard  only,  we  find  the  same  see-saw  manifested  in  his 
pages.  In  different  parts  of  his  Essay,  he  evaluates  complex 
ideas  and  meaning  very  differently  in  respect  to  simple  ideas,  by 
hypothesis,  considered  the  sole  ultimates.  We  find  that  complex 
ideas  and  meaning  get  themselves  viewed,  now  as  unreal,  then 
as  real, — as  real  and  as  ultimate  as  his  hypothetical  simple  ideas. 
And  when  we  ask  by  which  decision  Locke  in  truth  stands,  we 
can  answer  in  the  affirmative,  one  way  or  the  other,  only  by  em- 
phasizing his  statements  at  one  place  and  in  one  context,  and  by 
ignoring  what  he  as  explicitly  states  to  the  contrary  in  other  parts 
of  his  Essay.  He  who  does  not  take  these  various  contradictions 
of  Locke  into  full  consideration  and  hold  them  together,  may 
attain  to  a consistent  theory  or  view  of  him,  but  he  can  do  so 
only  by  a process  of  elimination  and  by  a substitution  of  a dialect, 
so  to  speak,  for  Locke’s  own  rich,  although  varied,  utterance. 
It  is  as  difficult  at  times  to  answer  whether  Locke  is  a rationalist 
as  it  is  to  answer  whether  Locke  is  an  empiricist;  just  as  upon 
the  empirical  basis,  as  just  indicated,  it  is  difficult  at  times  to 
answer  whether  Locke  regards  meaning  and  complex  ideas  as 


Relativity  and  Locke 


11 


ultimate  as  simple  ideas,  or  not.  What  are  we  to  make  of  this 
tangle  ? At  what  point  dogmatize  concerning  him  ? 

Locke’s  first  step,  as  just  stated,  “to  account  for  the  ways 
whereby  our  understandings  come  to  attain  those  notions  of  things 
we  have”  led  him  to  the  belief  that  simple  ideas  contained  the 
sole  ground  of  explanation.  He  rests  his  claim  upon  the  fact  that 
the  simple  ideas  are  essentially  non-relative.  To  admit  anything 
else  were  to  court  an  infinite  regress — such  seems  his  conviction. 
Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  he  admits  as  emphatically  (1)  that  they 
are  conditioned  in  their  shape  and  character  by  the  structure  of  our 
sense  organs;  (2)  that,  within  such  existing  structure,  variation 
in  range  and  acuteness  of  perception  is  the  law;  (3)  that  their 
perception  by  a direct  vision,  involving  a transcendence  of  the 
ordinary  mode  of  perception,  is  ideal;  (4)  that  they  involve  a 
latent  judgment;  (5)  that  they  reduce  to  mere  products  of  ex- 
ternally conditioning  factors  (relativity)  ; (6)  that  simple  modes, 
although  complex,  are  irreducible;  (7)  that  mixed  modes  are 
ultimate  and  have  their  real  essence  in  thought  (a  priori  rational- 
ism) ; (8)  that  complex  ideas  of  substances  are  ultimate  and  have 
their  reality  in  distinctions  as  final  in  character  as  our  distinction 
between  a horse  and  a stone.  And  thus  he  wrestles  with  his 
problem  to  and  fro!  Simple  ideas  are  ultimate — this  conclusion 
he  will  not  let  go,  and  yet  he  feels  himself  forced  to  admit : “that 
whatever  doth  or  can  exist,  or  be  considered  as  one  thing,  is 
positive ; and  so  not  only  simple  ideas  and  substances,  but  modes 
also,  are  positive  beings:  though  the  parts  of  which  they  consist 
are  very  often  relative  one  to  another ; but  the  whole  together, 
considered  as  one  thing,  and  producing  in  us  the  complex  idea 
of  one  thing,  which  idea  is  in  our  minds,  as  one  picture  though 
an  aggregate  of  divers  parts,  is  a positive  or  absolute  thing  or 
idea.”3  But  if  simple  ideas,  by  the  admissions  catalogued,  are 
conceded  to  be  complex  or  relative,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  com- 
plex ideas,  as  just  quoted,  “positive  or  absolute,”  what  becomes 
of  our  original  and  fundamental  distinction  between  simple  ideas 
and  our  complex  ideas?  The  next  quotation  will  aid  to  a solution 
of  the  matter  in  Locke’s  own  words.  “It  is  not,  therefore,  unity 
of  substance,”  writes  Locke  in  his  chapter  on  Identity  and  Diver- 
sity, “that  comprehends  all  sort  of  identity,  or  will  determine  it 
in  every  case.  . . . Thus  in  the  case  of  living  creatures,  their 

3.  Bk.  II,  ch.  25,  sec.  6. 


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identity  depends,  not  on  a mass  of  particles,  but  on  something 
else.”4  But  what  is  this  “something  else,”  capable  of  conferring 
a unity  where  there  is  a diversity?  Our  answer  to  this  question 
conducts  us  into  the  second  fundamental  step  in  Locke’s  phil- 
osophy, and  it  consists  in  locating  the  principle  of  unity  in  the 
subject  and  no  longer  in  any  external  object.  In  Book  IV  this 
principle  is  located  in  “Reason” ; in  Book  III  it  is  located  in  what 
he  terms  an  abstract  idea  or  definition ; in  Book  II  in  what  he 
terms  “ideas  of  relation” ; and,  lastly,  throughout  his  Essay,  in 
what  he  frequently  terms  “our  happiness  or  misery,  beyond  which 
we  have  no  concernment,  either  of  knowing  or  being.”5  Even 
our  simple  ideas  do  not  escape  this  general  transfer  in  their  unity, 
and,  in  their  case,  the  unity  is  found  dependent  upon  Jhe  particular 
character  and  structure  of  our  sense  organs,  or  upon  a single  pic- 
ture or  conception  in  the  mind.  The  outcome  of  the  doctrine, 
taken  in  its  full  setting,  is  what  I term  constructive  relativity. 

His  treatment  of  this  general  subject  is  critical  and  destructive, 
as  well  as  positive  and  constructive.  A general  outline  of  his 
inquiry,  with  a suggestion  of  the  final  conclusion  to  be  reached, 
will  amply  suffice  for  a passing  orientation  in  this  second  and 
more  fundamental  step  in  Locke’s  philosophy. 

Our  simple  ideas  given,  why  not  rest  content  with  them  ? Why 
seek  to  combine  them?  And  when  we  thus  set  about  to  unite 
them,  what  constitutes  our  motive  or  motives,  and  what  our 
“patterns”  ? Grant,  if  you  will,  that  a certain  aim  is  compassed 
in  reducing  complex  ideas  to  simple  ideas,  whether  that  aim  be 
pragmatic  (a  test  of  their  truth  or  reality)  or  epistemological 
(a  determination  of  the  varied  elements  involved  in  a possible  bit 
of  knowledge,  or  in  knowledge  as  a whole),  and  yet  it  is  evident 
that  no  adequate  “account  of  the  ways  whereby  our  understand- 
ings come  to  attain  those  notions  of  things  we  have”  could  end 
with  the  fact  that  our  particular  notions  involve  a purely  general 
truth  or  reality ; it  is  well-nigh  tantamount  to  saying  that  they 
have  no  truth  or  reality  at  all.  The  emphasis  with  Locke  through- 
out is  placed,  not  upon  the  universal,  but  upon  the  particulars. 
Hence  his  real  problem : simple  ideas  given,  why  do  we  combine 
them  at  all,  and  such  and  such  qualities  with  this  object  and  others 
with  other  objects?  We  may  seek  the  solution  in  the  answer  that 
different  objects  are  inherently  of  a different  constitution  or 

4.  Ibid.,  sec.  7. 

5.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  11,  sec.  8. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


13 


essence.  But  this  answer  merely  begs  the  question  at  issue.  We 
answer  our  question  by  off-hand  asserting  a principle  of  differen- 
tiation not  discoverable  within  our  experience. 

Now  Locke  vigorously  denies  the  validity  thus  to  explain  our 
why.  Thus  he  writes : “Our  faculties  carry  us  no  further  toward 
the  knowledge  and  distinction  of  substances,  than  a collection  of 
those  sensible  ideas  which  we  observe  in  them.  ...  A blind 
man  may  as  soon  sort  things  by  their  colof,  and  he  that  has  lost 
his  smell  as  well  distinguish  a lily  and  a rose  by  their  odor,  as 
by  those  internal  constitutions  which  he  knows  not.’’6  Locke 
returns  to  this  contention  with  a wearisome  prolixity,  now  domin- 
ated by  the  rationalistic,  then  by  the  sensationalistic,  the  nominal- 
istic, the  dualistic,  or  the  relativistic  point  of  view,  but  he  is 
rarely  at  variance  with  the  conclusion  that  we  never  know  an 
object’s  real  essence  but  its  nominal 7 essence  only;  and  he  con- 
stantly questions  the  legitimacy  even  to  assume  the  existence  of  a 
real  essence, — “that  inherent  constitution  which  everything  has 
within  itself,  without  any  relation  to  anything  without  it.’’8 

Thus  reduced  to  our  simple  ideas,  we  may  ask  whether  they 
have  any  natural  and  visible  “connections  and  dependencies,” 
whereby  guidance  is  yielded  in  the  proper  formation  of  our  par- 
ticular complex  ideas?  And  here  Locke’s  answer,  in  general 
theory,  is  again  consistently  negative.9  Hence  Locke’s  conclusion, 
that  our  complex  ideas,  of  which  there  are,  according  to  him,  three 
distinct  sorts, — modes,  substances,  and  relations, — “are  of  man’s, 
and  not  of  nature’s  making.”  In  regard  to  mixed  modes,  his  gen- 
eral contention  is,  “that  they  are  not  only  made  by  the  mind,  but 
made  very  arbitrarily,  made  without  patterns  or  reference  to  any 
real  existence.  Wherein  they  differ  from  those  of  substances, 
which  carry  with  them  the  suggestion  of  some  real  being,  from 
which  they  are  taken,  and  to  which  they  are  conformable.”10 

I have  now  sufficiently  outlined,  in  general  theory,  the  second 
step  in  Locke’s  philosophy.  But  this  second  step,  so  easily  over- 

6.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  6,  sec.  9. 

7.  Although  the  terms  real  and  nominal  undergo  some  change  in 
their  meaning,  all  of  which  shall  be  touched  upon  in  detail  later,  the  dis- 
tinction in  Locke  is  vital  to  modern  thought  and  is  no  mere  echo  or 
vestige  of  mediaeval  thought  so  frequently  fancied.  There  is  a sense  in 
which  Locke  no  less  than  Kant  produced  a critique  of  historical  thought, 
and  the  most  profitable  entrance  to  this  complete  study  of  Locke  is  this, 
very  distinction  of  his  between  the  real  and  the  nominal  essences. 

8.  Bk : III,  ch.  6,  sec.  6. 

9.  See  Bk.  IV,  ch.  3,  secs.  28-29. 

10.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  5,  sec.  3. 


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looked  as  a second  step,  and  so  commonly  regarded  as  a subordi- 
nate phase  only  of  the  first  step  in  his  argument,  instead  of  the 
reverse,  calls  for  a few  additional  considerations  at  this  point. 

The  problem  which  particularly  concerns  Locke  after  he  has 
once  settled  the  claim  that  it  is  the  nominal  and  not  the  real  essence 
“which  determines  the  sorts  of  things,”  may  be  made  to  take  the 
following  form : what  constitutes  the  “measure  and  boundary”  of 
each  particular  thing,  whereby  it  is  made  that  particular  thing,  and 
distinguished  from  others?  And  his  answer  is:  an  object’s 
measure  and  boundary  is  the  “workmanship  of  the  mind,”  opera- 
tive within  the  nominal  essence,  and  a matter  of  definition  or  ab- 
stract idea ; that  is,  a construct.  This  answer,  as  elaborated  in 
Locke,  suffers  in  cogency,  only  where  he  persists  in  his  exagger- 
ated theoretical  claim,  that  “there  is  no  individual  parcel  of  matter 
to  which  any  of  its  qualities  are  so  annexed  as  to  be  essential  to 
it  or  inseparable  from  it,”11  and  rendered  with  the  meaning,  that 
every  particular  parcel  of  matter  reduces  to  pure  flux  as  it  were ; 
that  is,  reduces  to  a degree  of  variability  or  instability  never  ex- 
perienced save  in  a theory  which  ignores  varying  degrees  of 
instability  and  varying  degrees  of  stability,  as  commonly  experi- 
enced. It  is  only  when  thus  rendered  that  it  is  necessary  for  him 
to  find  the  sole  principle  of  stability  or  permanence  in  a realm  other 
than  that  of  matter-of-fact.  But  it  is  in  this  version  only  that  his 
notion  of  the  definition  or  abstract  idea  as  constituting  the 
“essence”  of  a thing,  namely,  its  measure  and  boundary,  chimes  in 
with  his  generally  assumed  dualism,  or  absolute  divorce,  between 
“fact”  and  “meaning,”  in  the  varied  forms  this  divorce  assumes  in 
his  Essay.  Thus  formulated,  Locke’s  doctrine  would  be  indeed  a 
doctrine  of  (a  rationalistic  type  of)  relativity  of  a most  extreme 
and  exaggerated  sort ; but  it  would  be  a type  of  relativity  where 
everything  was  attributed  to  the  function  of  thought,  only  to  be 
dashed  to  naught  by  one  fell  stroke : “nothing  exists  but  particu- 
lars — which  doctrine,  when  pushed  to  extremes,  as  Locke’s 
writings  only  too  frequently  favor,  practically  means,  that  all 
knowledge  is  irrelevant.  “Nothing  exists  but  particulars  !”  But  if 
“particulars,”  as  indicated,  are  so  elastic  in  content  as  to  imply 
any  content  from  a mere  blank  to  the  universe,  how  again  avoid  an 
interminable  see-saw?  Above  the  level  of  a mere  zero,  the  “par- 
ticular” would  thus  again  openly  negate  knowledge,  only  itself 
tacitly  to  usurp  it. 

11.  Ibid.,  ch  6,  sec.  6. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


15 


In  holding  then,  as  Locke  does,  that  “each  distinct  idea  is  a 
distinct  essence,”  nothing  more  is  implied  by  him  than  that  such 
determination  or  boundary  of  a thing,  as  of  this  or  that  kind,  is 
given  in  an  abstract  idea  or  definition,  which,  although  in  one 
sense  less  complete  than  reality,  in  another  sense,  exceeds  it. 
It  is  incomplete  or  inadequate  in  respect  to  the  sum  total  of  its 
potential  qualities ; but  in  respect  to  its  momentary  existences, 
all  alike  partial  and  variable,  it  is  in  excess  of  any  such  single 
instance  of  its  actual  existence.  For,  at  any  moment,  any  given 
object  may  possess  almost  any  quality  and  lose  almost  any  of  its 
qualities  the  next.  There  is  a need  of  unity  in  the  midst  of 
diversity.  Hence  his  conception  of  an  object  is  that  of  a con- 
struct, which  involves  a description  of  an  object  in  Locke  truly 
marvelous,  not  only  because  it  emerges  out  of  a sea  of  contradic- 
tions and  prepossessions,  but,  because  in  the  form  it  finally  as- 
sumes, it  stands  unsurpassed.  The  question  is  not  whether  we 
have  gotten  beyond  Locke ; rather  is  it  the  question  whether  we 
have  caught  up  to  him.  Back  to  Book  III,  is  the  plea  I would 
urge  for  a proper  understanding  of  the  other  Books. 

CHAPTER  II 

RELATIVITY  DEFINED  AND  LOCKERS  POSITION  INDICATED  IN  RESPECT 
TO  ITS  VARIOUS  FORMULATIONS 

Historic  thought  has  given  specific  formulation  and  currency 
to  several  forms  of  relativity.  In  its  most  general  form,  the 
principle  properly  denotes  the  theory  that  every  object  determines, 
and  is  determined  by,  every  other  object,1  and,  thus  considered, 
commonly  supports  the  claim  that  any  object,  at  any  point  of  its 
history,  is  capable  of  a still  larger  growth  or  of  a reduction 
by  a mere  mathematical  increase  or  decrease  of  its  relations  with 
other  objects.  Conceived  in  this  form,  I designate  the  principle 
radical  relativity.  This  formulation  of  it  is  the  one  that  is  most 
commonly  encountered,  and  it  has  its  usual  and  explicit  statement 
in  Locke.  His  more  peculiar  and  frequent  expression  of  it, 
however,  is  the  following:  “Substances  when  truly  considered  are 
powers,  and  hence  nothing  else  than  so  many  relations  to  other 
substances.”2 

' Radical  relativity  is  no  doubt  sound  enough  in  abstract  theory. 

1.  See  Baldwin’s  Dictionary;  Article  on  Relativity. 

2.  Bk.  II,  ch.  24,  sec.  37. 


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Its  emphasis  is  upon  mutual  dependence  among  objects, — the 
postulate  of  all  scientific  inquiry.  But  to  talk  of  an  object’s  depen- 
dence in  general  and  to  talk  of  a particular  object’s  dependence 
upon  other  particular  objects  in  a given  situation,  are  very  dif- 
ferent things.  When  discoursing  upon  this  matter  of  mutual  de- 
pendence in  the  abstract,  the  dependence  of  one  object  upon  an- 
other admits  of  no  partiality ; they  are  all  thought  to  be  equally 
interdependent  and  they  are  all  thought  to  be  completely  inter- 
dependent; whereby  their  independence,  if  thought  to  have  any, 
vanishes  like  mist  in  the  morning  air,  the  more  this  central 
tenet  of  an  impartial  mutual  dependence  is  emphasized.3  But 
objects  as  we  learn  from  experience  on  all  sides  are  not 
equally  dependent  upon  each  other  in  any  given  situation ; they 
do  not  as  a general  rule  in  specific  situations  entail  a perfect 
equivalence  of  give-and-take;  and  as  knowledge  begins  with  the 
given,  it  is  incumbent  upon  a scientific  spirit  to  hold  strictly  to  the 
facts  as  thus  revealed.  The  dependence  of  a given  object  in  a 
given  situation  may  be  large,  yet  the  dependence  of  the  other  ob- 
jects upon  it  or  upon  each  other  in  that  particular  situation  may 
be  zero.  The  unaffected  objects  are  accordingly  more  properly 
designated  as  independent.  But  an  independence  properly  main- 
tained for  an  object  in  certain  situations  may  in  other  situations 
convert  itself  into  a dependence,  as  our  scientific  postulate  of 
general  dependence  would  naturally  dispose  us  to  expect.  In  so  far, 
then,  as  we  remain  strictly  empirical,  and,  further,  strictly  adhere 
to  our  confessed  postulate,  the  following  form  of  relativity  seems 
the  more  permissible  one:  objects  reveal  themselves  differently  in 
different  situations  and,  in  different  situations,  are  capable  of 
revealing  qualities  often  absolutely  incompatible  with  each  other. 
Relativity  thus  conceived,  I term  empirical.  Locke’s  common  ex- 
pression of  it  takes  on  the  following  form : “The  changes  which 
one  ‘body’  is  apt  to  receive  from  or  produce  in  other  ‘bodies,’ 
upon  a due  application,  exceeds  far,  not  only  what  we  know,  but 
what  we  are  apt  to  imagine.”4 

3.  And  the  burden  of  proof  does  not  rest  upon  him  who  denies  a 
fundamental  unity  to  the  Universe,  but  upon  him  who  affirms  this  fact. 

4.  I hasten  to  say  that  by  insisting  upon  the  distinction  between  the 
abstract  and  the  empirical  basis  of  the  relativistic  principle,  I feel  I fully 
meet  the  objection  commonly  directed  against  it;  namely,  that  objects, 
according  to  it,  resolve  themselves  into  a sheer  netvvork  of  empty  re- 
lations. In  addition  to  what  has  already  been  stated,  it  need  only  be  said 
that  relations,  or,  to  be  more  specific,  particulars,  are  as  effective  in  re- 
inforcing each  other  and  in  preserving  each  other  intact,  as  they  are  in 
building  each  other  up  or  in  destroying  each  other;  and  in  still  other  cases 


Relativity  and  Locke 


17 


These  considerations  conduct  us  to  the  third  form  which  I am 
inclined  to  affirm  the  principle  in  question  assumes.  I term  it 
constructive  relativity.  Let  me  explain.  If  a given  object  reveals 
itself  differently-m~d liferent  situations  and  in  different  situations  is 
capable  of  revealing  qualities  often  absolutely  incompatible  with 
each  other,  then  the  conclusion  follows,  as  in  opposition  to  the  con- 
clusion reached  by  radical  relativity,  that  no  single  situation  of 
actual  existence  can  reveal  or  exhaust  an  object’s  total  actuality, 
that  is,  all  its  possible  phases  or  qualities.  It  is  in  its  very  nature 
a multiplicity,  viewed  spatially  or  temporally.  Such  unity  as 
may  be  ascribed  to  it,  Locke  assigns  to  the  function  of  the  so- 
called  abstract  idea.  The  object  that  results  is  a synthesis  and 
is  accordingly  viewed  in  the  light  of  a construct  and  not  a copy,  “of 
man’s  and  not  of  nature’s  making,”  as  we,  in  due  place,  shall  find 
him  propounding  with  great  vigor.  He  writes  in  general  to  the 
following  effect : “It  is  not  unity  of  substances  that  comprehends 
all  soi'ts  of  identity,  or  will  determine  it  in  every  case ; but  to  con- 
ceive and  judge  of  it  aright  ....  whatever  does  or  can  exist, 
or  be  considered  as  one  thing  is  positive,  and  so  not  only  simple 
ideas  and  substances,  but  modes  also  are  positive  beings : though  the 
parts  of  which  they  consist  are  often  relative  one  to  another 
. . . . it  sufficing  to  the  unity  of  every  idea  that  it  be  consider- 

ed as  one  representation  or  picture,  though  made  up  of  ever  so 
many  particulars.”5  The  statement  involves  the  contention  already 
enunciated  that  things,  however  partial  or  variable  in  their  matter- 
of-fact  existenc? of  this  or  that  moment,  are  determined  in  their 
character  of  this  or  that  sort  or  whole  by  the  idea ; namely,  that 
“men  determine  sorts,”6  specific  things,  which,  in  accord  with 
his  declared  relativity,  he  denies  as  existing  “in  nature  with  any 
prefixed  bounds.”7 

disdain,  as  it  were,  to  enter  into  any  effective  relations  with  each  other 
at  all.  For  illustration,  turn  to  Chemistry  with  its  combining  laws  of 
substances,  or  to  the  principle  of  elimination  as  involved  in  the  methods 
governing  inductive  inferences.  Hence  a relative  independence  among 
objects  is  no  less  involved  and  presupposed  in  the  operation  of  the 
principle  than  a relative  dependence.  In  fact,  properly  grasped,  the 
principle  of  relativity  is  no  other  than  the  fundamental  principle  of  all 
science ; namely,  that  given  conditions  produce  a given  result.  Hence, 
let  the  results  or  the  conditions  be  defined  as  you  will,  the  dependence  and 
correlation,  namely,  the  connection  between  the  factors  involved  could 
never  be  affirmed,  if  disconnection  were  not  a fact  equally  obvious  and 
ultimate  in  any  given  situation.  For  further  discussion  of  this  matter, 
see  pp.  29-32. 

5.  Bk.  II,  ch.  25,  sec.  6;  ch.  24,  sec.  1. 

6. -  Bk.  III.  ch.  6,  sec.  35. 

7.  Ibid.,  sec.  29. 


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For  the  sake  of  completeness,  I mention  several  additional 
forms  of  the  relativistic  principle.8  Thus  Protagoras  is  made  the 
exponent  of  one  such  specific  formulation.  The  doctrine  that 
all  knowledge  is  merely  phenomenal,  yields  another  specific 
formulation.  The  former  is  based,  in  the  main,  upon  a declared 
diversity  in  our  perceptions  of  a given  object;  the  latter,  upon  the 
claim  that  an  object  (to  quote  Mill)  “is  known  to  us  only  in  one 
special  relation ; namely,  as  that  which  produces,  or  is  capable  of 
producing,  certain  impressions  on  our  senses ; and  all  that  we 
really  know  is  these  impressions.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  the 
Relativity  of  Knowledge  to  the  knowing  mind,  in  the  simplest, 
purest,  and,  as  I think,  the  most  proper  acceptation  of  the  word.” 
(See  Thomson’s  Dictionary;  Art.,  Relativity.) 

To  complete  this  survey,9  another  specific  formulation  of 
relativity,  the  Kantian,  requires  mentioning.  Spencer  gives  the  fol- 
lowing graphic  description  of  it : “Every  thought,”  he  says,  “in- 
volves a whole  system  of  thoughts;  and  ceases  to  exist  if  severed 
from  its  various  correlatives.  As  we  cannot  isolate  a single  organ  of 
a living  body,  and  deal  with  it  as  if  it  had  a life  independent 
of  the  rest;  so,  from  the  organized  structure  of  our  cognitions, 
we  cannot  cut  one  out  and  proceed  as  though  it  had  survived  the 

separation A developed  intelligence  can  arise  only 

by  a process  which,  in  making  thoughts  defined,  also  makes  them 
mutually  dependent — establishes  among  them  certain  vital  con- 
nections, the  destruction  of  which  causes  instant  death  of  the 
thoughts.”  (First  Prin.  sec.  39.) 

With  these  formulations  of  relativity  as  covering  the  ground, 
T resume  the  study  of  Locke.  He  finds,  as  I claim,  that  reality 
in  the  last  analysis  is  determined  in  ideas,  formed  under  the 
control  of  ends  or  purposes  within  a world  of  relatively  deter- 
mined needs  (“beyond  which  we  have  no  concernment  either  to 
know  or  be”)  and  of  relatively  “unalterable  organs,”  and  where 
certain  fixed,  regular,  and  constant  co-existences  among  ideas 
(objects  or  events)  are  accepted  by  him  as  a fact.  This  is  at 
once  relativistic,  positivistic,  pragmatic,  and  constructive. 

8.  Properly  interpreted,  however,  the  formulations  offered  above 
should  make  provision  for  every  other  form  of  it  that  seems  valid.  This 
is  not  the  place,  however,  for  entering  upon  any  such  discussion. 

9.  I do  not  mention  the  flux-doctrine  as  another  form  of  the  rela- 
tivistic principle.  It  represents  its  crudest  formulation.  How  vividly 
this  form  of  it,  however,  was  present  in  Locke’s  mind  could  be  demon- 
strated by  adducing  many  a passage  from  the  Essay. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


19 


II 

RELATIVISTIC  MOTIVES  IN  LOCKE 
CHAPTER  III 

THE  SIMPLE  IDEAS:  WHAT  ARE  THEY? 

The  simple  ideas  play  a somewhat  variable  role  in  Locke’s 
philosophy  and  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  trace  it,  and  to 
define  them  as  nearly  as  possible. 

“One  thing,”  says  Locke,  “is  carefully  to  be  observed  concern- 
ing the  ideas  we  have ; and  that  is,  that  some  of  them  are  simple 
and  some  complex.”1  They  distinguish  themselves  in  the  fact  that 
complex  ideas  consist  in  the  unity  or  supposed  unity  of  distin- 
guishable parts,  whereas  simple  ideas,  “being  each  in  itself  un- 
compounded, contain  nothing  but  one  uniform  appearance  or  con- 
ception in  the  mind,  and  are  not  distinguishable  into  different 
ideas.”2  By  this  criterion,  simple  ideas  are  (a)  uncompounded, 
(b)  contain  but  one  uniform  appearance,  and  ( c ) are  but  one 
conception  in  the  mind.  We  shall  presently  learn  that  Locke 
regards  them  as  products ; hence  compounded.  I turn  to  the 
remaining  differentiae  indicated. 

They  constitute  but  one  uniform  appearance.  Let  us  consider 
this  mark. 

Their  uniform  appearance,  we  find,  is  one  that  is  relative: 
“blood  that  is  red  to  the  naked  eye  is  not  so  under  the  micro- 
scope.”3 Furthermore,  we  find  that  the  simple  modes,  although 
in  themselves  complex  ideas,  are  also  declared  to  have  a uni- 
formity or  likeness  in  their  parts:  space  and  time  “are  justly 
reckoned  among  our  simple  ideas,  yet  none  of  the  distinct  ideas 
we  have  of  either  is  without  composition ; it  is  the  very  nature 
of  both  of  them  to  consist  of  parts ; but  their  parts  being  all  of 
the  same  kind  . . hinder  them  not  from  having  a place 

amongst  simple  ideas.”4  Thus  in  the  one  case  we  find  “the  one 

1.  Bk.  II,  ch.  2,  sec.  1. 

2.  Ibid. 

3.  Ibid.,  ch.  23,  secs.  11-12. 

4.  Ibid.,  ch.  15,  sec.  9. 


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uniform  appearance”  a conditioned  affair;  in  the  latter  case,  they 
are  seen  to  share  this  “uniform  appearance”  in  common  with 
simple  modes.  Hence,  no  differentia. 

The  third  mark,  that  of  “one  conception”  in  the  mind,  also 
fails  to  be  a differentia,  as  simple  ideas  are  herein  found  undis- 
tinguished from  complex  ideas  as  a whole.  There  is  no  need  to 
quote  him  at  length.  The  discrepancy  from  this  standpoint  is 
writ  too  large  in  any  part  of  the  treatise  to  which  we  may  turn. 
One  citation  therefore  will  be  made  to  suffice.  “Besides  these 
complex  ideas  of  several  single  substances,  as  of  man,  horse, 
gold,  violet,  apple,  etc.,  the  mind  hath  also  complex  collective 
ideas  of  substances ; which  I so  call,  because  such  ideas  are  made 
up  of  many  particular  substances  considered  together,  as  united 
into  one  idea,  and  which,  so  joined,  are  looked  on  as  one;  v.  g., 
the  idea  of  such  a collection  of  men  as  made  an  army  .... 
is  as  much  one  idea  as  the  idea  of  a man : and  the  great  collective 
idea  of  bodies  whatever,  signified  by  the  name  world,  is  as  much 
one  idea  as  the  idea  of  any  the  least  particle  of  matter  in  it ; it 
sufficing  to  the  unity  of  any  idea,  that  it  be  considered  as  one 
representation  or  picture,  though  made  up  of  ever  so  many  par- 
ticulars.”5 That  is,  between  an  imaginary  point  and  the  universe, 
unity  may  be  appropriated  by  anything;  either  by  the  complex 
simple  idea  or  by  the  simple  complex  one. 

He  next  distinguishes  between  them  in  the  fact,  that  in  the 
origin  of  simple  ideas  the  mind  is  passive,  and  that  “it  cannot 
invent  or  frame  one  new  simple  idea”  nor  refuse  to  have,  alter 
or  blot  out  one  of  them  when  offered  to  the  mind ; whereas  in 
the  case  of  complex  ideas  the  mind  has  the  power  to  repeat,  com- 
pare, and  unite  them  to  an  infinite  variety.6  From  this  follows 
his  conclusion  “that  simple  ideas  are  the  material  of  all  our 
knowledge,”7  and  that  we  have  “no  complex  idea  not  made  out 
of  those  simple  ones.”  A total  dependence  upon  reality  for  our 
simple  ideas,  and  a complete  independence  of  reality  in  regard  to 
complex  ideas,  is  the  distinction  which  discloses  itself  here.  The 
mind,  in  its  complex  ideas,  would  appear  totally  dependent  upon 
the  simple  ideas,  but,  other  than  that,  the  impression  conveyed  is 
that  complex  ideas  neither  require  nor  disclose  any  further  de- 
pendence upon  a reality  and  general  constitution  of  things.  And 

5.  Ibid.,  ch.  24,  sec.  1. 

6.  Ibid.,  ch.  2,  sec.  2. 

7.  Ibid.,  ch.  7.  sec.  4. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


21 


yet  Locke’s  distinction  between  complex  ideas  of  modes  and  sub- 
stances is  grounded  just  in  this  particular  fact,  that  modes,  within 
simple  ideas,  are  more  or  less  purely  of  the  mind’s  invention, 
whereas  substances  are  declared  to  be  dependent,  not  only 
upon  the  simple  ideas,  but  upon  “the  supposition  of  -some  real 
being,  from  which  they  are  taken,  and  to  which  they  are  con- 
formable.”8 The  affirmed  distinction  then  between  complex  ideas 
and  simple  ideas  cannot  be  based  upon  the  fact  that,  in  the  origin 
of  simple  ideas,  the  mind  is  wholly  dependent  and  passive,  and 
the  opposite  in  respect  to  complex  ideas ; for,  as  indicated,  sub- 
stances are  dependent  beyond  simple  ideas  in  a way  that  modes 
are  not.  As  to  Locke’s  motive  in  thus  ascribing  a dependence 
of  the  mind  upon  reality,  the  copy-view  theory  asserts  itself, 
wherein  he  affirms,  that,  in  the  case  of  simple  ideas,  as  is  evident, 
the  mind,  not  unlike  “a  mirror,  cannot  refuse,  alter,  or  obliterate 
the  images  or  ideas  which  the  objects  before  it  do  therein  pro- 
duce.”9 This  copy-view  of  his,  however,  even  when  thus  falsely 
restricted  within  his  theory  to  simple  ideas,  encounters  several 
set-backs  in  his  pages.  The  first  is  that  our  senses  may  not~^ 
be  proportionate  to  or  commensurate  with  the  demands,  variety, 
and  richness  of  reality.  To  this  effect,  I quote  the  following:  “I 
think  it  is  not  possible  for  any  one  to  imagine  any  other  qualities 
in  bodies,  however  constituted,  whereby  they  can  be  taken  notice 
of,  besides  sounds,  taste,  smells,  visible  and  tangible  qualities 
. . . . But  how  much  these  few  and  narrow  inlets  are  dis- 

proportionate to  the  vast  whole  extent  of  all  beings  will  not  be 
hard  to  persuade  those  who  are  not  so  foolish  as  to  think  their 
span  the  measure  of  all  things.  What  other  simple  ideas  it  is 
possible  the  creatures  in  other  parts  of  the  universe  may  have,  ' 
by  the  assistance  of  senses  and  faculties  more  (in  number)  or 
more  perfect  than  we  have,  or  different  from  ours,  it  is  not  for 
us  to  determine  ....  and  a great  presumption  to  deny.”10 

The  second  set-back  is  experienced  when  he  comes  to  dis- 
tinguish between  primary  qualities  as  alone  copies  and  secondary 
qualities  as  effects : “There  is  nothing  like  our  ideas  existing  in 
the  bodies  themselves  ....  and  what  is  sweet,  blue  or  warm 
in  idea,  is  but  the  certain  bulk,  figure  and  motion  of  the  insensible 

8.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  5,  sec.  3. 

9.  Bk.  II,  ch.  1,  sec.  25. 

10.  Ibid.,  ch.  2,  sec.  3,  and  Bk.  IV,  ch.  3,  sec.  22. 


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parts  in  the  bodies  themselves.”11  Hence  he  regards  it  as  possible 
to  have  “positive  ideas  even  from  privative  causes.”12  Thus  the 
ideas  of  “heat  and  cold,  light  and  darkness,  white  and  black,  mo- 
tion and  rest  are  equally  clear  and  positive  ideas  in  the  mind ; 
though,  perhaps,  some  of  the  causes  which  produce  them  are 
barely  privations  in  the  subjects  (objects)  from  whence  our  senses 
derive  these  ideas.”13 

The  original  position  becomes  still  further  confused  when, 
as  just  set  forth  (p.  21),  the  simple  ideas,  viewed  as  effects, 
are  found  to  be  conditioned  by  the  particular  character  and  struc- 
ture of  the  sense-organs,  no  less  so  and  to  no  less  extent,  than  as 
conditioned  by  the  structure  of  the  “insensible  parts”  of  an  object. 
"Had  we  senses  acute  enough  to  discern  the  minute  particles  of 
bodies,  and  the  real  constitution  in  which  their  sensible  qualities 
depend,  I doubt  not  but  they  would  produce  quite  different  ideas 
in  us : and  that  which  is  now  the  yellow  color  of  gold  would  then 
disappear,  and  instead  of  it  we  should  see  an  admirable  texture  of 

parts This  microscopes  plainly  discover  to  us ; for 

what  to  our  naked  eyes  produce  a certain  color,  is,  by  augmenting 
the  acuteness  of  our  senses,  discovered  to  be  quite  a different 
thing.”14  Thus  simple  ideas,  instead  of  being  simple,  underived, 
unconditioned,  are  found  to  be  complex,  derived  and  conditioned ; 
and,  instead  of  being  copies  of  objects,  are  effects ; and,  instead  of 
effects  produced  solely  by  the  “insensible  part”  of  bodies,  they  are 
effects  equally  conditioned  in  their  character  by  the  particular 
character  and  structure  of  the  sensible  organism ; and,  in  the  case 
of  positive  ideas  resulting  from  privative  causes,  almost  ex- 
clusively conditioned,  according  to  Locke’s  statements,  by  the 
sensible  organism.  Here,  then,  we  have  the  principle  of  relativity 
wholly  installed  within  the  sacred  precincts  of  even  the  simple 
ideas.  In  these  changes  registered  in  Locke’s  view  of  them,  they 
become  increasingly  regarded  as  working  assumptions  and  less 
and  less  as  established  facts  ; and,  as  is  equally  apparent,  the  need 
of  psychology  grows  less  relevant  to  his  arguments.  Simple  ideas 
thus  come  more  and  more  to  fill  the  place  of  the  necessary  ‘term’ 
in  the  term-relation  motive,  to  be  indicated  in  subsequent  chapters, 
as  well  as  the  ‘part’  in  the  part-whole  relation.  They  preserve  a 

11.  Bk.  II,  ch.  8,  sec.  15. 

12.  Ibid.,  sec.  1-6. 

13.  Ibid.,  sec.  2. 

14.  Ibid.,  ch.  23,  secs.  11-12. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


23 


uniqueness,  but  it  is  a uniqueness  in  kind,  and  not  one  of  simplicity 
or  unity.  The  simple  modes,  as  we  perceived,  are  no  less  simple 
ideas  of  a kind;  just  as  pleasure  and  pain,  succession,  change, 
co-existence,  etc.,  are  others  as  ultimate  and  as  unique  in  their 
kind.  Future  chapters  will  show  how  consistently  this  motive 
works  out  in  his  pages. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  TERM-RELATION  MOTIVE 

“This  is  certain,”  writes  Locke,  “things  however  absolute  and 
entire  they  may  seem  in  themselves  are  but  retainers  to  other 
parts  of  nature,  for  that  which  they  are  most  taken  notice  of  by 
us;  ...  . and  there  is  not  so  complete  and  perfect  a part 

that  we  know  of  nature  which  does  not  owe  the  being  it  has,  and 
the  excellencies  of  it,  to  its  neighbors ; and  we  must  not  confine 
our  thoughts  within  the  surface  of  any  body,  but  look  a great 
deal  further,  to  comprehend  perfectly  those  qualities  that  are 
in  it.”1  Here,  as  in  like  passages  with  which  the  Essay  abounds, 
the  dependence  of  terms  upon  relations  is  absolute  and  complete. 
But  then  in  Locke  it  is  only  necessary  to  turn  a page  if  we  wish 
to  read  some  fiat  contradiction  of  what  may  chance  to  be  said  on 
a preceding  page.  Turning  to  such  pages  we  read  something  very 
dififerent  concerning  terms  and  relations:  “The  immediate  object 
of  all  our  reasoning  and  knowledge  is  nothing  but  particulars. 

Universality  is  but  accidental  to  it.2  .... 
When  therefore  we  quit  particulars,  the  universals  that  rest  are 
only  creatures  of  our  own  making;  their  general  nature  being 
nothing  but  the  capacity  they  are  put  into  by  the  understanding 
of  signifying  or  representing  particulars.”3  By  particulars,  Locke 
seems  to  imply  “anything  as  existing  in  any  determined  time 
and  place,”4  and  by  universals  he  denotes  meaning  or  any  other 
thought  product.  That  is,  particulars  now  are  the  primary  things  ; 
and  relations  and  what  results  therefrom,  accidental  and  extrane- 
ous.5 In  the  one  case,  relations  are  without  reservation  affirmed 

1.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  6,  sec  11. 

2.  Ihid.,  ch.  17,  sec.  8. 

3.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  3,  sec.  11. 

4.  Bk.  II,  ch.  27,  sec.  1. 

5.  Bk.  II,  Chapters  on  ideas  of  relations. 


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to  be  internal ; here,  with  an  equal  lack  of  reserve  they  are  af- 
firmed to  be  wholly  external.  Let  us  follow  him  step  by  step  to 
note  which  line  of  thought  in  this  contradiction  becomes  tri- 
umphant. I know  no  viewpoint  from  which  a study  of  Locke  is 
more  worth  while  or  fascinating. 

Locke’s  original  conception  of  particulars  is  the  plain  onto- 
logical one  of  ready-made,  independent  objects,  each  with  its  own 
“prefixed  bounds.”  But  particulars,  thus  conceived,  run  counter 
to  his  doctrine  of  “the  new  way  of  ideas.”  Suppose,  then,  that 
we  identify  these  ontological  particulars  with  Locke’s  other  speci- 
fied particulars ; namely,  simple  and  complex  ideas ; and  if  par- 
ticulars refuse  to  be  thus  assimilated,  our  only  alternative  is  to 
identify  them  with  real  essences ; and  then,  of  course,  what  is 
said  of  either,  will  hold  equally  true  of  particulars.  It  seems  to 
me  nothing  more  remains  to  be  said  on  the  subject.  Unless  thus 
capable  of  being  assimilated,  they  remain  wholly  foreign  to  and 
outside  of  his  philosophy  as  the  “new  way  of  ideas.” 

Locke’s  distinction  of  the  primary-secondary  qualities  marks 
a step  in  the  direction  required.  Chapter  VII  will  concern  itself 
with  another  very  significant  step  in  the  same  direction.  I refer 
to  his  affirmed  primacy  of  the  clear  and  distinct  ideas  as  indepen- 
dent of  and  external  to  meaning  and  knowledge,  and  wherein 
Locke  comes  to  hold  that  meaning  and  knowledge  are  confined 
to  the  mere  relations  of  such  ideas.  In  each  case,  however, 
whether  dealing  with  our  ontological  particular  in  one  of  its  trans- 
formed guises  or  in  its  original  form,  we  encounter  in  Locke  what 
for  present  convenience  may  be  termed  an  anti-relativistic  motive. 

The  following  passage,  typical  in  its  disposition  of  the  primary- 
secondary qualities,  will  start  us  on  our  way:  “Our  senses  failing 
us  in  the  discovery  of  the  bulk,  texture,  and  figure  of  the  minute 
parts  of  bodies,  on  which  their  real  constitutions  and  differences 
depend,  we  are  fain  to  make  use  of  their  secondary  qualities  as 
the  characteristical  marks  and  notes  whereby  to  frame  ideas  of 
them  in  our  minds,  and  distinguish  them  one  from  another:  all 
which  secondary  qualities  are  nothing  but — mere  powers  depend- 
ing on  its  primary  qualities.”6  Here  we  have  distinct  statements 
enunciated  in  respect  to  our  insensible  objects  and  the  secondary 
qualities  as  depending  upon  them.  First,  that  primary  qualities 
constitute  the  insensible  object,  and  secondly,  that  “the  secondary 

6.  Bk.  II,  ch.  23,  sec.  8. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


9^ 


qualities  as  the  characteristical  marks  and  notes”  serve  “to  dis- 
tinguish” such  objects  one  from  another.  The  first  assertion 
involves  the  contradiction  that  the  primary  qualities,  as  but  a 
division  within  simple  ideas  and  therefore  sensible,  are  also  to  be 
identified  witjj  the  insensible  real  constitution  of  bodies.  The 
second  assertion  involves  the  claim  that  the  secondary  qualities 
constitute  the  sole  data  of  knowledge  and  are  effects  rather  than 
products. 

With  Locke,  therefore,  the  conception  of  particulars  natur- 
ally becomes  one  thing  when  made  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
secondary  qualities  as  constituting  our  sole  range  of  ideas,  and 
quite  another  when  made  from  the  standpoint  of  such  data 
widened  in  scope  as  Locke  commonly  recognizes.  Reserving  the 
more  specific  solution  of  this  particular  question  for  the  next 
chapter,  let  us  turn  exclusive  attention  to  Locke’s  insensible  objects 
as  furnishing  our  so-called  terms.  Here  we  enter  upon  Locke’s 
issue  between  the  real  and  the  nominal  essence. 

The  real  essence  of  an  object  is  conceived  by  Locke  in 
three  distinct  ways,  the  result  of  three  fundamental  motives 
in  his  general  thinking;  namely,  the  rationalistic,  the  sensation- 
alistic,  and  the  term-relation  motive.  Under  the  influence  of  the 
rationalistic  motive,  Locke’s  conception  of  the  real  essence  of  an 
object  grows  out  of  the  demand  for  an  inherent  principle  in 
objects,  in  virtue  of  which  objects  attain  to  a necessary  and 
precise  determination  of  the  number  and  the  kind  of  simple  ideas 
composing  them;  “the  reason  whereof  is  plain:  for  how  can  we 
be  sure  that  this  or  that  quality  is  in  gold  when  we  know  not  what 
is  or  is  not  gold?”  Without  knowledge  of  such  a principle,  ac- 
cording to  him,  we  can  have  no  object  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
word.  Each  substance  would  present  sheer  diversity,  or,  if  held 
as  determined  and  of  this  or  that  sort,  variety  of  determination  in 
each  sort  would  be  the  inevitable  outcome,  and,  logically  con- 
sidered, each  sort  would  be  equally  valid  in  its  different  determina- 
tion. Have  we  such  ideas  of  substances  as  the  necessity  of  the 
case  would  seem  to  demand? — ideas  from  which  their  qualities  and 
properties  “would  be  deducible  and  their  necessary  connection 
known,  as  all  the  properties  of  a triangle  depend  on,  and,  as  far  as 
they  are  discoverable,  are  deducible  from  the  complex  idea  of  three 
lines,  including  a space?”7  Locke’s  negative  answer  to  this  ques- 

7.  Bk.  II,  ch.  31,  sec.  6. 


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tion  is  endless  in  repetition : “the  complex  ideas  we  have  of  sub- 
stances are  certain  collections  of  simple  ideas  that  have  been  ob- 
served or  supposed  constantly  to  exist  together.  But  such  a com- 
plex idea  cannot  be  the  real  essence  of  any  substance 

This  essence,  from  which  all  these  properties  flow  in  the  case  of 
gold),  when  I inquire  into  it  and  search  after  it,  I plainly  perceive 
I cannot  discover;  the  furthest  I can  go  is,  only  to  presume  that, 
it  being  nothing  but  body,  its  real  essence  or  internal  constitution, 
on  which  these  qualities  depend,  can  be  nothing  but  the  figure, 
size  and  connection  of  its  solid  parts ; of  neither  of  which  having 
any  distinct  perception  at  all,  can  I have  any  idea  of  its  essence, 
which  is  the  cause  that  it  has  that  particular  shining  yellowness, 
a greater  weight  than  anything  I know  of  the  same  bulk,  and  a 
fitness  to  have  its  color  changed  by  the  touch  of  quicksilver.  If 
any  one  will  say  that  the  real  essence  and  internal  constitution  on 
which  these  properties  depend,  is  not  the  figure,  size,  and  ar- 
rangement or  connection  of  its  solid  parts,  but  something  else, 
I am  even  further  from  having  any  idea  of  its  real 
essence  than  I was  before.”8  In  either  event,  we  deal  with  a 
‘supposition’  only,  and  one  that  Locke  regards  ‘useless,’9  from  the 
standpoint  under  consideration.  Substances  consist  of  the  nominal 
essence  only.  I shall  return  to  this  matter  in  a later  chapter,  when 
considering  Locke’s  contention  that  modes,  contrary  to  sub- 
stances, embody  or  represent  such  real  essences ; whereby  sub- 
stances (to  use  Kant’s  terminology)  distinguish  themselves  from 
modes  as  respectively  a posteriori  and  a priori  determinable. 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  sensationlistic  motive,  wherein 
the  nominal  essence  is  identified  in  scope  with  the  secondary 
qualities,  Locke  sets  up  his  contrast  between  simple  ideas  as  con- 
sisting of  sensible  qualities  and  an  unknown  cause  consisting  of 
insensible  parts.  It  is  at  this  juncture  that  the  primary  qualities 
are  compelled  to  assume  their  dual  role.  Primary  qualities  are 
made  equivalent  to  that  essence  or  reality  in  which  “our  senses  fail 
us,”  and  yet  he  is  inclined  to  view  them  as  mere  distinctions  within 
simple  ideas.  They  are  accordingly  made  to  pass  for  simple  ideas 
until  forced  to  function  as  insensible  parts,  whereupon  “the  second- 
ary qualities  are  nothing  but  powers  depending  on  primary  quali- 
ties.” But  whether  narrowly  or  widely  defined,  with  Locke  the 

8.  Ibid. 

9.  Ibid.,  sec.  8. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


27 


nominal  essence,  as  the  knowable,  is  always  opposed  to  the  real 
essence  as  the  unknowable ; and  in  this  motive,  the  real  essence  is 
our  ontological  particular.  Hence,  if  the  primary  qualities  persist 
in  such  identification,  the  same  fate  would  naturally  be  theirs  that 
Locke,  without  exception,  visits  upon  the  real  essences  in  general. 

But  if  real  essences  remain  unknown  from  either  of  the  above 
viewpoints,  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  term-relation  motive  in 
the  form  of  radical  relativity,  Locke  goes  a step  further  and  holds 
them  as  non-existent.  According  to  this  motive  the  meaning  of 
the  real  essence  is  identified  with  “that  particular  constitution 
which  everything  has  within  itself,  without  any  relation  to  any- 
thing without  it.”  Here  again  he  denies  the  existence  of  any 
such  essence.  He  does  so  in  three  distinct  ways.  I quote  from 
the  text  in  order  to  get  the  first  way  stated.  “It  is  evident  the 
internal  constitution,  wherein  their  (an  object’s)  properties  de- 
pend, is  unknown  to  us ; for  to  go  no  further  than  the  grossest 
and  most  obvious  of  objects  we  can  imagine  amongst  them,  what 
is  that  texture  of  parts,  that  real  essence,  that  makes  lead  and 
antimony  fusible,  wood  and  stones  not?  What  makes  lead  and 
iron  malleable,  antimony  and  stones  not?”10  That  is  to  say,  ob- 
jects manifest  genuine  differences,  differences  hardly  to  be  ex- 
plained where  we  abandon  the  ultimate  character  of  terms  en- 
tirely and  expect  mere  relations  to  originate  such  differences ; 
yet  he  concludes,  that  the  supposed  essence  “whereon  this  differ- 
ence in  their  properties  depend,  is  unknozvn  to  us.” 

Objects  resolve  themselves  into  nothing  but  “powers” — is  the 
second  and  more  familiar  way  in  which  this  term-relation  motive 
acquires  formulation  by  him.  I select  a passage  at  random : 
“The  simple  ideas  that  make  up  our  complex  ideas  of  substances, 
when  truly  considered,  are  nothing  but  powers,  however  we  are 
apt  to  take  them  for  positive  qualities  ....  all  which  ideas 
are  nothing  else  but  so  many  relations  to  other  substances,  and 
are  not  really  in  the  gold  (to  take  an  instance),  considered  barely 
in  itself,  though  they  depend  on  those  real  and  primary  qualities 
of  its  internal  constitution.”11  His  disposition,  which  is  general, 
(a)  to  resolve  substances  into  pure  relations,  ( b ) and  yet  not  to 
do  so  out  of  a need  adequately  to  provide  for  inherent  differences 
in  objects,  and  then  ( c ) to  save  himself,  to  affirm  an  unknown 

10.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  6,  sec.  9. 

11.  Bk.  II,  ch.  23,  sec.  37. 


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inner  constitution,  (of)  which  in  its  turn  is  again  denied  reality 
and,  further,  held  to  be  a more  or  less  “useless  supposition,” 
— is  a circle  of  thought  in  which  he  keeps  revolving.  Where 
doubt,  however,  still  persists  in  his  mind  concerning  the  reality 
of  an  inner  constitution  or  real  essence,  the  next  line  of  reason- 
ing he  falls  back  upon,  according  to  his  own  statement,  puts 
the  matter  conclusively  and  beyond  all  doubt : real  essences  do  not 
even  justify  the  mere  supposition  of  their  reality.  It  involves  a 
statement  of  the  relativistic  principle  in  its  so-called  radical  form. 
“Put  a piece  of  gold  anywhere  by  itself,  separate  from  the  reach 
and  influence  of  all  other  bodies,  it  will  immediately  lose  all  its 

color,  weight,  etc Water,  in  which  to  us  fluidity  is 

an  essential  quality,  left  to  itself,  would  cease  to  be  fluid 

We  are  then  quite  out  of  the  way  when  we  think  that  things 
contain  within  themselves  the  qualities  that  appear  to  us  in  them ; 

and  we  in  vain  search  for  that  (inherent)  constitution 

upon  which  depend  those  qualities  and  powers  we  observe  in 
them.”12.  Viewed  in  one  light  then,  substances  out  of  all  rela- 
tions, reduce  to  zero ; viewed  in  the  other  light,  “no  one  can  doubt,” 
he  holds,  “that  this  called  gold  has  infinite  other  properties  not 
contained  in  any  specific  complex  idea”13  we  may  have  of  it.  The 
following  quotation,  however,  I take  as  more  truly  representative 
of  Locke  in  this  term-relation  motive : “The  simple  qualities  which 
make  up  the  complex  ideas  being  most  of  them  powers  in  relation 
to  changes  which  they  are  apt  to  make  in  or  receive  from  other 
‘bodies,’  are  almost  infinite.”14  From  whence  the  conclusion  fol- 
lows, that  if  essences  exist,  such  essences,  and  such  meaning  as 
they  denote,  must  be  found  within  the  nominal  essence ; the  nomi- 
nal essence,  in  the  course  of  the  process,  ever  widening  its  scope 
beyond  the  secondary  qualities  as  the  sole  ultimates.  And  this 
conclusion  is  a transcription  of  Locke’s  view,  not  of  mine,  in 
support  of  which  the  following  chapters  will  abundantly  testify. 

We  speak  in  general  as  if  ideas  (whether  simple  or  complex) 
acquired  this  or  that  specific  determination  in  virtue  of  this 
or  that  specific  thing  actually  existing  as  one;  whereas,  according 
to  Locke,  it  is  just  the  reverse  that  is  true.  Specific  ideas  of 
different  union  in  varying  situations,  but  of  a fixed  union  in  the 
same  situations,  furnish  the  data  for  the  specific  determination  of 

12.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  6,  sec.  11. 

13.  Bk.  II,  ch.  31,  sec.  10.  Italics  are  mine. 

14.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  9,  sec.  13. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


29 


our  abstract  ideas : whence  it  comes  to  pass  that  “every  distinct 
abstract  idea  is  a distinct  essence.”  Thus  water  when  frozen 
is  held  and  designated  a distinct  thing  from  water  in  its  fluid 
form,  namely  ice.  Why  do  we  fail  to  do  the  same  thing  in 
the  case  of  gold  when  a liquid  and  when  a solid,  or  with  jelly 
when  a liquid  and  when  congealed?  Locke’s  answer  is  found  in 
his  claim  that  the  idea  determines  the  thing,  in  which  view  we 
have  (in  Kant’s  familiar  phrase  in  its  familiar  setting)  a com- 
plete Copernican  shift  in  our  view  of  things.  Locke’s  dogma: 
“nothing  exists  but  particulars,”  thus  finds  its  other  extreme  con- 
tention in  him : “nothing  essential  to  particulars.”  I have  already 
suggested  his  solution  of  the  matter.  It  is  based  upon  an  empirical 
relativity  and  a synthetic  process  of  thought,  culminating  in  what 
may  be  termed  his  “new  way  of  ideas in  the  course  of  which 
process  the  real  essence,  as  defined  within  his  rationalistic  motive, 
is  found  transferred  to  the  nominal  essence.  Hence  the  reason 
for  terming  the  nominal  essence,  an  essence. 

I pause  for  a moment  to  consider  the  term-relation  problem  on 
its  own  merits.  If  terms  threaten  to  vanish  from  the  standpoint 
of  radical  relativity,  what  hinders  a like  outcome  for  them  from 
the  standpoint  of  so-called  empirical  relativity  ? 

A prompt  answer  to  this  question  would  be:  the  conserva- 
tion of  matter  and  energy.  In  accord  with  this  principle,  terms 
may  displace  and  modify  each  other,  but  never  can  totally  ex- 
tinguish each  other.  That  is,  radical  relativity  in  contradiction 
with  this  principle  would  reduce  a certain  term  to  zero  by  a total 
abstraction  of  it  from  the  rest  of  the  universe,  but  it  fails  to  note 
that  this  reduction  of  one  of  its  terms  argues  some  change  or  other 
in  some  of  the  remaining  terms ; and,  if  we  adhere  to  the 
principle  of  conservation  in  its  abstract  form,  such  change  may  be 
maintained  as  affecting  all  of  the  remaining  terms.  We  may  con- 
clude, therefore,  that  empirical  relativity  stands  for  the  principle 
of  interdependence  of  terms  where  terms  in  some  form  or  other  are 
already  assumed  to  exist.  It  is,  accordingly,  a logical  and  not 
necessarily  a genetic  principle. 

In  opposition  to  any  such  solution,  however,  it  may,  not- 
withstanding, be  argued  that  the  principle  of  relativity  is  clearly 
genetic,  since  it  implies  the  conclusion  that  every  term  is  a product 
of  other  terms.  And  the  answer  to  this  argument  is,  that  the 
product-view  of  terms  is  not  the  outcome  of  an  interdependence- 


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view,  but  the  outcome  of  the  One  and  the  Many  problem  as  con- 
joined with  that  of  interdependence.  The  notion  of  interdepend- 
ence denotes,  not  merely  that  this,  that,  or  some  other  change  in 
a term  has  and  finds  its  cause  and  explanation  in  some  other  specific 
terms,  but,  in  harmony  with  the  postulate  of  all  science,  that  all 
change  in  all  terms  is  thus  caused  and  is  not  otherwise  to  be 
explained.  The  recognition  of  change,  however,  is  relatively  in- 
dependent of  the  notion  of  interdependence  in  so  far  as  interde- 
pendence involves  the  cause  of  a change  as  well  as  the  idea  of 
change.  Change  is  also  prior  in  logical  order.  It  is  a complex 
mental  process  indicating  a comparison  with  something  more  or 
less  permanent.  It  is  at  this  juncture  that  the  product- view  of 
terms,  as  involving  the  One  and  the  Many  problem,  is  evoked. 
The  product-view  of  terms,  then,  is  precipitated  only  when  the  One 
and  the  Many  problem,  which  any  change  in  any  object  compels, 
becomes  superinduced  upon  that  of  interdependence.  It  is  in 
recognition  of  this  distinction  in  problems  that  I have  been  led  to 
distinguish  between  relativity  as  empirical  and  as  constructive. 
But  the  One  and  the  Many  problem  is  not  one  confined  to  re- 
lativity ; it  may  and  does  exist  as  a real  problem  in  quarters  where 
no  tincture  of  relativity  is  evinced.  The  question  therefore  arises, 
how  the  One  and  the  Many  problem  is  to  find  a solution  from  the 
standpoint  of  relativity  as  interdependence.  To  postulate  terms 
with  an  inherent  essence  will  not  help  us,  for  in  that  case  we 
postulate,  as  Locke  has  so  abundantly  taught,  we  know  not  what. 
And  where  an  object  changes,  and  all  objects  do  and  can  be  made 
to  change  to  an  indefinite  degree,  the  question  arises  to  which 
group  of  its  changing  qualities  shall  I hold  as  representing  the 
group  of  a particular  object?  It  is  in  description  of  this  situation 
that  Locke  has  come  to  employ  the  phrase  that  “objects  exist  in 
nature  with  no  prefixed  bounds.”  Now  chemistry  has  its  own 
term-solution  in  its  elementary  substances,  just  as  modern  physics 
has  its  present  solution  of  it  in  its  electrons.  As  for  philosophy 
(to  quote  from  a recent  book),  “I  do  not  say  that  it  is  impossible 
to  solve  the  problem  of  the  One  and  the  Many  ....  but 
up  to  the  present  time  no  such  solution  has  been  given.”15 
Modern  realism,  with  its  elusive  and  protean  conception  of  an 
object,  would  surely  not  offer  its  solution  as  the  solution  of  the 
15.  Russell.  First  Course  in  Philosophy,  1913,  p.  90. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


31 


problem  in  hand.  I wonder  how  long  a chemist  and  physicist 
would  pause  to  receive  the  instruction  thus  offered  ? 

Suppose,  then,  that  we  accept  the  verdict  of  chemistry  as  pro- 
visionally valid.  Our  terms  in  that  case  are  its  elementary  sub- 
stances. Secondly,  let  us  also  accept  its  combining  laws  of  sub- 
stances. Generalized,  the  second  assumption  would  mean  that 
we  accept  the  principle  of  uniformity  as  involving  fundamental 
limits  and  peculiarities,  differences  in  its  operation  as  well  as  a 
constancy  within  such  limits  and  peculiarities.  Where  then  shall 
we  place  the  source  of  these  limits  and  peculiarities  incident  to  the 
behavior  or  interaction  of  substances  ? Suppose  we  locate  them  in 
the  substances.  In  that  event  we  should  have  the  phrase  “relation” 
implying  nothing  but  the  presence  of  some  specific  change  in  one 
or  more  of  the  instances  brought  into  an  effective  union,  and  be- 
yond some  such  abstract  meaning,  the  phrase,  to  my  mind,  sig- 
nifies nothing. 

So  much  granted,  we  may  now  return  and  ask : do  the  ele- 
mentary substances  of  chemistry  rightly  determine  our  “terms?” 
The  chemist  regards  them  as  irreducible  and  he  regards  them  in 
the  light  of  constructs, — as  specific  groups  of  itemized  properties, 
demanding  time  and  most  varied  situations  or  conditions  for  their 
complete  realization.  But  to  speak  of  them  as  at  once  irreducible 
and  as  constructs  involves  confusion.  Such  a claim  evokes  the 
One  and  the  Many  problem  as  obviously  as  could  be  affirmed  in 
any  other  quarter.  I have  no  intention  of  laying  bare  the  tech- 
nique whereby  chemistry  seeks  to  establish  its  claims.  All  that  is 
necessary  to  add  here  is,  that  without  its  affirmed  principle  of 
conservation  (constancy  of  weight  in  change)  chemistry  would 
not  get  very  far.  But  constancy  of  weight  is  not  uniformly  its 
standard  for  determining  the  number  and  variety  of  its  substances  ; 
at  times  it  is  not  this  standard  but  some  declared  differences  in 
properties  upon  which  it  relies  and  in  dependence  upon  which  it 
asserts  ultimate  differences  in  substances.  Such  dualism  however 
involves  confusion.  The  confusion  is  further  accentuated  when 
we  read  chemistry  in  the  light  of  the  electron  as  ultimate,  whereby, 
as  affirmed  by  many  of  the  leading  physicists  of  today,  the  electron 
and  not  the  elementary  substances  of  the  chemist  is  the  desired 
“term.”  And  thus  the  issue  of  the  One  and  the  Many  problem 
continues,  and  for  all  we  know,  always  will  continue.  But  the 
ideal  isolation  of  the  “term,”  the  special  aim  of  both  these  sciences, 


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is  not  of  necessity  the  only  ideal.  Often  we  aim  to  know  the 
effect  of  a complex  term  upon  other  complex  terms.  Hence  all 
we  seem  entitled  to  affirm  in  any  case  is,  that  the  principle  of 
uniformity,  in  so  far  as  it  signifies  so-called  conditions  and  so- 
called  results,  presupposes  the  existence  of  terms  at  every  step 
of  its  operation.  Terms  thus  come  and  go ; but  with  terms  in  some 
form  or  other  we  begin  and  with  terms  in  some  form  or  other  we 
end.  Whence  it  follows  that  relativity  is  the  generally  recognized 
logical  principle  of  interaction  and  not  of  necessity  a cosmic  or 
genetic  principle  of  outright  creation.  But  any  term  necessarily 
presupposed  and  decided  upon  is  without  doubt  inherently  com- 
plex.16 Hence,  no  term,  as  the  result  of  conditions,  may  be 
affirmed  to  exist  independently  of  other  terms ; for  to  do  so  is 
to  go  counter  to  the  fundamental  principle  of  all  science;  namely, 
that  all  terms  find  their  sole  explanation  in  their  conditioning 
terms.  Nor  does  empirical  relativity  stand  for  any  thing  else 
than  for  this  principle  of  science  properly  grasped  by  and  incor- 
porated within  metaphysics.  Constructive  relativity  marks  the 
next  step  in  its  metaphysical  development, — the  incorporation  of 
the  One.  and  the  Many  problem. 

CHAPTER  V 

THE  PART-WHOLE  MOTIVE 

The  part-whole  motive,  in  connection  with  mixed  modes  and 
substances,  concerns  itself  with  the  question,  “how  such  a pre- 
cise multitude  of  parts”  as  manifested  in  such  complex  ideas, 
“comes  to  make  but  one  idea.”  Locke’s  solution  of  the  matter  I 
have  reserved  for  a later  chapter.  Here  I intend  to  consider  the 
simple  modes  as  a phase  of  this  same  motive.  How  do  Space,  Time, 
Number,  Infinity,  Power  come  to  be?  They  are  not  simple,  and 
yet  he  holds  “that  they  are  justly  reckoned  amongst  our  simple 
ideas.”1  Wherein  then  lie  their  complexity ; wherein  their  sim- 
plicity? To  get  his  position,  it  is  sufficient  to  consider  the  modes 
of  Space  and  Time  only.  Modes  are  complex  because  “they 
consist  of  parts,  even  though  their  parts  are  not  separable  one  from 

16.  Professor  Rowland  speaks  of  the  atom  as  being  as  complex 
as  a piano. 

1.  Bk.  II,  ch.  15,  sec.  9;  ch.  21,  sec.  3. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


33 


another.”2  Their  parts  are  such  as  will  in  each  case  naturally 
involve  and  presuppose  each  other. 

But  of  what  do  the  parts  consist?  His  answer  is  this:  “Could 
the  mind,  as  in  Number,  come  to  so  small  a part  of  extension 
or  duration  as  excluded  divisibility,  that  would  be,  as  it  were, 
the  indivisible  unit  or  idea,  by  repetition  of  which  it  would  make 
its  more  enlarged  ideas  of  extension  and  duration.  But  since 
the  mind  is  not  able  to  frame  an  idea  of  any  space  without  parts, 
instead  thereof  it  makes  use  of  the  common  measures  which,  by 
familiar  use,  in  each  country,  have  imprinted  themselves  in  the 
memory  (as  inches  and  feet;  seconds,  minutes,  hours,  days, 
years.)  ....  Every  part  of  duration  is  duration  too,  and 
every  part  of  extension  is  extension,  both  of  them  capable  of 
addition  or  division  in  infinitum.  But  the  least  portions  of  either 
of  them  whereof  we  have  clear  and  distinct  ideas  may  perhaps  be 
fittest  to  be  considered  by  us  as  the  simple  ideas  of  that  kind  out 
of  which  our  complex  modes  of  space,  extension  and  duration 
are  made  up,  and  into  which  they  can  again  be  distinctly  re- 
solved.”3 We  have  no  absolute  unit  of  space  and  no  absolute 
unit  of  time;  hence  “no  two  parts  of  duration  can  be  certainly 
known  to  be  equal  ;”4  that  is,  space  and  time  are  inherently  vari- 
ables. We  try  to  control  the  situation,  lacking  such  absolute 
units,  by  practical  devices  of  one  kind  or  another,  involving  regu- 
lar, periodic  motions,  “of  which  seeming  equality,  however,  we 
have  no  other  measure,  but  such  as  the  train  of  our  ideas  lodged 
in  our  memories,  with  the  concurrence  of  other  probable  reasons, 
to  persuade  us  of  their  equality.”5  In  a word,  our  notions  of  time 
and  space  are  in  their  own  nature  variables,  and,  hence,  a con- 
ditioned product  no  matter  after  what  model  they  may  be  con- 
ceived or  computed.  Like  ideas  in  general,  they  are  constructs 
from  which  an  arbitrary  element  can  never  be  wholly  excluded. 

But  in  this  absence  of  an  absolute  unit  of  space  or  time,  what 
gives  occasion  for  their  formation?  We  find  it  to  be  the  facts  of 
change,  motion,  and  succession,  and  that  of  distance  and  place, 
as  well  as  existing  needs  for  unity  or  order.  Of  change,  Locke 
writes : “Wherever  change  is  observed,  the  mind  must  collect  a 
poiver  somewhere  able  to  make  that  change,  as  well  as  a possi- 

2.  Ibid.,  ch.  15,  sec.  10. 

3.  Ibid.,  sec.  9.  Italics  mine. 

4.  Ibid.,  sec.  21. 

5.  Ibid. 


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bility  in  the  thing  itself  to  receive  it;”6  and  he  might  have  said 
the  same  of  succession  which  he  holds  conditions  our  notion  of 
time : wherever  succession  is  observed  the  mind  must  collect  a 
notion  somewhere  able  to  make  the  fact  of  succession  a pos- 
sibility. 

But  such  facts  as  change,  etc.,  it  may  be  held,  are  not  only 
complex  and  relative,  but  obviously  mediate  in  character.  Hence 
to  base  the  other  concepts  upon  them  would  look  like  a twofold 
removal  from  reality  conceived  in  terms  of  our  simple  ideas.  But 
such  a view  of  Locke  fails  in  force  where  simple  ideas  are  con- 
verted into  complex  ideas  and  complex  ideas  converted  into  simple 
ideas,  as  was  shown  at  large  in  Chapter  III.  What  then  becomes 
of  our  so-termed  parts,  whether  a color  or  sound,  or  the  facts  of 
succession  and  change?  We  accept  the  ideas  of  color  and  sound 
as  ultimate  under  conditions;  then  succession,  change,  motion, 
place,  distance,  involving  aspects  equally  as  unique  and  irreducible 
are  equally  as  ultimate.  Hence  the  confusion  between  perception 
and  conception  or  the  immediate  and  the  mediate,  which  infects 
the  whole  treatment  of  the  simple  and  complex  ideas,  is  no  less 
evident  in  respect  to  his  treatment  of  the  simple  modes.  Take  the 
following  passage  in  illustration : “it  seems  to  me  that  the  con- 
stant and  regular  succession  of  ideas  in  a waking  man,  is,  as  it 
were,  the  measure  and  standard  of  all  other  succession ; whereof, 
if  any  one  either  exceeds  the  pace  of  our  ideas,  as  where  two 
sounds  or  pains,  etc.,  take  up  in  their  succession  the  duration  of 
but  one  idea,  or  else  where  any  motion  or  succession  is  so  slow, 
as  that  it  keeps  not  pace  with  the  idea  in  our  minds,  or  the  quick- 
ness in  which  they  take  their  turns  ....  there  also  the 
sense  of  a constant  continued  succession  is  lost,  and  we  perceive 
it  not.”7  In  that  event,  he  goes  on  to  say,  “we  must  have  recourse 
to  other  means  for  determining  the  fact  of  a succession”  as  ex- 
isting in  this  or  that  event,  “which  we  then  perceive  by  the  change 
of  distance  that  it  hath  moved,  yet  the  motion  itself  we  perceive 
not.”8 

How  then  do  our  simple  modes  come  to  be?  This  question  I 
think  I have  answered.  They  are  constructs  inevitably  involved 
in  the  comprehension  of  certain  organizable  aspects,  parts,  or 

6.  Ibid.,  ch.  21,  sec.  4. 

7.  Ibid.,  ch.  14,  sec.  12.  Secs.  9-17.  Italics  are  mine. 

8.  Ibid.,  sec.  11. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


35 


phases  of  experience ; their  peculiar  kind  or  quality,  in  each  case, 
being  in  a sense  dependent  upon  the  more  or  less  unique  aspect 
of  the  parts  or  phases  involved,  “and  therefore  we  are  not  to 
wonder  that  we  comprehend  them  not  ....  when  we 
would  consider  them  either  abstractly  in  themselves”10  or  in  their 
supposed  ontological  character;  they  work  successfully  in  pre- 
venting an  “incurable  confusion,”9  and  hence  are  real  pragmat- 
ically. Whether  they  are  real  ontologically,  Locke  gives  us  no 
ground  for  concluding  one  way  or  the  other.10 


CHAPTER  VI 


locke’s  conception  of  relation 


A term  used  so  freely  in  Locke  as  the  term  relation,  demands 
definition.  What  does  Locke  understand  by  this  term?  The 
question  is  not  to  be  answered  off-hand,  nor,  after  due  inquiry, 
to  be  answered  dogmatically.  If  we  take  Hume’s  version  of  it, 
Locke  therein  denotes  what  in  itself  is  a delusion.  Knowledge 
begins  with  impressions.  What,  then,  is  the  impression  to  which 
I can  point  as  the  impression  of  a relation  ? And  Hume’s  conclu- 
sion is,  as  we  know,  that  there  are  no  such  existing  impressions, 
and  that  relations,  accordingly,  are  fictitious,  or,  at  least,  an  arbi- 
trary or  subjective  importation  into  knowledge.  This  proclama- 
tion in  Hume  has  its  equally  full  proclamation  in  Locke.  We  read 
in  Locke  with  endless  repetition,  that  whether  we  consider 
objects  in  relation  to  objects,  or  ideas  in  relation  to  ideas,  at  no 
point  can  we  perceive  a visible  or  necessary  connection  between 
9.  Ibid.,  ch.  15,  sec.  5;  also  secs.  6-10. 

10.  The  following  is  a typical  passage:  “Where  and  when  are  ques- 

tions belonging  to  all  finite  existences,  and  are  by  us  always  reckoned 
from  some  certain  epochs  marked  out  to  us  by  the  motions  observable  in 
it.  Without  some  such  fixed  parts  or  periods,  the  order  of  things  would 
be  lost  to  our  finite  understandings  in  the  boundless  variable  oceans  of 
(abstract  or  conceptual)  duration  and  expansion;  which  comprehend  in 
them  all  finite  beings,  and  in  their  full  extent  belong  only  to  the  Deity. 
And  therefore  we  are  not  to  wonder  that  we  comprehend  them  not,  and 
do  so  often  find  our  thoughts  at  a loss,  when  we  would  consider  them 
either  abstractly  in  themselves,  or  as  any  way  attributed  to  the  first  in- 
comprehensible Being.  But  when  applied  to  any  particular  finite  being, 
the  extension  of  any  body  is  so  much  of  that  infinite  space  as  the  bulk  of 
the  body  takes  up;  . . . all  which  distances  we  measure  by  precon- 

ceived ideas  of  certain  lengths  of  space  and  duration,  as  inches,  feet, 
miles;  and,  in  the  other,  minutes,  days,  years,  etc.”  Ibid.,  sec.  8. 


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them,  except  among  one  class  of  ideas  only, — modes  as  d priori 
determinable.1  Yet  Locke,  notwithstanding,  devotes  chapters 
to  “ideas”  of  relations ; speaks  of  a “visible  connection”  in  respect 
to  modes ; and,  in  respect  to  our  complex  ideas  of  substances, 
writes  that,  “when  truly  considered  [such  ideas]  are  only  powers 
. . . . nothing  else  but  so  many  relations  to  other  sub- 

stances.”2 And,  then,  in  his  chapter  on  “powers”  we  read  this 
very  remarkable  summary  of  his  whole  position.  It  is  so  signifi- 
cant, yet  brief,  that  I quote  it  in  full.  “I  confess  power  includes 
in  it  some  kind  of  relation,  as  indeed,  which  of  our  ideas,  of 
what  kind  soever,  when  attentively  considered,  does  not?  For 
our  ideas  of  extension,  duration,  and  number,  do  they  not  all 
contain  in  them  a secret  relation  of  the  parts?  Figure  and  motion 
have  something  relative  in  them  much  more  visibly ; and  sensible 
qualities,  what  are  they  but  the  powers  of  different  bodies,  in 
relation  to  our  perception?  And,  if  considered  in  the  things 
themselves,  do  they  not  depend  on  the  bulk,  figure,  texture,  and 
motion  of  the  parts?  All  which  include  some  kind  of  relation  in 
them.  Our  idea  therefore  of  power,  I think,  may  well  have  a 
place  amongst  other  simple  ideas,  and  be  considered  as  one  of 
them.”3  That  is,  all  ideas  reduce  to  relations;  yet  that  seems 
not  to  hinder  them  from  being  ideas;  yes,  even  simple  ideas, 
according  to  Locke. 

There  is  only  one  place  in  the  treatise,  that  I can  recall,  where 
Locke  himself  deliberately  sets  about  to  define  the  term.  “Re- 
lation, what?” — is  the  title  of  the  section.4  This  sounds  propi- 
tious ; let  us  turn  to  it.  There  we  read : — 

“Besides  the  ideas,  whether  simple  or  complex,  that  the  mind 
has  of  things,  as  they  are  in  themselves,  there  are  others  it  gets 

from  their  comparison  one  with  another When  the 

mind  so  considers  one  thing,  that  it  does,  as  it  were,  bring  it  to 

1.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  3,  sec.  28.  “How  any  thought  should  produce  a 
motion  in  body  is  as  remote  from  the  nature  of  our  ideas,  as  how  any 
body  should  produce  any  thought  [simple  ideas]  in  the  mind.  That  it  is 
so,  if  experience  did  not  convince  us,  the  consideration  of  the  things 
themselves  would  never  be  able  in  the  least  to  discover  to  us.  These, 
and  the  like,  though  they  have  a constant  and  regular  connection  [co- 
existence or  sequence]  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things,  yet  the  con- 
nection being  not  discoverable  in  the  ideas  themselves  . . . we  can 
attribute  their  connection  to  nothing  else  but  the  arbitrary  determina- 
tion of  that  All-wise  Agent.” 

2.  Bk.  II,  ch.  24,  secs.  6-12  and  37. 

3.  Ibid.,  ch.  21,  sec.  3.  Italics  are  mine. 

4.  Ibid.,  ch.  25,  sec.  1. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


37 


and  set  it  by  another,  and  carries  its  view  from  one  to  the  other : 

that  is,  as  the  words  import,  relation  and  respect And 

since  any  idea,  whether  simple  or  complex,  may  be  the  occasion 
why  the  mind  thus  brings  two  things  together,  and,  as  it  were, 
takes  a view  of  them  at  once,  though  still  considered  as  distinct ; 
therefore  any  of  our  ideas  may  be  the  foundation  of  relation 
. . . . For  as  I said,”  he  adds  in  a following  section,  “rela- 

tion is  a way  of  comparing  or  considering  two  things  together, 
and  giving  one  or  both  some  appellation  (‘denomination’)  from 
that  comparison ; and  sometimes  giving  even  the  relation  itself 
a name  ;”5  as  a result  of  which,  Locke  mentions,  as  some  among 
the  “innumerable  kinds”  of  relations,  causal,  spatial,  temporal, 
quantitative,  qualitative,  blood,  legal,  civic,  moral0  etc. ; and  that 
objects,  in  view  of  their  consideration  under  this  or  that  relation, 
take  on  this  or  that  distinction  or  denomination,  “although  it  be 
not  contained  in  the  real  (‘positive  or  absolute’)  existence  of 
things,  but  is  something  extraneous  or  superinduced.”7  Thus 
Locke,  upon  the  basis  of  something  real  or  fancied,  concedes  to 
thought  the  capacity  to  organize  our  objects  into  a world  where 
mutual  implication  and  abstract  dependence  may  come  to  reveal 
a whole  set  of  new  distinctions  (denominations)  in  our  objects; 
but  they  are  distinctions  which  exist  through  thought  and  for 
thought  only,  and  this  conclusion  Locke  insists  upon  over  and 
over  again : they  are  merely  -superinductions ; they  in  no  way 
alter,  modify,  or  transform  the  things  themselves ; thought  and 
facts  have  no  commerce ; “nothing  really  exists  but  particulars.” 

Our  first  conclusion,  then,  stands  out  sharply  in  answer  to  the 
question:  “Relations,  what?”  Relations  are  the  pure  products 
of  thought,  and  result  from  comparing  one  object  wJth  another. 
But  since  nothing  but  particulars,  by  dogma,  are  real ; and,  further, 
since  particulars,  by  dogma,  in  their  determination,  are  wholly 
independent  of  thought  and  its  processes,  relations  in  that  sense 
are  not  only  non-real  and  non-existent,  but  are  a deliberate  and 
specious  falsification  of  reality, — Locke’s  reality  as  ontological 
particulars. 

But  are  they  the  pure  products  of  thought?  If  so,  why  speak 
of  a necessity  enjoined  upon  the  mind  in  the  presence  of  change 
“to  collect  a power  somewhere”  to  account  for  it,  if  no  such 

5.  Ibid.,  sec.  1 and  6. 

6.  Ibid.,  ch.  26-28. 

7.  Ibid.,  ch.  25,  sec.  8. 


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thing  as  control  of  thought  exists  ? Or  where  does  that  necessity 
arise  if  wholly  irrelevant  to  particulars?  Are  causality,  space, 
time,  power,  and  morality  something  or  nothing?  These  are  some 
of  his  typical  relations  ; but  what  is  their  status  and  part  in 
the  scheme  of  things?  Then  again,  if  relations  are  pure  products 
of  thought,  why  designate  the  “relations”  pertaining  to  modes 
“visible,”  and  those  pertaining  to  substances  “undiscoverable?” 
If  relations  are  non-existent  and  invisible  as  fact-reality  within 
the  sphere  of  substances,  just  what  is  that  “visible”  relation  af- 
firmed by  Locke  as  existent  within  the  sphere  of  modes?  These 
questions  are  exceedingly  pertinent  to  the  matter  in  hand.  Let 
us  see  whether  an  answer  to  them  is  accessible  in  Locke. 

THE  VISIBLE  RELATIONS  OF  MODES:  WHAT  IS  THEIR  KIND;  WHAT 

THEIR  REALITY 

We  may  search  at  large  in  Book  IV,  and  on  almost  every  page 
we  shall  find  ourselves  confronted  by  the  statement  that  modes  are 
essentially  different  from  substances:  the  former,  the  pure  off- 
spring of  reason ; the  latter,  the  product  of  experience  as  divorced 
from  reason.  Then  we  shall  also  habitually  encounter  there,  the 
uncriticized  and  unanalyzed  assertion  that  the  “relations”  of  the 
one  are  “visible,”  and  the  copiously  criticized  and  analyzed  fact 
that  the  relations  of  the  other  are  totally  “invisible.”  Such  is  the 
situation.  A passage  or  two  from  the  text  will  suffice  for  our 
purpose. 

“Is  it  true  of  the  ideas  of  a triangle  that  its  three  angles  are 
equal  to  two  right  ones?  Then  it  is  true  also  of  a triangle, 
wherever  it  really  exists.  Whatever  other  figure  exists,  that  is 
not  exactly  answerable  to  the  idea  of  a triangle  in  his  mind,  is 
not  at  all  concerned  in  that  proposition ; and  therefore  he  is  cer- 
tain all  his  knowledge  concerning  such  ideas  is  real  knowledge ; 
because,  intending  things  no  further  than  they  agree  with  those 
his  ideas,  he  is  sure  what  he  knows  concerning  those  figures, 
when  they  have  barely  an  ideal  existence  in  his  mind,  will  hold 
true  of  them  also  when  they  have  real  existences  in  matter.”8 

The  passage  is  a very  compact  statement  of  his  doctrine  of 
a priori  modes,  and  the  doctrine  is  a fixture  in  Locke.  Its  out- 
come is : reality,  in  the  case  of  modes,  identified  with  ideality,  and 

8.  Bk.  IV,  eh.  4,  sec.  6.  Italics  are  mine. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


39 


because  modes  alone  fulfil  his  conceived  requirements  of  knowl- 
edge proper  (that  which  is  not  mere  opinion),  modes  become 
identified  by  him  with  reality  in  its  most  perfect  form.  These 
generalities  aside,  let  us  get  down  to  particulars. 

The  doctrine,  in  the  first  place,  asserts  a certain  independence 
in  thought  to  form  ideas  not  directly  depending  upon  nor  directly 
responsible  to  sense,  and,  within  its  own  province,  having  as  it 
were,  its  own  codes,  patterns,  and  standards  of  reality.  Hence  (he 
writes)  if  moral  knowledge  is  of  the  type  modes,  and  they,  “as 
other  modes,  be  of  our  own  making,  what  strange  notions  will 
there  be  of  justice  and  temperance.  No  confusion  at  all,”  for 
in  the  case  of  morality  as  in  the  case  of  the  triangle,  as  he  goes 
on  to  say,  “we  intend  things  no  further  than  as  they  are  con- 
formable to  our  ideas,”9  and  if  things  are  not  conformable,  so 
much  the  worse  for  them. 

It  is  well  to  keep  in  mind  this  great  emphasis  which  Locke 
places  upon  an  originating  power  in  thought.  But  the  question  con- 
tested is,  Locke’s  apparent  restriction  of  it  here  to  modes,  and 
to  the  extent  in  which  relations  with  him  follow  thought,  also  to 
note  his  tendency  to  restrict  them  to  the  status  of  a pure  thought- 
product.  He  calls  relations  in  their  case  visible.  Why?  Because 
in  their  case,  he  holds  that  “by  the  mere  contemplation  of  any 
of  our  ideas,”  I am  able  to  affirm  something  of  another  idea 
“which  is  a necessary  consequence  of  its  precise  complex  idea, 
but  not  contained  in  it,”10  that  is,  relations  have  no  reality  save 
with  an  a priori  rationalism,  and  these  relations  are  referred  to 
by  him  as  “visible”.  Along  this  exploded  line  of  inquiry,  how- 
ever, we  are  not  likely  to  gather  much  illumination  from  Locke 
on  the  subject.  Let  us  turn,  then,  to  the  other  question.  Wherein 
lies  that  necessity  which  leads  reason  to  produce  its  modes,  such  as 
they  are?  And  I can  think  of  no  other  answer  than  the  one  to 
be  asserted  in  connection  with  the  other  type  of  relations ; namely, 
the  necessity  resides  in  certain  uniformities,  in  certain  induced 
needs,  and  in  a certain  interdependence  or  “constant  and  regular 
union  of  parts.”  And,  if  this  be  true,  how  is  he  to  defend  the 
claim  that  in  the  case  of  modes  objects  are  purely  a product  of 
the  mind;  and  in  the  case  of  substances,  that  objects  are  products 
purely  unaffected  by  thought, — Lockers  world  of  ontological  par- 

9.  Ibid.,  sec.  5 and  9. 

10.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  8,  sec.  8. 


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ticulars?  And  if  Locke  himself  is  far  from  persisting  in  such  a 
divorce  shall  we  conclude  with  him,  that,  “apart  from  our  abstract 
ideas,  no  determination  in  our  substances  is  possible?”11  In  other 
words  shall  we  credit  Locke  with  the  justice  of  knowing  his  own 
mind  in  approving  the  designation  of  his  philosophy  as  “the  •lew 
way  of  ideas?”  Further,  shall  we  credit  that  “new  way”  with 
the  same  Copernican  inversion  of  object  and  idea  that  Kant  credits 
himself  with  originating?  Then  we  must  also  be  ready  to  admit 
as  Locke’s  conclusion  Kant’s  own  specific  one : relations  are  gen- 
erated in  a thought  situation  and  pertain  to  objects  in  so  far  as  they 
are  grasped  and  comprehended  by  thought.  And  what  an  object 
may  be  apart  from  such  a thought  construct  of  it, — for  that  answer 
we  must  turn  to  the  destructive  and  profitless  analysis  of  a Hume, 
or  to  Locke  himself,  where  his  uncriticized  dogmatism  throws  a 
confusing  shadow  upon  this  brighter  vision,  fully  elaborated  by 
him  as  we  shall  come  to  see.12  Hence,  in  his  efforts  to  discover 
where  the  unity  of  objects  in  general  lies, — physical,  vegetative, 
and  animal,  including  that  of  personal  identity, — he  does  not  seek 
to  find  a “real”  essence,  nor  an  empirical  unity  (an  impression  in 
Hume’s  sense),  but  a thought-constructed  and  a thought-deter- 
mined unity,  “an  identity  suited  to  the  idea.”13  Relations  stand 
for  determinations,  abstract  or  concrete,  of  which  the  mind  feels 
itself  privileged,  as  well  as  constrained,  to  take  note  in  any  effort 
to  know  its  objects  and  to  organize  them;  beyond  which  end,  we 
may  grant,  “the  mind  need  not  intend  things  further,” — beyond 
the  articulated  needs  of  an  articulated  self  for  an  articulated 
world.  Thus  does  his  rationalistic  motive,  by  stages,  become 
thoroughly  fused  with  his  positivistic  motive.  It  reflects  itself  in 
the  scope  accorded  by  Locke  to  conduct,  to  the  nominal  essence, 
and  to  synthesis. 

11.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  6,  secs.  1-8. 

12.  In  particular,  see  chapters  10,  5 and  8 in  the  order  given. 

13.  Bk.  II,  ch.  27. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


41 


III 

ANTI-RELATIVISTIC  MOTIVES  IN  LOCKE 

CHAPTER  VII 

IDEAS  versus  KNOWLEDGE  and  meaning 

The  tendency  in  Locke  to  resolve  even  simple  ideas  into  rela- 
tions finds  a counter  motive  in  him,  in  which  ideas  are  the  self- 
sufficient,  and  all  relational  reality  is  a mere  consequence.  Thus 
Knowledge,  in  his  restricted  sense  of  the  word,  “is  founded  in 
the  habitudes  and  relations  of  abstract  ideas,”1  and  Meaning 
founded  in  “the  comparing  or  considering  of  two  things  together,” 
whereby  a new  and  irrelevant  type  of  reality  results,  commonly 
designated  by  him  as  equivalent  to  the  term  signification.  I have 
described  it  as  irrelevant.  By  that  I mean  merely  that  “it  is  not 
contained  in  the  real  existence  of  things  (the  original  ideas), 
but  something  extraneous  and  superinduced.”2  It  is  to  this  self- 
sufficient  and  originating  character  of  our  ideas  in  their  affirmed 
independence  of  relations  to  which  I wish  now  to  draw  attention. 
Upon  what  ground  does  Locke  rest  this  contention  ? 

“To  improve  our  knowledge,”  says  Locke,  “is,  I think,  to  get 
and  fix  in  our  minds  clear,  distinct  and  complete  ideas  . . . and 
thus,  perhaps,  without  any  other  principle,  but  barely  considering 
those  perfect  ideas,  and  by  comparing  them  one  with  another,  find- 
ing their  agreement  or  disagreement,  and  their  several  relations 
and  habitudes,  we  shall  get  more  true  and  clear  knowledge  by  the 
conduct  of  this  one  rule  than  by  taking  in  principles,  and  thereby 
putting  our  minds  into  the  disposal  of  others.”3  If  our  ideas  are 
to  be  “clear  and  complete”  before  they  enter  into  relations,  the 
relations  could  scarcely  be  calculated  to  make  them  more  so.  The 
implication  is  evident:  ideas  or  terms  elaborate  themselves,  seek 
to  make  themselves  “clear  and  complete”  outside  of  the  knowl- 
edge or  relation  situation.  Ideas  are  one  thing,  knowledge  another, 

1.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  12,  sec.  7. 

2.  Bk.  II,  ch.  25,  sec.  8. 

3.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  12,  sec.  6.  Italics  are  mine. 


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and  meaning  still  another.  This  is  very  clearly  stated  in  his 
triple4  division  of  perception : the  perception  of  an  idea ; the  per- 
ception of  “a  visible  connection”  (Knowledge)  ; and  the  percep- 
tion of  signification  (Meaning).  In  no  case  do  we  appear  to  get 
beyond  a “perception” ; and  the  difference  between  them  is  one, 
not  of  the  Understanding,  but  of  three  distinct  types  of  reality 
thus  perceived.  Let  us  get  at  the  very  roots  of  this  motive  if 
possible. 

I think  Locke’s  apotheosis  of  the  idea  issues  from  the  union  of 
his  two  sharply  antithetical  convictions, — his  positivistic  reac- 
tionary one : nothing  exists  but  particulars ; and  his  rationalistic 
one:  certain  and  absolute  knowledge  involves  an  d priori  deter- 
mination of  parts  and  their  mutual  and  inevitable  implication. 
In  the  course  of  time  the  former  conviction,  dogmatic  in  form,  be- 
comes transformed  and  substituted  by  his  critical  view  that  simple 
ideas  constitute  our  ultimates.  The  simple  ideas  in  turn  come  to 
form  an  alliance  with  his  rationalistic  criterion  of  truth  with  a 
center  of  interest  in  “clear  and  distinct”  ideas.  Nor  is  there  any 
effort  on  Locke’s  part  to  consider  simple  ideas  as  otherwise  than 
synonymous  with  “clear  and  distinct”  ideas ; and  if  either  motive 
gains  the  ascendancy,  it  is  the  rationalistic  one.  In  proof  of  this 
statement,  consider  his  general  account  of  what  constitutes  the 
unity  of  our  simple  ideas ; namely,  that  simple  ideas  are  to  be 
“considered  as  one  representation  or  picture  in  the  mind,”  a 
description  of  them  stated  in  the  very  opening  chapters  of  Book 
II  and  one  repeated  without  modification  throughout  the  Essay. 
Particulars,  simple  ideas,  clear  and  distinct  ideas,  and  a priori  ideas 
— these  four  prescribe  the  locus  of  a distinct  phase  of  his  thought. 
Each  in  turn,  or  the  four  in  fusion,  as  the  case  may  be,  aspires  to 
what  is  final  and  ultimate  in  reality.  None  of  them  can  be  made 
more  “perfect  and  complete” ; they  are  perfect  and  complete  in 
themselves.  Knowledge  and  meaning  in  turn  become  either  ir- 
relevant incidents  to  ideas,  or  necessary  consequences  of  them  ; 
whereby  knowledge  and  meaning  issue  forth  as  two  new  and  dis- 
tinct types  of  reality,  which,  if  any  sort  of  reality  at  all,  must, 
like  ideas  in  general,  be  modes  of  perception.  Thus,  in  his  reac- 
tion against  the  “abuse  of  words,”  and  likewise,  in  his  re-action 
against  authority  or  general  principles  and  maxims  of  all  kind  he 
sends  us  for  remedy  to  “clear  and  distinct”  ideas.  That  he  should 

4.  See  Bk.  II,  ch.  21,  sec.  5. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


43 


also  have  been  driven  to  the  same  source  for  knowledge  (such  as 
his  notion  of  knowledge  is)  seems  inevitable.  Thus  we  read  that 
ideas  are  not  dependent  upon,  or  the  consequence  of,  the  knowl- 
edge situation,  but  “knowledge  is  the  consequence  of  the  ideas  (be 
they  what  they  will)  that  are  in  our  minds  . . . that  wherever  we 
can  suppose  such  a creature  as  man  is,  endowed  with  such  facul- 
ties, and  thereby  furnished  with  such  ideas  as  we  have,  we  con- 
clude, he  must  needs  when  he  applies  his  thoughts  to  the  considera- 
tion of  his  ideas,  know  the  truth  of  certain  propositions  that  will 
arise  from  the  agreement  or  disagreement  which  he  will  perceive  in 
his  own  ideas.”5  The  “new  way  of  ideas”  does  not  characterize 
his  doctrine  amiss  whether  we  consider  this  motive  in  his  think- 
ing or  whether  we  consider  his  far  more  approved  and  developed 
ones.  But  we  must  not  fail  to  note,  that  as  a matter  of  general 
theory  with  him,  it  is  primarily  the  “way  of  ideas'’  to  knowledge, 
and  not  primarily  the  “way  of  ideas”  to  objects ; and  yet  objects, 
in  their  characterization  of  modes  and  substances,  constitute  the 
central  interest  with  him.  Failing,  as  he  does,  to  make  the  idea 
dependent  upon  its  relations,  even  while  making  the  relations 
dependent  upon,  although  wholly  external  to,  ideas,  the  knowl- 
edge said  to  result  really  converts  itself  into  an  entirely  new 
thing.  Hence  to  keep  knowledge  and  objects  apart,  or  to  make  of 
knowledge  an  end  independent  of  objects,  is  an  antithesis  in  Locke 
that  yields  nothing  but  contradiction  and  confusion  till  we  come  to 
his  doctrine  of  “Sorts”  in  Book  III.  Influenced  by  his  mistaken  no- 
tion of  knowledge,  his  aim  in  Book  II  is  not  to  consider  his  simple 
ideas  as  essentially  determinations  of  things,  but  as  the  elements 
“out  of  which  is  made  all  our  other  knowledge.”6  Or,  with  clear 
and  distinct  ideas  the  touchstone  of  reality,  simple  ideas  become 
the  means  of  appraising  knowledge,  such  as  it  is : he  demands 
any  one  to  produce  a complex  idea,  which,  in  so  far  as  it  is  valid, 
is  “not  made  out  of  those  simple  ideas.” 

Let  us  consider  the  subject  of  discussion  in  a slightly  different 
light;  and  this  were  best  done  by  its  presentation  from  the  stand- 
point of  a proposition  or  predication.  The  procedure  will  guard 
against  the  conviction  that  Locke’s  definition  of  knowledge,  as  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas,  is  mere  words,  and  likewise, 
against  the  opposite  conviction  that  true  predication  is  thereby 
involved  or  understood. 

5.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  11,  sec.  14.  Italics  are  mine. 

6.  Bk.  II,  ch.  7,  sec.  10. 


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There  are  two  sorts  of  general  propositions,  says  Locke,  the 
truth  of  which,  it  is  affirmed,  we  come  to  know  with  perfect  cer- 
tainty. “The  one  is,  of  those  trifling  propositions  [otherwise  called, 
analytical  or  explicative  propositions]  which  have  a certainty  in 
them,  but  it  is  only  a verbal  certainty,  but  not  instructive.  And, 
secondly,  we  can  know  the  truth  and  so  may  be  certain  in  proposi- 
tions, which  affirm  something  of  another,  which  is  a necessary  con- 
sequence of  its  precise  complex  idea,  but  not  contained  in  it:  as 
that  the  external  angles  of  all  triangles  are  bigger  than  either  of 
the  opposite  internal  angles.”7  Modes  are  said  to  yield  this  type 
of  instructive  propositions,  which  Locke  then  sets  up  in  radical 
contrast  to  all  general  propositions  based  on  substances,  as,  for 
example,  that  “gold  is  yellow;”  which,  if  they  are  certain,  are 
trifling;  and  if  instructive,  are  uncertain.8  We  have  trifling  prop- 
ositions, in  respect  to  substances,  “when  a part  of  the  complex 
idea  is  predicated  of  the  name  of  the  whole,”  as  “when  the  genus 
is  predicated  of  the  species,  or  more  comprehensive  of  less  compre- 
hensive terms.  For  what  information,  what  knowledge,  carries 
this  proposition  in  it : viz.,  Lead  is  a metal,  to  a man  who  knows 
the  complex  idea  the  name  lead  stands  for?  . . . Indeed  to  a man 
that  knows  the  signification  of  the  word  metal,  and  not  of  the  word 
lead,  it  is  a shorter  way  to  explain  the  signification  of  the  word 
lead.  . . . But,  before  a man  makes  any  proposition,  he  is  sup- 
posed to  understand  the  terms  he  uses  in  it  [that  is,  he  is  sup- 
posed to  make  his  ideas  “clear,  distinct,  complete,  and  perfect” 
before  they  enter  a proposition  or  enter  the  knowledge  situation] 
or  else  he  talks  like  a parrot,  and  making  a noise  by  imitation  and 
framing  certain  sounds,  which  he  has  learnt  of  others ; but  not 
as  a rational  creature,  using  them  for  signs  of  ideas  which  he  has 
in  his  mind.”9 

This  passage  is  illuminating  and  throws  Locke’s  whole  position 
in  full  relief.  All  reality,  as  thus  specified,  begins  and  ends  with 
ideas,  and  all  predication  is  explication ; and  that  explication  (and, 
hence,  predication)  does  not  realize  itself  as  a fact,  save  where 
ideas  are  already  “complete  and  perfect”  before  they  enter  or 
attempt  to  enter  the  knowledge  situation.  Hence  explication  and  a 
knowledge  situation  are  one  in  meaning.  Entering  the  knowl- 
edge situation  then,  is  not  for  the  purpose  of  studying  objects  in 

7.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  8,  sec.  8. 

8.  Ibid.,  sec.  9. 

9.  Ibid.,  secs.  4-7. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


45 


their  changing  value  or  relations  to  other  objects  thus  noted,  dis- 
covered, or  forced  upon  them  (the  proper  role  of  predication,  fully 
recognized  in  his  account  of  sorts),  but  that  entrance  into  the 
knowledge  situation,  namely,  predication  is  merely  for  an  explan- 
ation of  what  already  exists  in  a completed  form,  or  comes  thus 
to  exist  through  some  assumed  inner  development  or  dynamic 
motive  that  ideas  have  of  their  own  and  wholly  outside  of  a knowl- 
edge situation. 

Here  then  in  Locke  we  have  an  anti-relativistic  motive  of  im- 
portance, because  it  is  so  prominent.  The  contention  enjoins 
the  need  to  inquire  more  narrowly  into  this  d priori  claim.  For,  as 
this  claim  implies,  ideas  (objects)  are  products  involving  neither 
relations  nor  knowledge.  Inquiry  into  this  contention  constitutes 
the  subject-matter  of  the  next  chapter.  Here  it  will  suffice  to 
observe  that  even  though  knowledge  and  meaning  are  taken  by 
him  in  the  light  of  “extraneous  superinductions,”  this  claim  ac- 
quires force  only  to  the  extent  in  which  the  thought-process 
appears  transferred  within  the  periphery  of  the  ideas  themselves. 
How  this  matter  is  ultimately  resolved  in  his  pages,  our  future 
chapters  are  required  to  help  make  clear.  At  this  point,  how- 
ever, be  it  said,  that  in  this  self-sufficient  character  of  our  ideas, 
we  find  in  Locke  the  one  extreme  anti-relativistic  motive,  and,  such 
as  it  is,  the  direct  opposite  of  his  general  contention,  that  ideas 
or  objects  are  nothing  but  “powers,”  that  is,  relations. 

CHAPTER  VIII 

ABSOLUTE  KNOWLEDGE  : THE  PRIMACY  OF  THE  “VISIBLE  RELATION” 
AND  OF  CONDUCT 

Locke’s  claim  that  an  absolute  knowledge  exists,  bulks  forth 
with  large  proportions,  giving  occasion  in  Book  IV  for  the  central 
problem  there  set  up  between  knowledge  proper  and  knowledge 
as  mere  opinion  or  judgments  of  probability. 

The  distinction  made  rests  upon  the  assertion,  as  expressed  in 
Kantian  terminology,  that  certain  ideas  (modes)  are  a priori  deter- 
minable, and  that  others  (substances)  are  d posteriori  determin- 
able. Thus  Locke  writes : “In  some  of  our  ideas  there  are  certain 
relations,  habitudes,  and  connections,  so  visibly  included  in  the 
nature  of  the  ideas  themselves,  that  we  cannot  conceive  them 


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University  of  Cincinnati  Studies 


separable  from  them  by  any  power  whatsoever.  And  in  these 
only,  we  are  capable  of  certain  and  universal  knowledge.  Thus 
the  idea  of  a right-lined  triangle  necessarily  carries  with  it  an 
equality  of  its  angles  to  two  right  ones.  Nor  can  we  conceive 
this  relation,  this  connection  of  these  two  ideas  to  be  possibly 
mutable,  or  to  depend  on  any  arbitrary  power  which  of  choice 
made  it  thus  or  could  make  it  otherwise  j"1  whereas  in  respect  to 
“the  coherence  and  continuity  of  the  parts  of  matter ; the  pro- 
duction of  sensation  in  us  of  colors  and  sounds,  etc.,  by  impulse 
and  motion ; nay,  the  original  rules  and  communication  of  motion 
being  such  wherein  we  can  discover  no  natural  connection  with 
any  ideas  we  have,  we  cannot  but  ascribe  them  to  the  arbitrary 
will  and  good  pleasure  of  the  Wise  Architect.’’2  When  ideas  of 
the  latter  type  are  joined  together  in  a proposition,  because 
their  “connection  and  dependencies,  being  not  discoverable  in 
our  ideas,  we  can  have  but  an  experimental  knowledge  of  them.” 
All  such  propositions  are  held  as  limited  in  scope,  conditional  in 
character,  and  full  of  uncertainty  and  possible  error.  “Cer- 
tainty and  universality’’  in  knowledge  only  exists  where,  “ by 
the  mere  contemplation  of  our  ideas,”  I am  able  to  affirm 
something  of  another  idea  “which  is  a necessary  conse- 
quence of  its  precise  complex  idea,  but  not  contained  in  it,”3 
although  “certainty”  without  “universality”  is  attained  in  the 
other  type  of  ideas  in  our  judgments  of  “particulars”:  “as  when 
our  senses  are  actually  employed  about  any  object,  we  do  know 
that  it  exists ; so  by  our  memory,  we  may  be  assured  that  hereto- 
fore things  that  affected  our  senses  have  existed.”4  But  judgments 
of  “particulars”  aside,  which  do  not  here  concern  us,  “certainty 
and  universality”  in  knowledge,  if  anything  more  than  verbal  or 
trifling,  is  possible  only  with  that  type  of  ideas  where,  as  stated, 
by  the  mere  contemplation  of  an  idea,  we  are  able  to  affirm  some- 
thing of  another  idea  “which  is  a necessary  consequence  of  its 
precise  complex  idea  but  not  contained  in  it.”  Where  such  a priori 
determination  of  an  idea  is  not  possible,  we  do  not  have  knowl- 
edge in  his  use  of  the  word,  as  identified  with  “certainty  and 
universality,”  but  mere  “opinion”  or  judgments  of  probability. 
Thus  considered  and  thus  distinguished,  he  regards  knowledge 

1.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  8,  sec.  8.  Italics  are  mine. 

2.  Ibid.,  ch.  3,  sec.  29. 

3.  Ibid.,  ch.  8,  sec.  8. 

4.  Ibid.,  ch.  11,  sec.  11. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


47 


possible  only  in  respect  to  modes,  in  truth  whereof  mathematics  is 
cited  as  an  accomplished  fact,  and  “demonstrated  morality”  a pet 
faith  and  conviction  of  his ; whereas  “propositions  that  are  made 
about  substances,  if  they  are  certain,  are  for  the  most  part  trifling; 
and,  if  they  are  instructive,  are  uncertain,  and  such  as  we  can 
have  no  knowledge  of  their  real  truth,  however  much  constant  ob- 
servation and  analogy  may  assist  our  judgment  in  guessing.”5  The 
fact  of  this  distinction  in  Locke,  in  its  asserted  reality  and  in  its 
nature,  is  beautifully  summarized  in  the  following  brief  citation. 
He  writes : “The  want  of  ideas  of  their  real  essences  sends  us 

from  our  thoughts  to  the  things  themselves  as  they  exist.  Ex- 
perience here  must  teach  me  what  reason  cannot.”6  Rela- 
tivity will  be  found  to  be  the  outcome  of  both  aspects  of  this  doc- 
trine ; latent  in  respect  to  modes ; explicit  in  respect  to  substances. 
It  is  necessary  to  add,  however,  that  substances  do  not  attain  their 
full  and  proper  elaboration  from  him  in  Book  IV.  For  that  we 
must  turn  to  the  Chapter  on  Sorts.  And  the  same  may  be  said 
in  regard  to  modes.  Here,  substances  have  their  reality  despoiled 
and  modes  assigned  a reality  which  simulates  the  rejected  innate 
ideas. 

Locke  distinguishes  between  them  in  two  respects. 

1.  Concerning  their  origin. 

2.  Concerning  their  foundation. 

1.  In  regard  to  origin,  modes  originate  with  or  in  the  mind, 
and  present  the  status  of  “real”  essences;  whereas  substances 
have  their  origin  in  the  simple  ideas,  and,  hence,  are  of  the  so- 
called  “nominal”  essence  only. 

2.  In  regard  to  their  respective  foundation,  modes  are  held  as 
grounded  in  abstract  reason,  and  involve  for  their  certainty,  (a) 
“the  mere  evidence  of  the  thing  itself”  or  (b)  the  principle  of 
Inconceivability.  As  for  substances,  their  foundation  is  said  to  be 
experience  as  divorced  from  Reason. 

FOUNDATION  OF  MODES 

Locke  gives  the  matter  incidental  rather  than  deliberate  atten- 
tion. He  merely  speaks  of  a “visible”  connection  between  certain 
of  our  ideas  and  the  lack  of  such  “visible”  connection  among 
other  ideas ; but  he  nowhere  attempts  to  articulate  what  his  asser- 

5.  Ibid.,  ch.  8,  sec.  9.  Italics  are  mine. 

6.  Ibid.,  ch.  12,  sec.  9.  Italics  are  mine. 


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tion  appears  to  involve.  Thus  he  writes  in  his  Third  Letter  to 
Stillingfieet : “To  perceive  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two 
ideas  and  not  to  perceive  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two 
ideas  is,  I think,  a criterion  to  distinguish  what  a man  is  certain 
of  from  what  he  is  not  certain  of.  Has  your  Lordship  any  other 
or  better  criterion  to  distinguish  certainty  from  uncertainty?’' 
That  mere  awareness  is  the  principle  here  involved,  seems  obvious. 
In  other  cases,  where  Locke  intimates  the  existence  of  a rational 
foundation  between  ideas,  the  principle  actually  involved  is  the 
principle  of  inconceivability.6  One  additional  quotation  in  this 
connection  must  also  suffice.  “We  cannot  conceive  the  relation, 
the  connection  of  these  two  ideas  [speaking  of  certain  parts  of  a 
triangle],  to  be  possibly  mutable,  or  to  depend  on  any  arbitrary 
power  which  of  choice  made  it  thus  or  could  make  it  otherwise.” 
They  stand  for  reason,  as  it  were,  made  objective  and  inherent  in 
the  very  nature  of  this  class  of  things.  But  as  Locke  was  seen 
to  take  his  simple  ideas  more  or  less  for  granted  (logical  data, 
rather  than  psychological),  so  with  the  fact  of  consciousness  as 
awareness  or  perception,  he  merely  accepts  its  deliverance  as  a 
fact  that  is  ultimate,  and  does  not,  save  incidentally,  make 
it  a subject  of  special  inquiry.  Certain  connections,  he  af- 
firms, are  “visible,”  and  others  are  not,  and,  because  “visible,” 
they  are  claimed  to  be  underived,  unconditioned,  and  final. 
They  are  then  forthwith  accepted  as  constituting  knowledge 
that  is  absolute.  But  when  we  inquire  into  this  alleged  distinc- 
tion within  connections,  we  find  that  the  whole  matter  resolves 
itself  into  the  claim  that  in  certain  objects,  as  in  the  case  of  a 
triangle,  parts  are  found  that  mutually  and  inevitably  involve  and 
implicate  each  other;  whereas,  in  the  case  of  substance,  he  takes 
great  pains  to  prove  that  the  direct  opposite  is  found  to  character- 
ize its  parts ; they  are  discrete  and  disparate,  without  rhyme  or 
rhythm  in  order  and  arrangement,  and  at  no  time  permit  the  mind, 
by  the  mere  contemplation  of  the  one,  to  pass  to  the  other.  He 
fails,  however,  in  this  affirmed  distinction,  to  take  note  of  three 
significant  facts:  first,  that  the  triangle,  like  any  other  object 
of  thought,  is  a construct ; secondly,  that  it  is  relative  to  the 
mind,  whose  principle  of  self-evidence,  although  in  itself 
ultimate,  involves,  in  any  given  situation,  the  principle  of 

6.  The  connection  between  ideas  of  the  a priori  type  yields  a “cer- 
tainty every  one  finds  to  be  so  great  that  he  cannot  imagine,  and 
therefore  not  require  a greater.”  Bk.  IV,  ch.  2,  sec.  1. 


1 


Relativity  and  Locke  49 


exclusion  or  inconceivability,  and  hence  is  inherently  relative  and 
conditioned,  whether  such  conditions  remain  fixed  or  changeable ; 
and  thirdly,  that  it  is  dependent  in  this  specific  instance,  upon  a 
derived  and  fixed  conception  of  space,  which  conception,  if  altered, 
would  subject  the  triangle  to  the  same  vicissitudes  of  change  that 
any  other  object  finds  itself  exposed  to  share.  Allowing  for  a dif- 
ference in  degree,  I can  see  no  reason  why  the  substance  gold,  as  a 
construct,  deliberately  held  fixed  to  the  exclusion  of  change,  should 
any  less  successfully  implicate  its  parts  than  a triangle.  It 
may  be  affirmed  of  the  triangle  that  its  sides  implicate  the 
angles  in  a way  that  weight  and  the  color  of  my  fixed 
concept  of  gold  would  not  implicate  each  other.  But  in  these 
two  situations,  is  the  difference  at  bottom  any  other  than  the  fact 
that  the  principle  of  inconceivability  is  differently  involved?  I 
admit  a difference  of  degree,  but  not  a difference  of  kind.  Nor  is 
Locke  himself  blind  to  the  contention  I here  raise.  Such  a passage 
as  the  following,  wherein  it  is  declared  that  the  principle  of  uni- 
formity is  involved  in  mathematics  no  less  than  in  knowledge  of 
substances,  helps  to  destroy,  by  Locke’s  own  confession,  the  very 
essence  of  the  issue  propounded.  “If  the  perception  that  the  same 
ideas  will  eternally  have  the  same  habitudes  and  relations  be  not  a 
sufficient  ground  of  knozvledge,  there  could  be  no  knowledge  of 
general  propositions  in  mathematics ; for  no  mathematical  demon- 
stration could  be  other  than  particular : and  when  a man  has  de- 
monstrated any  proposition  concerning  one  triangle  and  circle  his 
knowledge  would  not  reach  beyond  that  particular  diagram.”7 
Concerning  his  other  claim,  that  of  inconceivability,  nothing 
more  needs  to  be  said.  An  object  may  be  absolute  for  me  because 
I cannot  conceive  it  to  be  other  than  it  is.  But  then  at  what  point, 
pray,  is  that  object  in  my  conception  of  it,  or  in  my  inability  to 
conceive  it  otherwise,  unconditioned?  And  to  concede  this  point,  is 
to  concede  the  sole  point  at  issue  between  a relativistic  and  an 
absolute  view  of  an  object.  The  absolute  point  of  view  does  not 
only  require  the  possibility  of  an  unconditioned  and  an  undeter- 
mined object,  but  an  unconditioned  mode  of  perception  or  concep- 
tion as  well.  But,  after  all,  Locke’s  interest  centers  itself  primarily 
in  the  determination  of  objects  such  as  they  are.  Let  us  then, 
without  more  ado,  turn  to  his  account  of  modes  as  having  their 
origin  in  Reason  and  not  in  Experience.  Modes,  in  their  proper 

7.  Bk.  IV,  cli.  l,  sec.  9. 


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character,  as  has  been  stated,  shall  be  taken  up  for  inquiry  in 
future  chapters ; and  so  with  substances.  Here  we  are  merely 
to  concern  ourselves  with  the  a priori  element  that  modes  are 
made  to  involve. 

origin  of  d priori  modes 

Relevant  statements  on  modes,  scattered  throughout  the  Essay 
in  endless  repetition,  assume  the  following  forms:  (a)  that 

modes  are  of  a real  essence;  ( b ) that  they  are  ideas  of 
Reason  and  not  of  Experience  ; (c)  “that  wherever  we  can  suppose 
such  a creature  as  man  is,  endowed  with  such  faculties,  and  thereby 
furnished  with  such  ideas  as  we  have,”  the  same  knowledge  must 
follow;  ( d ) “for  the  same  ideas  have  immutably  the  same  rela- 
tions and  habitudes,”  and  (e)  knowledge  is  a consequence  of 
ideas,  and  not  the  reverse;  hence  (/)  these  ideas  are  primary,  and 
not  the  result  of  knowledge.  And  lastly,  ( g ) modes  are  of  the 
Mind’s  own  making,  ( h ) made  very  arbitrarily.  Consider  these 
statements,  and  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  are,  either  (1 ) that  the 
mind  out  of  nothing,  under  necessity  or  at  pleasure,  creates  some- 
thing; or  (2)  that  it  has  native  or  original  ideas  of  its  own,  and 
hence  creates  nothing  but  merely  unfolds  what  is  latent;  or  (3) 
that  it,  within  a given  experience,  has  the  faculty  to  create  some- 
thing new,  as  conditioned  within  and  conditioned  without.  Which 
conclusion  shall  we  accept?  The  first  conclusion  is  absurd;  the 
second  is  in  contradiction  with  his  denial  of  innate  ideas ; and  the 
third  is  impossible  in  the  light  of  the  antithesis  he  here  sets  up  be- 
tween Reason  and  Experience.  To  conclude,  then,  as  we  did  in  a 
previous  chapter,  that  the  Mind,  according  to  Locke,  has  an  origin- 
ating activity  seems  to  invite  least  violence  to  all  the  facts  of  the 
case.  This  is  our  positive  conclusion.  It  is  only  when  we  ask  of 
Locke,  as  we  must  in  Book  IV,  what  an  originating  capacity  may 
achieve  where  it  has  no  data,  that  this  positive  conclusion  in  Locke 
is  apt  to  be  overlooked.  Modes  and  abstract  ideas  are  the  mind’s 
products,  it  is  there  affirmed.  But  if  so,  where  does  the  mind  get 
its  data?  In  Book  IV,  nothing  else  remains  to  draw  upon  for 
such  data  than  Reason  as  opposed  to  Experience.  But  where  is 
Reason,  as  opposed  to  Experience,  to  get  that  data?  From  innate 
ideas?  Locke  would  hardly  admit  this.  But  what  other  alterna- 
tive lies  open  to  us  for  choice?  In  the  face  of  this  obvious  pre- 


Relativity  and  Locke 


51 


dicament,  however,  let  us  not  lose  sight  of  Locke’s  conception 
of  the  mind  as  active  and  as  law  giving. 

SUBSTANCES  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  EXPERIENCE  DIVORCED  FROM 

REASON 

I turn  from  a priori  modes  to  consider  a posieriori  substances. 
With  substances,  Locke  ceases  to  be  merely  dogmatic. 

Knowledge,  as  we  are  told,  depends  upon  the  fulfilment  of 
two  conditions.  First,  that  we,  “by  the  mere  consequence  of  any 
idea,”  can  affirm  another  “which  is  a necessary  consequence  of  its 
precise  complex  idea,  but  not  contained  in  it.”8  Or  secondly,  that 
“connections  and  dependencies”  must  be  “visible,”  and  that 
where  “connections  and  dependencies  are  not  thus  discoverable  in 
our  ideas,  we  can  have  but  an  experimental  knowledge  of  them.” 
It  presupposes  that  our  account  of  knowledge,  in  respect  to  modes, 
was  positive  in  its  outcome,  whereas  the  account  proved  negative, 
save  for  the  one  positive  conclusion  we  drew  above  in  respect  to 
his  view  of  the  mind  as  originating  and  form-giving.  These  convic- 
tions, however,  furnish  the  setting  of  his  inquiries  concerning  sub- 
stances in  Book  IV.  I begin  my  account  with  a passage  from  the 
text:  “Had  we  such  ideas  of  substance  as  to  know  what  real 

constitutions  produce  these  sensible  qualities  we  find  in  them,  and 
how  these  qualities  flowed  from  thence,  we  could,  by  the  specific 
ideas  of  their  real  essence  in  our  minds,  more  certainly  find  out 
their  properties  and  discover  what  qualities  they  had  or  had  not, 
than  we  can  now  by  our  senses  : and  to  know  the  properties  of  gold, 
it  would  be  no  more  necessary  that  gold  should  exist  and  that  we 
should  make  experiments  upon  it,  than  it  is  necessary  for  the 
knowing  of  the  properties  of  a triangle,  that  a triangle  should 
exist  in  any  matter,  the  idea  in  our  minds  would  serve  for  one  as 
well  as  the  other.  But  we  are  so  far  from  being  admitted  into  the 
secrets  of  nature,  that  we  scarce  so  much  as  ever  approach  the 
entrance  towards  them.”  How  monotonous  this  strain  is  in  Locke, 
the  projection  of  the  a priori  ideal  in  respect  to  substances  and  its 
rejection,  must  be  perfectly  familiar.  Yet  substances  as  of  this 
or  that  collection  of  simple  ideas  do  exist.  How  then  do  we  come 
by  them? 

8.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  6,  sec.  11. 


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(a)  THE  DISPARATE  AND  DISCRETE  CHARACTER  OF  SUBSTANCES 

“The  simple  ideas  whereof  our  complex  ideas  of  substances 
are  made  up  are  such  as  carry  with  them,  in  their  own  nature,  no 
visible  necessary  connection  or  inconsistency  with  any  other  simple 
ideas,  whose  co-existence  with  them  we  would  inform  ourselves 
about.  . . . Besides  our  ignorance  of  the  primary  qualities  on  which 
depend  all  their  secondary  qualities,  there  is  yet  another  and 
more  incurable  part  of  ignorance,  . . . and  that  is,  that  there 
is  no  discoverable  connection  between  any  secondary  quality  and 
those  primary  qualities  which  it  depends  on.  . . . We  are  so  far 
from  knowing  what  figure,  size,  or  motion  of  parts  produces  a 
yellow  color,  a sweet  taste,  or  a sharp  sound,  that  we  cannot 
by  any  means  conceive  how  any  size,  figure,  or  motion  of  any  par- 
ticles, can  possibly  produce  in  us  the  ideas  of  any  color,  taste  or 
sound  whatsoever ; there  is  no  conceivable  connection  between  the 
one  and  the  other.  . . . How  any  thought  should  produce  a motion 
in  body  is  as  remote  from  the  nature  of  our  ideas,  as  how  any  body 
should  produce  any  thought  in  the  mind.  ...  In  vain,  therefore, 
shall  we  endeavor  to  discover  by  our  ideas  (the  only  true  way  of 
certain  and  universal  knowledge)  what  other  ideas  are  to  be  found 
constantly  joined  with  that  of  our  complex  idea  of  any  substance. 
. . . So,  that,  let  our  complex  idea  of  any  species  of  substance  be 
what  it  will,  we  can  hardly,  from  the  simple  ideas  contained  in  it, 
evidently  determine  the  necessary  co-existence  of  any  other  quality 
whatsoever.  Our  knowledge  in  all  these  inquiries  reaches  very 
little  further  than  our  experience.  . . . That  it  is  so,  if  experience 
did  not  convince  us,  the  consideration  of  the  things  themselves 
would  never  be  able  in  the  least  to  discover  to  us.”9  But  with  ideas 
of  substances  lacking  an  inherent  constitution,  and  also  lacking 
“discoverable  connections”  between  them  or  their  parts,  his  con- 
clusion is  that  substances  are  all  alike  arbitrary  and  inadequate 
forms  of  reality. 

(&)  IDEAS  OF  SUBSTANCES  ARBITRARY  PRODUCTS  AND  INADEQUATE 

“Distinct  ideas  of  the  several  sorts  of  bodies  that  fall  under 
the  examination  of  our  senses  perhaps  we  may  have : but  adequate 
ideas,  I suspect,  we  have  not  of  any  one  amongst  them.  . . . Hence 
no  science  of  bodies.”10  They  are  inadequate,  no  matter  what 

9.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  3. 

10.  Ibid.,  sec  26. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


53 


specific  determination  we  fix  upon,  because  we  do  not  know  what 
possible  relations  an  object  may  assume,  and  hence  what  quali- 
ties properly  belong  to  it  and  what  do  not.  “No  one  who  hath 
considered  the  properties  of  bodies  in  general,  or  of  gold  in  partic- 
ular, can  doubt  that  this  called  gold  has  infinite  other  properties  not 
contained  in  that  complex  idea”11  that  we,  in  any  specific  case,  may 
decide  upon.  “So  that  if  we  make  our  complex  idea  of  gold  a body 
yellow,  fusible,  ductile,  weighty  and  fixed,  we  shall  be  at  the  same 
uncertainty  concerning  solubility  in  aqua  regia,  and  for  this  reason : 
since  we  can  never,  from  the  consideration  of  the  ideas  themselves, 
with  certainty  affirm  or  deny  of  a body  whose  complex  idea  is  made 
up  of  yellow,  very  weighty,  etc.,  that  it  is  soluble  in  aqua  regia ; 
and  so  on  of  the  rest  of  its  qualities.”12 

The  disparate  and  discrete  character,  then,  of  our  ideas,  the 
indefinite  and  inexhaustible  number  of  them  that  may,  upon  equal 
ground,  come  to  form  a part  of  any  specific  determination  of  sub- 
stances, and  the  flux  thus  of  necessity  projected  into  our  sub- 
stances, and  his  assumption  that  such  is  not  the  case  with  modes, 
constitute  the  ground  upon  which  Locke  forces  the  sharp  antithesis 
between  modes  and  substances,  or  “abstract  ideas  and  their  rela- 
tions” and  “matter-of-fact.”  Hence,  instead  of  instructive  a 
priori  judgments  being  possible  in  respect  to  substances,  he  forces 
their  antithesis  to  modes  to  a point  that  makes  substances  seem  in 
Book  IV  as  little  else  than  a highly  capricious  fluctuation  of  parts. 
If  only  “we  had  such  ideas  of  substances  as  to  know  what  real  con- 
stitution [in  each]  produces  those  sensible  qualities  we  find  in 

them, ”13  then  all  would  be  well — so  Locke  keeps  repeating. 
But  substances  have  no  such  central  core  of  reality,  and, 

then,  he  concludes,  that  they  have  no  adequacy,  no  fixity,  no  truth, 
and  no  reality  at  all.  Nor  can  the  substitution  of  judgments  of 
probability  for  this  affirmed  lack  of  proper  knowledge  alter  or 
improve  the  situation  any.  If  substances  are  of  a pure,  unregu- 
lated flux  in  the  one  case,  they  continue  pure,  unregulated  flux 
in  the  other.  And  the  question  is,  not  how  would  we,  but  how 
does  Locke  himself  handle  this  situation?  This  is  the  subject 
proper  of  Book  III  and  of  a later  chapter. 

Suppose  we  grant  Locke  that  no  abstract  consideration  of  an 

11.  Bk.  II,  ch.  31,  sec.  10. 

12.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  6,  sec.  9. 

13.  Ibid.,  sec.  10. 


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object  can  yield  an  adequate  one, — for  such  is  here  the  mode  of 
his  approach  and  such  the  conclusion  here  drawn.  Does  it  neces- 
sarily follow  that  an  abstract  consideration  and  determination  of 
an  object  is  the  only  proper  one,  or  that  adequacy  of  an  object 
implies  a theoretical  exhaustiveness  of  its  infinite  possible  rela- 
tions? We  get  two  distinct  resolutions  of  this  matter  from  Locke 
in  Book  IV,  one  that  is  sceptical  in  its  outcome  and  the  other  that 
is  constructive  and  relativistic.  I shall  consider  the  sceptical 
issue  first. 

THE  PRIMACY  OF  CONDUCT 

He  writes : “The  way  of  getting  and  improving  our  knowl- 
edge in  substances  only  by  experience  and  history,  which  is  all 
that  the  weakness  of  our  faculties  . . . can  attain  to,  makes  me 
suspect  that  natural  philosophy  is  not  capable  of  being  made  a 
science  . . . from  whence  it  is  obvious  to  conclude  . . . that 
morality  is  the  proper  science  and  business  of  mankind  in  gen- 
eral.”14 Namely,  in  the  defeat  of  theory  or  science  turn  to  con- 
duct for  truth  and  reality.  This  demands  a word. 

In  this  deference,  or  better,  abdication  of  knowledge  in  the 
interest  of  conduct,  we  have  a lurking  fallacy.  When  we  say 
knowledge  must  subordinate  itself  to  conduct,  the  assertion  has  a 
certain  pertinency  when  it  appears  as  a needful  corrective  of  a 
one-sided,  opposite  theoretical  tendency ; but  beyond  that  it  has 
no  more  force  than  to  say  that  conduct  must  subordinate  itself  to 
knowledge.  If  the’ principle  of  relativity,  erroneously  construed 
or  applied,  compasses  the  bankruptcy  of  knowledge  in  theory,  we 
cannot  thereafter  logically  ignore  this  defeat  of  knowledge  and 
make  it  do  service  in  a sphere,  supposedly  different,  as  if  knowl- 
edge had  not  met  defeat  and  as  if  conduct  itself  were  not  dis- 
rupted in  the  general  disruption  of  other  objects.  Knowledge 
does  not  cease  to  be  a failure,  and  as  a failure  it  is  totally  useless 
when  made  to  minister  to  conduct,  even  when  granted  that  con- 
duct itself  remains  undisrupted  (as  if  the  principle  of  relativity 
did  not  apply  to  conduct  as  to  all  objects  in  general).  Besides, 
to  speak  of  conduct  in  general  is  to  speak  of  an  abstraction  as 
mythological  as  the  abstraction  involved  in  the  notion  “matter.” 
For  conduct,  as  it  exists,  exists  in  “sorts,”  as  Locke  would  say, 
and  how  to  get  the  “sorts”  of  conduct  defined,  apart  from 

14.  Ibid.,  ch.  12,  secs.  10-11. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


55 


knowledge,  or  apart  from  the  abstract  idea,  as  he  would 
state  it,  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  each  sort,  if 
knowledge  has  previously  been  declared  a failure?  It  is  not 
logical  to  blow  hot  and  cold  with  the  same  principle.  Knowledge, 
if  not  the  pretended  failure,  may  truly  subserve  conduct ; but  con- 
duct no  less  truly  subserves  knowledge,  when  it  is  conduct, 
rather  than  some  other  object,  that  demands  a determination,  and 
without  a specific  determination  (again  to  speak  in  Locke’s  own 
language)  “particular  beings,  considered  barely  in  themselves, 
may  at  once  be  everything  or  nothing.”15  Yet  conduct  would  seem 
to  set  itself  up  as  an  Absolute.  Then  we  might  further  ask : does 
conduct  belong  to  the  class  substances  or  mixed  modes?  To  one 
of  them  or  to  simple  ideas  it  must  belong,  if  reality  has  thus  been 
exhaustively  outlined  by  him.  And  so,  instead  of  having  conduct 
in  reserve  as  a place  of  safe  retreat,  when  the  world,  otherwise 
reared  by  knowledge,  collapses,  he  really  has  nothing  in  reserve 
but  a bare,  empty  abstraction,  just  as  bare  and  empty  as  the  notion 
“matter,”  for  example.  Such,  to  my  mind,  is  the  fallacy  contained 
in  the  conduct-reference.  The  truth  contained  in  it  is  this : that 
the  ends,  aims  and  values  of  life,  as  revealed  in  conduct,  cannot 
be  prevented  from  reflecting  themselves  in  the  form,  char- 
acter, and  structure  of  things  as  of  this  or  that  sort ; that  the 
reality  that  thus  reflects  itself  in  the  various  sorts  is  no  less  cog- 
nitive in  quality  than  sense-perceptions  ; and,  according  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  relativity,  may  be  either  more  or  less  real  than  sense- 
perceptions,  as  being  a thing,  in  large  measure,  as  dependent  upon 
other  things  as  other  things  in  turn  are  dependent  upon  it.  I shall 
return  to  this  particular  issue  in  subsequent  chapters. 

This  general  conclusion  is  confirmed  in  Locke’s  constructive 
solution  of  the  above-mentioned  theoretical  defeat.  The  note  is  a 
recurrent  one  and  a brief  citation  will  suffice  for  a statement  of  the 
position.  “Our  faculties  being  suited,  not  to  the  full  extent  of 
being,  nor  to  a perfect,  clear,  comprehensive  knowledge  of  things 
free  from  all  doubt  and  scruple ; but  to  the  preservation  of  us,  in 
whom  they  are,  and  accommodated  to  the  use  of  life,  they  serve  to 
our  purpose  well  enough,  if  they  will  but  give  us  certain  notice  of 
those  things  which  are  convenient  or  inconvenient  to  us.  . . . 
So  that  this  evidence  is  as  great  as  we  can  desire,  being  as  certain 
to  us  as  our  pleasure  or  pain,  i.  e.,  happiness  or  misery;  beyond 

15.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  6,  sec.  5. 


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which  we  have  no  concernment  either  of  knowing  or  being.”10  In 
other  words,  instead  ,of  defining  an  object’s  truth,  reality,  and 
adequacy  or  inadequacy  in  abstraction  and  in  its  isolation,  he  seeks 
here  to  define  them  in  terms  of  a purpose,  a limit,  or  a 
condition  which  our  ‘needs’  impose.  But  even  in  this  shift  in  his 
position,  it  may  be  held,  he  has  not  gained  anything,  except  to 
extend  his  principle  of  relativity  to  include  a new  source  of  change 
or  determination:  a further  determination  of  objects  in  reference 
to  our  needs,  constitution,  or  ends.  Instead  of  less  flux,  then,  we 
ought  really  to  expect  more.  And,  if  not,  may  we  ask  why?  It 
does  not  introduce  more  flux,  because  he  assumes  a certain  fixity 
in  such  needs,  constitution,  or  ends.  But  what  right  has  he  to 
assume  a fixity  in  these  objects  and  fail  to  assume  a higher  degree 
of  fixity  than  he  does  in  objects  in  general?  And  suppose  we 
answer  by  reference  to  experience,  that  a fixity  is  here  recognized 
which  is  not  recognized  in  respect  to  objects  in  general;  that  my 
own  needs,  constitution,  and  ends  fluctuate  less  than  such  an  object 
as  a stone,  let  us  say;  and  then  we  may  ask  further,  is  this  true? 
And  if  not  true,  we  have  gained  one  vast  admission  in  respect  to 
substances : the  collections  of  ideas,  constituting  this  or  that  sub- 
stance, do  not  share  equally  in  their  degree  of  stability  or  flux ; 
and  this  Locke  himself  tacitly  admits  in  his  account  of  primary  and 
secondary  ideas  and  explicitly  admits  or  presents  in  his  empirical 
and  constructive  relativity.  Moreover,  Locke  does  not  deny 
that  things  “proceed  regularly”17  and  “act  by  a law  set  them.”18 
He  merely  insists  upon  the  fact,  that,  even  if  they  act  by  a law 
set  them,  it  is  “a  law  that  we  know  not.”19  It  is  thus  the  sensu- 
ous unknowability  and  not  the  non-existence  of  a law  or  order 
or  union  of  parts  that  Locke  insists  upon. 

The  reality,  truth,  adequacy,  and  certainty  of  simple  ideas  in 
general,  he  defines  in  the  same  way.  They  are  real,  etc.,  for  the 
reason,  as  he  repeats  over  and  over  again,  “that  they  represent 
to  us  things  under  those  appearances  which  they  are  fitted  to  pro- 
duce in  us,  whereby  we  are  enabled  to  distinguish  the  sorts  of  par- 
ticular substances,  to  discern  the  state  they  are  in,  and  so  to  take 
them  for  our  necessities,  and  apply  them  to  our  uses.”20  Objects 

16.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  11,  sec.  8;  ch.  12,  sec.  11;  Bk.  II,  ch.  23,  secs.  12-13. 

17.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  3,  sec.  29. 

18.  Ibid. 

19.  Ibid. 

20.  Ibid.,  ch.  4,  sec. 4. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


57 


are  thus  regarded  as  partaking  of  certainty  and  adequacy  when  we 
hold  them  fixed  in  a certain  definite  and  restricted  context ; namely, 
hold  them  fixed  to  their  specific  conditions.  The  a priori  element, 
which  he  felt  must  exist  in  order  to  secure  limits  and  bounds 
and  fixity  to  things,  is  now  found,  by  this  other  view  of  his,  to 
depend  upon  certain  uniformities  in  the  connection  of  facts,  al- 
though such  facts  are  disparate  in  character  and  their  interde- 
pendence an  appearance  only,  and  to  depend  upon  needs,  interests, 
or  aims.  We  are  now  ready  to  turn  to  Locke’s  doctrines  in  their 
most  perfect  form  as  deliberately  elaborated  by  him. 


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IV 

CONSTRUCTIVE  RELATIVITY  IN  LOCKE 

CHAPTER  IX 

DOCTRINE  OF  SORTS:  MIXED  MODES  AND  SUBSTANCES 

By  the  term  “sorts,”  Locke  understands  things  as  of  this  or 
that  specific  determination  or  kind,  as  horse,  stone,  charity,  mur- 
der. It  is  a generic  term  of  which  substances,  modes,  and  rela- 
tions are  species.  Hence  to  ask  how  we  come  by  “sorts”  is  to  ask 
how  we  come  by  substances,  modes,  and  relations.  Substances 
and  modes  are  to  be  considered  in  this  chapter  and  relations  in 
the  chapter  following. 

In  the  first  place,  Locke  makes  both  substances  and  modes,  de- 
pendent upon  simple  ideas  or  the  so-called  nominal  essence.  “The 
supposition  of  a real  essence  that  cannot  be  known,”  such  is  his 
position,  “is  so  wholly  useless  and  unserviceable  to  any  part  of  our 
knowledge,  that  that  alone  were  sufficient  to  make  us  lay  it  by,  and 
content  ourselves  with  such  essences  of  the  sorts  or  species  of 
things  [namely,  the  nominal]  as  come  within  the  reach  of  our 
knowledge.”1 

Next,  substances  and  modes  are  held  to  agree  in  the  fact  “that 
sorts,  as  distinguished  and  denominated  by  us,  neither  are  nor  can 
be  anything  but  those  precise  abstract  ideas  we  have  in  our 
minds.”2  Hence  his  conclusion  in  respect  to  both : “Each  distinct 
abstract  idea  is  a distinct  essence Thus  a circle  is  as  es- 

sentially different  from  an  oval  as  a sheep  from  a goat;  and  rain 

is  as  essentially  different  from  snow  as  water  from  earth 

Thus  any  two  abstract  ideas,  that  in  any  part  vary  from  another 
with  two  distinct  names  annexed  to  them,  constitute  two  distinct 
sorts,  as  essentially  different  as  any  two  of  the  most  remote  or 
opposite  in  the  world.”3 

But  modes  and  substances  are  found  to  differ  from  each 

1.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  3,  sec.  17. 

2.  Ibid.,  sec.  13. 

3.  Ibid.,  sec.  14. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


59 


other  as  well  as  to  agree.  Let  me  enumerate  these  differences  be- 
fore turning  to  modes  and  substances  for  separate  and  enlarged 
discussion. 

Modes,  in  theory,  are  made  dependent  (a)  solely  upon  simple 
ideas  and  ( b ) upon  “the  free  choice  of  the  mind,”  giving  a union 
or  connection  to  a certain  number  of  these  ideas.  Substances,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  not  solely  dependent  upon  simple  ideas,  but 
upon  their  constant  and  inseparable  union  in  Nature  as  well.  Sub- 
stances “carry  with  them  the  supposition  of  some  real  being,  from 
which  its  complex  ideas  are  taken  and  to  which  they  are  conform- 
able. But,  in  its  complex  ideas  of  mixed  modes,  the  mind  takes  a 
liberty  not  to  follow  the  existence  of  things  exactly.”4 

The  two  are  said  to  be  very  different  in  another  essential : 
modes  deal  with  intangible  as  well  as  with  tangible  elements; 
whereas  substances  are  thought  to  deal  with  the  tangible  only. 
“And  hence  I think  it  is  that  these  mixed  modes  are  called  notions, 
as  if  they  had  their  original  and  constant  existence  more  in  the 
thought  of  men,  than  in  the  reality  of  things ; and  to  form  such 
ideas,  it  sufficed  that  the  mind  puts  the  parts  of  them  together,  and 
that  they  were  consistent  in  the  understanding,  without  considering 
whether  they  had  any  real  being ; though  I do  not  deny  but  several 
of  them  might  be  taken  from  observation,  and  the  existence  of 
several  simple  ideas  so  combined.”5  From  this  follows  the  more 
peculiar  dependence  of  modes  upon  words,  as  “the  sensible  signs 
of  his  ideas  who  uses  them.”6 

I.  MIXED  MODES 

By  mixed  modes,  then,  Locke  understands  such  “complex  ideas 
as  we  mark  by  the  names  obligation,  drunkenness,  a lie,  etc.  . . . 
being  fleeting  and  transient  combinations  of  simple  ideas,  which 
have  but  a short  existence  anywhere  but  in  the  minds  of  men.”7 
Inherently  many,  how  do  they  come  by  their  unity?  “Every 
mixed  mode,  consisting  of  many  distinct  simple  ideas,  it  seems 
reasonable  to  inquire,  ‘whence  it  has  its  unity,  and  how  such  a 
precise  multitude  comes  to  make  but  one  idea,’  since  that  combina- 
tion does  not  always  exist  together  in  nature.”8 

4.  Ibid.,  ch.  5,  sec.  3. 

5.  Bk.  II,  ch.  22,  sec.  2. 

6.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  2,  sec.  2. 

7.  Bk.  II,  ch.  22,  secs.  1 and  8. 

8.  Bk.  II,  ch.  22,  sec.  4. 


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I shall  consider  mixed  modes  under  three  heads : 

1.  Their  independence  of  Nature  and  dependence  upon  the 
mind  and  its  simple  ideas. 

2.  Their  dependence  upon  Nature. 

3.  Every  distinct  abstract  idea  is  a distinct  essence  or  sort. 

Division  three  constitutes  a far  more  vital  issue  in  connection 

with  substances.  Special  consideration  of  this  matter,  then,  were 
best  reserved  for  such  place. 

1.  THEIR  INDEPENDENCE  OF  NATURE  AND  DEPENDENCE  UPON  TPIE 
MIND  AND  ITS  SIMPLE  IDEAS 

“Nobody  can  doubt,”  he  writes  “that  these  ideas  of  mixed 
modes  are  made  by  a voluntary  collection  of  ideas,  put  together  in 
the  mind,  independent  from  any  original  patterns  in  nature.  . . . 
For  what  greater  connection  in  nature  has  the  idea  of  a man  than 
the  idea  of  a sheep  with  killing,  that  this  is  made  a particular 
species  of  action,  signified  by  the  word  murder,  and  the  other  not. 
. . . It  is  evident  then,  that  the  mind  by  its  free  choice  gives  a 
connection  to  a certain  number  of  ideas,  which  in  nature  have  no 
more  union  with  one  another  than  others  that  it  leaves  out ; . . 
whereof  the  intranslatable  words  of  divers  languages  are  a proof, 
which  could  not  have  happened,  if  these  species  were  the  steady 
workmanship  of  nature,  and  not  collections  made  by  the  mind.” 
Furthermore,  mixed  modes  “do  often  unite  into  one  abstract  idea 
things  that,  in  their  nature,  have  no  coherence ; and  so  under  one 
term  bundle  together  a great  variety  of  compounded  and  decom- 
pounded ideas  . . . often  involving  actions  that  required  time 
to  their  performance,  and  so  could  never  all  exist  together.  . . . 
Thus  the  name  of  procession,  what  a great  mixture  of  independent 
ideas  of  persons,  habits,  tapers,  orders,  motions,  sound,  does  it 
contain  in  that  complex  one,  which  the  mind  of  man  has  arbitrarily 
put  together.”  Or  again,  “when  we  speak  of  justice  or  ingratitude, 
we  frame  to  ourselves.no  imagination  of  anything  existing,  which 
we  would  conceive ; but  our  thoughts  terminate  in  the  abstract 
ideas  of  those  virtues,  and  look  not  further,  as  they  do  when  we 
speak  of  a horse  or  iron,  whose  specific  ideas  we  consider,  not  as 
barely  in  the  mind,  but  as  in  things  themselves,  which  afford  the 
original  patterns  of  those  ideas.  For  the  originals  of  mixed 
modes  then,  we  look  no  further  than  the  mind,  which  also  shows 


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61 


them  to  be  the  workmanship  of  the  Understanding.”9  Turn  where 
we  will  in  his  account  of  mixed  modes,  this  line  of  argument  will 
be  found  continually  repeated. 

That  this  description  of  modes  contains  a very  large  element 
of  truth  cannot  be  denied.  The  mind  certainly  has  the  capacity 
of  holding  parts  together  and  keeping  them  fixed  and  distinct  so 
that  “any  two  abstract  ideas,  that  in  any  part  vary  one  from 
another  . . . constitute  two  distinct  sorts,  as  essentially  different 
as  any  two  of  the  most  remote  and  opposite  in  the  world.”10 
Furthermore,  we  cannot  deny  the  radical  character  of  the  Many 
in  such  ideas  as  those  cited;  namely,  the  notion  of  a procession. 
Nor  can  we  deny  the  arbitrary  character  in  their  determination, 
so  much  insisted  upon  by  him ; not  any  more  than  we  can  deny  the 
presence  of  an  intangible  element : “what  the  word  murder  or 
sacrilege,  etc.,  signifies  can  never  be  known  from  things  them- 
selves : there  be  many  of  the  parts  of  those  complex  ideas  which 
are  not  visible  in  the  action  itself ; the  intention  of  the  mind  or 
the  relation  of  holy  things,  which  make  a part  of  murder  or 
sacrilege,  have  no  necessary  connection  with  the  outward  and 
visible  action  of  him  that  commits  either.”11  What  we  may  deny, 
is  the  range  he  ascribes  to  “the  mind  in  its  liberty  not  to  follow  the 
existence  of  things  exactly,”  as  if  it  were  in  no  sense  dependent 
at  all.  The  corrective  of  this  view  exists  in  his  pages.  This  will 
constitute  the  subject-matter  of  our  next  division. 

2.  DEPENDENCE  UPON  NATURE 

I stated  above  that,  in  theory,  Locke  distinguishes  modes  from 
substances  by  the  quality  that  substances  are  dependent  upon 
Nature  for  their  pattern,  whereas  modes  are  not  thus  dependent ; 
but  dependent  solely  upon  simple  ideas  and  upon  “the  free  choice 
of  the  mind,  pursuing  its  own  ends.”12  But  instead  of  the  affirmed 
dependence  upon  simple  ideas  only,  we  find  modes  dependent  at 
least  in  part,  “upon  experience  and  observation  of  things  them- 
selves; . . . for  their  immediate  ingredients  are  also  complex 

ideas,  although  all  our  complex  ideas  are  ultimately  resolvable 
into  simple  ideas.”13  Or  again,  “action  being  the  great  business 

9.  See  Bk.  II,  ch.  22;  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  5. 

10.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  3,  sec.  14. 

11.  Ibid.,  ch.  9,  sec.  7. 

12.  Ibid.,  ch.  5,  sec.  6. 

13.  Bk.  II,  ch.  22,  sec.  9.  Italics  are  mine. 


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of  mankind,  and  the  whole  matter  about  which  laws  are  con- 
versant, it  is  no  wonder  [that  mixed  modes  should  be  made  so 
largely  out  of  them].  . . . Nor  could  any  communication  be 

well  had  amongst  men  without  such  complex  ideas,  with  names 
to  them : and  therefore  men  have  settled  names,  and  supposed 
ideas  in  their  minds,  of  modes  of  action  distinguishable  by  their 
causes,  means,  objects,  instruments,  time,  place,  and  other  cir- 
cumstances, and  also  of  their  powers  fitted  for  those  actions”14 — 
which  amounts  to  an  admission  that  modes  are  shaped  and  gener- 
ated in  concrete  and  complex  situations.  Locke’s  notion  of  “the 
mind,  pursuing  its  own  ends,”  becomes  particularized  in  a similar 
manner.  The  abstract  end  of  an  abstract  mind  makes  way  in 
his  essay  to  ends  generated  “in  the  ordinary  occurrence  of  af- 
fairs. So  that,  if  we  join  to  the  idea  of  killing  the  idea  of  father 
or  mother,  and  so  make  a distinct  species  from  killing  a man’s 
son  or  neighbor,  it  is  because  of  the  different  heinousness  of 
the  crime,  and  distinct  punishment  due  to  the  murdering  of  a 
man’s  father  or  mother,  different  from  what  ought  to  be  in- 
flicted on  the  murder  of  a son  or  neighbor ; . . . . which 
plainly  shows,  whereof  the  intranslatable  words  of  divers  lan- 
guages are  a proof,  that  those  of  one  country,  by  their  customs 
and  manners  of  life,  have  found  occasion  to  make  several  com- 
plex ideas,  and  given  names  to  them  which  others  never  col- 
lected into  ’specific  ideas.”15  When  we  consider  modes  in  this 
so-called  dependence  upon  nature,  it  becomes  increasingly  diffi- 
cult to  differentiate  them  from  substances  and  relations.  It  is 
significant  that  in  Book  III  relations  and  modes  are  dealt  with 
as  if  they  presented  no  differences. 

Without  needlessly  dragging  out  this  account,  we  may  formu- 
late the  following  conclusions  as  emerging  from  his  description  of 
modes:  (1)  They  are  inherently  many  and  get  their  unity  in  an 
abstract  idea;  (2)  that  ends,  as  manifesting  themselves  in  com- 
plex situations,  co-operate  in  determining  their  origin  and  specific 
character;  (3)  that  value  and  meaning  enter  them  as  inseparable 
elements  and  ingredients;  (4)  they  are  constructs  and  not  copies; 
and  (5)  they  are  inherently  relative. 

14.  Ibid.,  sec.  10. 

15.  Ibid.,  secs.  7-8. 


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63 


II.  SUBSTANCES 

If  it  be  true,  as  I think  we  have  every  reason  to  maintain,  that 
Locke  is  interested  primarily  in  things,  and  interested  in  their 
ground,  foundation,  origin,  or  explanation  only  so  far  as  they 
will  serve  to  account  for  “those  notions  of  things  we  have,” 
then  his  account  of  substances  (not  to  speak  of  modes  and  rela- 
tions) ought  to  be  the  real  test  of  his  theories.  In  regard  to  the 
origin  and  foundation  of  modes,  whether  simple  or  mixed,  Locke’s 
issue  is  fairly  clear  and  definite  throughout  the  essay,  whether 
or  not  we  agree  with  his  account  “whereby  the  understanding 
comes  by  them.”  In  regard  to  substances,  the  issue  is  not  fully 
and  frankly  met  until  we  come  to  Book  III ; but  there  the  issue,  at 
length,  is  clearly  stated : “Why  do  we  say  this  is  a horse,  and 
that  a mule ; this  an  animal,  that  an  herb  ? How  comes  any 
particular  thing  to  be  of  this  or  that  sort?”16  His  answer  is, 
that  substances  are  constructs  and  not  copies ; achievements 
attained  through  trials,  experimentation,  and  comparisons,  in 
a world  where  resemblances  among  things,  as  well  as 
“regular  and  constant  union”  among  ideas,  is  accepted  by  him 
as  a fact,  and  our  sole  knowable  reality  that  designated  by  him 
as  nominal.  How  can  our  objects  be  copies,  when  objects  reveal 
different  qualities  and  properties  in  different  situations,  and  where 
“there  is  not  so  complete  and  perfect  a part  that  we  know  of 
Nature,  which  does  not  owe  the  being  it  has,  and  the  excellencies 
of  it,  to  its  neighbors : and  that  we  must  not  confine  our  thoughts 
within  the  surface  of  any  body,  but  look  a great  deal  further,  to 
comprehend  perfectly  those  qualities  that  are  in  it.”17  Hence  his 
conclusion  that  our  ideas  or  conceptions  not  “only  depend  upon 
the  mind  of  man  variously  collecting”  or  elaborating  them,  but, 
even  at  their  best,  are  “seldom  adequate  to  the  internal  nature  of 
the  things  they  are  taken  from.”18 

The  mind,  “in  making  its  complex  ideas  of  substances,  never 
puts  any  together  that  do  not  really  or  are  not  supposed  to  co-exist ; 
and  so  it  truly  borrows  that  union  from  nature.  . . . Nobody 

joins  the  voice  of  a sheep  with  the  shape  of  a horse,  nor  the  color 
of  lead  with  the  weight  and  fixedness  of  gold,  to  be  the  complex 
ideas  of  any  real  substances ; unless  he  has  a mind  to  fill  his  head 

16.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  6,  sec.  7. 

17.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  6,  secs.  11-12;  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  6,  sec.  32- 

18.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  6,  sec.  37. 


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with  chimeras.”19  But  if  this  be  true,  as  already  intimated,  sub- 
stances are  not  only  dependent  upon  simple  ideas  but  upon  “their 
constant  and  inseparable  union  in  nature  as  well.”  But  we  may 
ask  again,  as  we  did  above:  what  extension  in  the  meaning  of  the 
nominal  essence,  or  the  simple  idea  doctrine,  is  herein  presumed? 
The  simple  ideas  of  taste,  color,  etc.,  cannot  be  our  sole  type  of 
a real  perception,  if  sequence  or  co-existence  is  also  a type  of 
reality,  and  yet  no  mere  taste,  color,  etc.  For  to  deny  this  fact 
a reality  of  some  kind,  is  to  deny  the  reality  of  every  complex 
idea  in  so  far  as  it  is  complex.  In  the  meantime,  the  reality  of  a 
distinction  between  a horse  and  a mule,  an  animal  and  an  herb 
persists,  as  well  as  his  question : how  do  particular  things 

come  to  be  of  this  or  that  sort?  Now  in  Book  III,  the  complex 
idea  never  has  its  reality  questioned,  save  in  the  one  point : “Does 
it  truly  borrow  its  union  from  nature?”  If  it  does,  it  may  grow 
ever  more  and  more  complex,  and,  in  so  doing,  make  itself  ever 
more  perfect  and  adequate.  The  sole  issue  then,  that  he  here  con- 
siders is  the  question  whether  our  sort-view  of  an  object  does  or 
does  not  limit  and  define  its  whole  “measure  and  boundary.” 
That  the  sort-view  exhausts  our  total  view  of  objects,  is  his  firm 
contention — a contention  directly  at  variance  with  his  cruder 
dogmatism  that  fact  and  meaning  stand  in  absolute  divorce. 

What,  then,  is  this  special  doctrine  of  substances  to  which 
I have  -so  frequently  reverted  and  so  frequently  extolled  in 
Locke?  I shall  present  it  as  fully  in  Locke’s  own  language  as  is 
possible.  The  doctrine  involves  the  primacy  of  the  idea  in  the 
determination  of  objects,  but  it  does  so  in  a way  that  is  new  in 
the  sphere  of  metaphysics.  He  writes  to  the  following  effect: 
“In  the  substance  of  gold,  one  man  satisfies  himself  with  color  and 
weight,  yet  another  thinks  solubility  in  aqua  regia  as  necessary  to 
be  joined  with  that  color  in  his  idea  of  gold,  as  any  one  does  its 
fusibility,  solubility  in  aqua  regia  being  a quality  as  constantly 
joined  with  its  color  and  weight  as  fusibility  or  any  other  [of  its 
infinite  possible  number.]  Who  of  all  these  has  established  the  right 
signification  of  the  word,  gold?  or  who  shall  be  judge  to  deter- 
mine ? Each  has  his  standard  in  nature,  which  he  appeals  to,  and 
with  reason  thinks  he  has  the  same  right  to  put  into  his  complex 
idea  signified  by  the  word  gold,  those  qualities,  which,  upon  trial, 
he  has  found  united  ; as  another  who  has  not  so  well  examined  has 

19.  Bk.  Ill,  cli.  6,  secs.  28-29. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


65 


to  leave  them  out ; or  a third  who  has  made  other  trials,  has  to  put 
in  others.  . . . From  hence  it  will  unavoidably  follow  that 

the  complex  ideas  of  substances  [and  the  same  fact  holds  with 
modes]  will  be  very  various,  and  so  the  signification  of  thosa 
names  very  uncertain.”20  Or  again : “If  we  will  examine  it,  we 
shall  not  find  the  nominal  essence  of  any  one  species  of  sub- 
stances in  all  men  the  same : no,  not  of  that  which  of  all  others 
we  are  the  most  intimately  acquainted  with.  Nor  could  it  possibly 
be,  that  the  abstract  idea,  to  which  the  name  man  is  given,  should 
be  different  in  several  men,  if  it  were  of  nature’s  making”21 ; that 
is,  if  it  were  a copy,  and  not  a construct.  “Men  generally  con- 
tent themselves  with  some  few  sensible  obvious  qualities ; and 
often,  if  not  always,  leave  out  others  as  material  and  as  firmly 
united  as  those  that  they  take.”22  It  only  remained  necessary 
for  him  to  have  correlated  with  substances,  at  this  point,  his  modes, 
relations,  and  his  “practical”  motive  or  the  Self,  to  have  given 
his  philosophy  all  the  unity  we  could  have  desired  of  it;  for  by 
the  incorporation  of  the  Self,  as  is  done  in  his  scattered  and  un- 
systematic manner,  our  notion  of  “nature”  also  would  have  been 
widened,  with  this  additional  standard  of  reference.  His  empha- 
sis upon  diversity  in  our  conceptions  of  substances,  constitutes  a 
line  of  argument  whereby  he  seeks  to  establish  that  substances 
are  not  copies,  but  constructs ; “not  of  nature’s  making,  but  of 
man’s.” 

But  by  the  side  of  this  view  in  Locke,  wherein  our  notion  of 
objects  is  presented  in  the  light  of  constructs,  the  complex  ideas 
thereby  formed  growing  fuller  and  richer  in  content,  Locke  pre- 
sents another  view  of  abstract  or  complex  ideas,  wherein  he  affirms 
that  “the  more  general  our  ideas  are,  the  more  incomplete  and 
partial  they  are.”  As  the  student  of  Locke  commonly  goes 
astray  here,  the  matter  needs  to  be  cleared  up  before  proceeding 
with  the  above  line  of  thought.  The  following  passage  from 
Locke,  though  quoted  at  length,  demands  no  apology:  “If  the 
simple  ideas  that  make  the  nominal  essence  of  the  lowest  species 
or  first  sorting  of  individuals,  depends  upon  the  mind  of  man 
variously  collecting  them,  it  is  much  more  evident  that  they  do  so 
in  the  more  comprehensive  classes,  which,  by  the  masters  of  logic, 
are  called  genera.  . . . This  is  done  by  leaving  out  those 


20. 

Ibid. 

ch.  9,  sec. 

13. 

21. 

Ibid., 

ch.  6,  sec. 

26. 

22. 

Ibid.. 

sec.  29. 

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qualities -which  are  peculiar  to  each  sort  and  retaining  a complex 
idea  made  up  of  those  that  are  common  to  them  all ; . . . 

whereby  it  is  plain  that  men  follow  not  exactly  the  patterns  set 
them  by  nature  when  they  make  their  general  ideas  of  substances, 
since  there  is  no  body  to  be  found  which  has  barely  malleableness 
and  fusibility  in  it  [as  in  the  case  of  the  abstract  ‘general  idea’ 
metal]  without  other  qualities  as  inseparable  as  those.  But  men, 
in  making  their  general  ideas,  seeking  more  the  convenience  of 
language  and  quick  dispatch  by  short  comprehensive  signs,  than 
the  true  and  precise  nature  of  things  as  they  exist,  have,  in  the 
framing  their  abstract  (general)  ideas,  chiefly  pursued  that  end, 
which  was  to  be  furnished  with  a store  of  general  and  variously 
comprehensive  names.  So  that  in  this  whole  business  of  genera 
and  species,  the  genus,  or  more  comprehensive,  is  but  a partial 
conception  of  what  is  in  the  species,  and  the  species  but  a partial 
idea  of  what  is  to  be  found  in  each  individual.  ...  If  we  would 
rightly  consider  what  is  done  in  all  these  genera  and  species,  or 
sorts,  we  should  find  that  there  is  no  new  thing  made,  but  only 
more  or  less  comprehensive  signs.  ...  In  all  which  we  may  observe 
that  the  more  general  term  is  always  the  name  of  a less  complex 
idea,  and  that  each  genus  is  but  a partial  conception  of  the  species 
comprehended  under  it.  So  that  if  these  abstract  general  ideas 
be  thought  to  be  complete,”  it  can  only  be  in  respect  to  the  ends 
of  language  which  called  them  forth,  “and  not  in  respect  of  any- 
thing existing,  as  made  by  nature.”23  It  is  hard  to  find  a more 
suggestive  passage  in  Locke.  First,  we  have  here  his  distinction 
between  particular  abstract  ideas  and  general  abstract  ideas,  or  so- 
termed  constructs  and  the  commonly  termed  abstract  ideas ; the 
former  involving  the  mind  in  its  “compounding”  character,  the 
latter  involving  it  in  its  more  narrowly  “abstracting”  character. 
Secondly,  within  this  difference,  it  is  further  to  be  noted  that 
they  are  alike  in  being  but  partial  and  incomplete  determinations 
of  things  ; the  general  abstract  idea  is  a “partial  conception  of  what 
is  in  the  species,  and  the  'species  but  a partial  idea  of  what  is  to 
be  found  in  each  individual.”  Thirdly,  that  the  general  abstract 
idea,  “if  thought  to  be  complete”  can  only  be  so  in  respect  to  a 
certain  end,  just  as  was  found  to  be  the  case  with  modes,  and  as 
is  found  to  be  the  case  with  the  particular  abstract  idea : “men 
generally  content  themselves  with  some  few  sensible  obvious 
23.  Ibid.,  sec.  32. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


67 


qualities  . . . which  serve  well  enough  for  gross  and  confused 
conceptions,  and  inaccurate  ways  of  talking  and  thinking;  . . . 
most  men  wanting  either  time,  inclination,  or  industry  enough”  to 
determine  their  ideas  more  fully,  or  “even  to  some  tolerable  de- 
gree, contenting  themselves  with  some  few  obvious  and  outward 
appearances  of  things,  thereby  readily  to  distinguish  and  sort  them 
for  the  common  affairs  of  life .”24  So  that,  if  maintained,  that 
Locke’s  notion  of  sorts  is  an  abstraction,  rather  may  the  contrary 
statement  be  offered  as  a rejoinder:  his  general  abstract  ideas  as 
“partial  conceptions,”  which  proceed  in  their  formation  “by  leaving 
out  qualities,”  are  rather  of  the  nature  of  constructs  even  though 
more  obviously  “inadequate  to  the  internal  nature  of  the  things 
they  are  taken  from.” 

As  the  conclusion  here  drawn  will  be  confirmed  by  what  fol- 
lows, I proceed  with  my  account,  presenting  the  matter  in  Locke’s 
own  language  whenever  possible.  “This,  then,  in  -short,  is  the  case,” 
he  writes.  “Nature  makes  many  particular  things  which  do  agree 
one  with  another  in  many  sensible  qualities,  and  probably  too  in 
their  internal  frame  and  constitution  ; but  it  is  not  this  real  essence 
that  distinguishes  them  into  species ; it  is  men,  who,  taking  occasion 
from  the  qualities  they  find  united  in  them,  and  wherein  they 
observe  often  several  individuals  to  agree,  range  them  into  sorts  ; 
under  which  individuals,  according  to  their  conformity  to  this  or 
that  abstract  idea,  come  to  be  ranked  as  under  ensigns ; so  that  this 
is  a man,  that  a drill.”25  In  other  words,  we  may  here,  as  in  the 
case  of  gold,  follow  the  ‘compounding’  or  the  ‘eliminating’  process  ; 
the  process  which  makes  for  a fuller  and  richer  complex  idea, 
or  the  one  which  makes  for  a more  partial  idea ; for  no  single 
object,  for  example,  a tree,  in  any  single  instance  of  its  actual  ex- 
istence, embodies  all  the  varied  qualities  embraced  in  any  notion  of 
a tree,  not  any  more  so  than  “that  particular  parcel  of  matter  which 
makes  the  ring  on  my  finger”  exhausts  all  the  ideas  of  gold  my 
complex  idea  of  gold  stands  for.  Or  gold  may  be  viewed  under  the 
more  ‘partial  idea’  the  word  metal  stands  for ; and  the  same  with 
the  object  tree.  Thus  he  writes : “It  is  necessary  for  me  to  be  as  I 
am ; God  and  nature  have  made  me  so ; but  there  is  nothing  I have 
is  essential  to  me.  An  accident  or  disease  may  take  away  my  reason 
or  memory,  or  both,  and  an  apoplexy  leave  neither  sense  nor  under- 

24.  Ibid.,  secs.  28-29. 

25.  Ibid.,  secs.  35-36. 


6S 


University  of  Cincinnati  Studies 


standing,  no,  nor  life.  Other  creatures  of  my  shape  may  be  made 
with  more  and  better,  or  fewer  and  worse  faculties  than  I have ; 
and  others  may  have  reason  and  sense  in  a shape  and  body  very 
different  from  mine.  None  of  these  are  essential  to  the  one,  or  the 
other,  or  to  any  individual  whatever,  till  the  mind  refers  it  to  some 
sort  or  species  of  things ; and  then  presently,  according  to  the  ab- 
stract idea  of  that  sort,  something  is  found  essential.  ...  So  that  if 
it  be  asked,  whether  it  be  essential  to  me  or  any  other  particular 
corporeal  being  to  have  reason?  I say,  no;  no  more  than  it  is 
essential  to  this  white  thing  I write  on  to  have  words  in  it.  But 
if  that  particular  being  is  to  be  counted  of  the  sort  man,  and  to  have 
the  name  man  given  it,  then  reason  is  essential  to  it,  supposing 
reason  to  be  a part  of  the  complex  idea  the  name  man  stands  for; 
as  it  is  essential  to  this  thing  I write  on  to  contain  words  if  I will 
give  it  the  name  treatise,  and  rank  it  under  that  species.”26  That 
is  to  say,  that  we  depend  upon  particular  instances  of  a common 
thing  in  order  to  ascertain  the  different  qualities  which  we  ought  to 
unite  in  our  complex  idea  of  an  object;  an  operation  which  may 
be  pursued  under  this  or  that  end,  and  hence  leads  to  differ- 
ent results  in  the  way  of  a complex  idea.  These  ideas,  thus 
variously  determined,  and,  as  thus  determined,  held  fixed,  define 
the  essence  or  species  of  such  objects  as  may  be  brought  or  ranked 
under  them.  Accordingly,  my  aim  in  one  case  may  be  the  knowl- 
edge of  something  in  its  fullest  possible  particular  character, 
as  in  the  case  of  gold  or  man,  in  the  course  of  which  aim  I would 
evolve  a very  different  complex  idea  of  man,  as  in  Ethics,  for 
example,  than  would  be  the  case  if  I only  consider  him  in  the 
light  of  some  other  end,  that  view  of  him  as  embraced  by  the  idea 
actor  or  soldier.  “If  therefore,  any  one  will  think  that  a man,  and 
a horse,  and  an  animal,  and  a plant,  etc.,  are  distinguished  by  real 
essences  made  by  nature,  he  must  think  nature  to  be  very  liberal 
of  these  real  essences,  making  one  for  body,  another  for  an  animal, 
and  another  for  a horse,  and  all  these  essences  liberally  bestowed 
upon  Bucephalus.  But  if  we  would  rightly  consider  what  is  done 
in  all  these  genera  and  species,  or  sorts,  we  should  find  that  there 
is  no  new  thing  made,  but  only  more  or  less  comprehensive  signs, 
whereby  we  may  be  enabled  to  express  in  a few  syllables  great 
numbers  of  particular  things,  as  they  agree  in  more  or  less  general 
26.  Ibid.,  sec.  4. 


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69 


conceptions,  which  we  have  framed  to  that  purpose.”27  Hence 
Locke’s  conclusion,  that  “the  essence  of  each  sort  is  the  abstract 
idea,”28  understanding  by  essence,  that  “measure  and  boundary 
of  each  sort  or  species  whereby  it  is  constituted  that  particular 
sort  and  distinguished  from  others.  ...  So  that  the  essential  and 
not  essential  relates  only  to  our  abstract  ideas ; which  amounts  to 
no  more  than  this,  that  whatever  particular  thing  has  not  in  it 
those  qualities  which  are  contained  in  the  abstract  idea  which 
any  general  term  stands  for,  cannot  be  ranked  under  that  species 
nor  be  called  by  that  name,”29  not  any  more  so  than  “that  particu- 
lar parcel  of  matter  which  makes  the  ring  on  my  finger”  may  be 
called  gold  and  held  to  possess  the  essence  of  gold,  unless  that 
particular  parcel  of  matter  is  either  actually  or  potentially  all  that 
my  complex  idea  of  gold  stands  for.  “Should  there  be  found  a 
parcel  of  matter  that  had  all  the  other  qualities  that  are  in  iron,  but 
wanted  obedience  to  the  loadstone,  would  any  one  question  whether 
it  wanted  anything  essential  ? It  would  be  absurd  to  ask  whether  a 
thing  really  existing  wanted  anything  essential  to  it ; nor  could  it 
be  demanded  whether  this  made  an  essential  or  specific  difference 
or  not,  since  we  have  no  other  measure  of  essential  or  specific  but 
our  abstract  idea?  And  to  talk  of  specific  differences  in  nature, 
without  reference  to  general  ideas  in  names,  is  to  talk  unintelligi- 
bly ; . . . all  such  patterns  and  standards  being  quite  laid  aside, 
particular  beings,  considered  barely  in  themselves,  will  be  found 
to  have  all  their  qualities  equally  essential ; and  everything  in  each 
individual  will  be  essential  to  it,  or,  which  is  more,  nothing  at  all. 
For  though  it  may  be  reasonable  to  ask,  whether  obeying  the 
magnet  be  essential  to  iron  ? yet  I think  it  is  very  improper  and  in- 
significant to  ask,  whether  it  be  essential  to  the  particular  parcel 
of  matter  I cut  my  pen  with,  without  considering  it  under  the  name 
iron,  or  as  being  of  a certain  species?  . . . Hence  we  find  many  of 
the  individuals  that  are  ranked  into  one  sort,  called  by  one  common 
name,  and  so  received  as  being  of  one  species,  have  yet  qualities, 
depending  on  their  real  constitutions,  as  far  different  one  from 
another  as  from  others  from  which  they  are  accounted  to  differ 
specifically.”30 

If  then  the  essence  or  specific  denomination  or  meaning  of  each 

27.  Ibid.,  sec.  32. 

28.  Ibid.,  sec.  2. 

29.  Ibid.,  secs.  2-4. 

30.  Ibid.,  secs.  5-8. 


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particular  thing  refers  to  its  determination  within  some  complex 
idea,  what  in  the  constitution  of  things  is  sufficient  to  justify  the 
formation  of  a new  sort  or  species?  We  distinguish  between 
watches  and  clocks  as  distinct  sorts,  yet  the  variation  among 
watches  is  large  just  as  it  is  among  clocks;31  or  we  distinguish  be- 
tween water  when  liquid  and  frozen,  designating  the  former  water 
and  the  latter,  ice,  and  yet  fail  to  do  so  in  the  case  of  congealed 
jelly  when  it  is  cold  and  the  same  jelly  fluid  and  warm;  or  in  the 
case  of  liquid  gold  in  the  furnace  and  hard  gold  in  the  hands  of  a 
workman.32  This  situation  Locke  suggests,  but  he  does  not  ela- 
borate it.  This  is  much  to  be  regretted,  for  Locke  in  that  case 
would  have  been  led  to  transfer  his  present  contention  into  the 
very  citadel  of  his  dogma : nothing  exists  but  particulars ; for 
ice  and  water  denote  two  particulars  ; why  not  so  in  the  case  of  gold 
or  jelly?  All  I can  find  in  Book  III  in  any  way  pertinent  to 
the  issue  is,  that  shape,  in  the  case  of  vegetables  and  animals,  and 
color,  in  respect  to  bodies  not  propagated  by  seed,  are  the  aspects 
of  things  we  most  fix  on  and  are  most  led  by.33  In  his  account 
of  mixed  modes,  as  may  be  recalled,  he  enters  upon  this  particular 
inquiry  more  fully.  But  in  respect  to  substances,  his  interest  rarely 
strays  beyond  the  locus  of  the  following  inquiry : things  are  de- 
termined and  held  fixed  to  their  specific  sorts  by  their  abstract 
ideas,  whereby  particular  things,  “because  they  have  that  nominal 
essence,  which  is  all  one,  agree  to  that  abstract  idea  a name  is 
annexed  to,”34  come  to  be  of  this  or  that  sort,  and  so,  as  we  read 
here  and  there,  “has  in  truth  a reference  not  so  much  to  the  being 
of  particular  things,  as  to  their  general  denominations .”35  But 
this  is  but  one  conclusion;  another:  “take  but  away  the  abstract 
ideas  by  which  we  sort  individuals,  and  rank  them  under  common 
names,  and  then  the  thought  of  anything  essential  to  any  of  them 
instantly  vanishes ; we  have  no  notion  of  the  one  without  the 
other,  which  plainly  shows  their  relation.36  . . . For  to  talk  of  a 
man,  and  to  lay  by,  at  the  same  time,  the  ordinary  signification 
of  the  name  man,  which  is  our  complex  idea  usually  annexed  to 
it,  and  bid  the  reader  consider  man  as  he  is  in  himself,  and  as  he 

31.  See  Ibid.,  sec.  39. 

32.  Ibid.,  sec.  13.' 

33.  Ibid.,  sec.  29. 

34.  Ibid.,  sec.  7. 

35.  Ibid.,  sec.  8.  Italics  are  mine. 

36.  Ibid.  sec.  4. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


71 


is  really  distinguished  from  others  . . . looks  like  trifling.”37 
“Nothing  essential  to  individuals,”38  is  the  claim  he  here  sets  up, 
as  it  were,  to  confront  his  familiar  dogma:  “nothing  exists  but 
particulars” : and  his  solution,  as  noted,  appears  to  be  twofold : 
sorts  relate  “not  so  much  to  the  being  of  particular  things,  as  to 
their  denomination” ; and  the  opposite  one,  that  to  “bid  the  reader 
consider  man  as  he  is  in  himself,  as  he  is  really  distinguished 
from  others,”  apart  from  our  sort-view  of  him,  “looks  like  trif- 
ling.” It  is  true,  he  goes  on  to  say,  “that  I have  often  mentioned 
a real  essence,  distinct  in  substance  from  those  abstract  ideas  of 
them,  which  I call  their  nominal  essence.  By  this  real  essence  I 
mean  the  real  constitution  of  anything,  which  is  the  foundation 
of  all  those  properties  that  are  combined  in  it,  and  are  constantly 
found  to  co-exist  with  the  nominal  essence ; that  particular  con- 
stitution which  everything  has  within  itself,  without  any  relation 
to  anything  without  it.  But  essence  (‘measure  and  boundary’) 
even  in  this  sense  relates  to  a sort,  and  supposes  a species ; for 
being  that  real  constitution  on  which  the  properties  depend,  it 
(the  ‘real  essence’)  necessarily  supposes  a sort  of  things,  proper- 
ties belonging  only  to  species  and  not  to  individuals.”39  That  is 
to  say,  that  even  if  we  grant  “essential  differences  in  nature  be- 
tween particulars,”  the  particular  would  be  as  much  an  intellectu- 
alized  thing,  if  we  get  beyond  mere  empty  words,  as  the  “sort”.  For 
to  talk  of  particulars,  in  so  far  as  they  are  particular,  implies  that 
they  have  something  which  belongs  to  them  in  their  own  right. 
They  involve  the  inclusion  and  exclusion  of  certain  specific  de- 
terminations. That  is,  certain  properties  are  affirmed  as  essentially 
true  of  a given  thing,  others  denied  as  constituting  a part  of  it. 
And  Locke’s  conclusion  is  : “There  is  no  individual  parcel  of  matter 
to  which  any  of  its  qualities  are  so  annexed  as  to  be  essential  to  it 
or  inseparable  from  it.  That  which  is  essential,  belongs  to  it  as  a 
condition,  whereby  it  is  of  this  or  that  sort ; but  take  away  the  con- 
sideration of  its  being  ranked  under  the  name  of  some  abstract 
idea,  and  then  there  is  nothing  necessary  to  it,  nothing  separable 
from  it.”40  Namely,  the  principle  of  inclusion  and  exclusion  in 
respect  to  particulars  presupposes  and  involves  comparison,  unless 


37. 

Ibid.,  sec. 

43. 

38. 

Ibid.,  sec. 

4. 

39. 

Ibid.,  sec. 

6.  Italics  are  mine. 

40. 

Ibid. 

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some  inherent  and  discoverable  real  essence  furnishes  us  with  the 
needed  principle.  And  Locke’s  arguments  on  this  point  assume 
two  forms:  (o)  a proof  to  establish  the  ungrounded  character  for 
even  assuming  that  such  real  essences  exist,  by  seeking  to 
exhibit  a diversity  among  our  particular  parcels  of  matter,  as 
well  as  among  a supposed  natural  animal  and  vegetable  species ; 
and  ( b ),  by  the  further  claim,  that  even  if  real  essences  did  exist, 
we  do  not  know  them  and  never  can  know  them.  This  claim  is 
reinforced  by  the  relativistic  principle  either  in  its  empirical  or 
radical  form ; namely,  isolate  a piece  of  gold  from  all  other 
bodies  and  it  reduces  to  zero,  for  not  only  substances  (in  the 
nominal  sense)  but  objects  or  bodies  in  general  “are  but  powers, 
either  active  or  passive,  in  reference  to  other  bodies.”41  Locke’s 
frequent  reversion  from  this  new  to  his  old  view  grows  out  of 
his  tendency  to  confound  the  ontological  particular  (which  seems 
to  resist  death  at  all  cost)  with  “a  particular  parcel  of  matter.”  In 
either  case,  however,  we  have  his  contention  that  particulars  are 
variable  and  indeterminate  until  made  determinate  by  and  held 
fixed  in  our  abstract  ideas  of  them. 

Summarized,  the  following,  then,  presents  Locke’s  position : 
he  assumes  an  interplay  of  distinguishable  ideas  in  uniform  and  in 
variable,  in  fixed  and  in  unstable  relations.  Owing  to  these  dif- 
ferences in  their  relations,  ideas  become  as  effective  in  breaking 
down  or  altering  particulars  as  in  building  them  up  and  preserving 
them  intact,  at  least  relatively  so ; for  relations  are  as  capable  of 
neutralizing  each  other’s  effects  as  they  are  capable  of  rein- 
forcing them.  Hence  the  justification  and  rational  basis  of  Locke’s 
empirical  relativity : “bodies”  are  capable  of  producing  change  in 
or  receiving  it  from  other  “bodies”  to  an  indefinite  degree.  But 
bodies  of  this  or  that  sort,  or  of  this  or  that  determination,  in- 
volve the  abstract  idea,  which,  in  turn,  involves  and  presupposes 
analysis,  comparison,  and  synthesis.  The  outcome  in  Locke’s 
language  is  the  more  “general  abstract  idea”  or  the  more  “par- 
ticular abstract  idea.”  “Nature,”  to  which  we  must  turn  in  the 
formation  of  our  complex  idea  of  substances,  offers  “similitudes” 
and  also  parts  in  “constant  and  inseparable  union hence  nature 
offers  “parts  in  union,”  complexes,  as  real,  as  ultimate,  and  as  final 

41.  Ibid.,  ch.  9,  sec.  17.  This  principle  has  such  frequent  restate- 
ment in  Locke,  that  any  special  references  are  needless.  In  particular, 
read  ch.  9,  Bk.  Ill;  ch.  31,  Bk.  II;  and  ch.  6,  secs.  11-12,  Bk.  IV. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


73 


as  parts  in  union,  as  any  of  its  parts  viewed  in  the  light  of  simple 
ideas.  And  these  parts  “in  union,”  however  partial  or  variable  the 
parts  “in  union,”  constitute  the  data  upon  which  the  abstract 
ideas,  in  their  formation,  are  shown  dependent.  Hence  the  dictum 
that  apart  from  our  abstract  ideas,  no  determination  in  our  ob- 
jects, has  its  complement  stated  as  well : apart  from  determinations, 
however  variable  or  partial  in  our  particular  parcels  of  matter 
in  this  or  that  specific  situation,  there  is  no  determination  of  our 
abstract  ideas. 

This  doctrine  in  Locke  I designate  as  a phase  of  his  con- 
structive relativity,  and  I request  any  one  to  show  me  a doctrine 
in  his  pages,  which  in  merit  and  comprehensive  survey  can  match 
itself  with  this  one.  In  his  elaboration  of  this  doctrine,  he  ac- 
cepts his  simple  ideas  as  such  “parts,”  but  he  goes  further  when 
he  insists  as  he  does  that  the  union  of  parts,  although  no  taste, 
smell,  color,  etc.,  is  as  much  of  the  nominal  essence  as  the  simple 
ideas  of  sensuous  perception.  Such  union  represents  nothing  that 
is  “visible,”  but  it  notwithstanding  implies  that  sequence,  co- 
existence, change,  succession  are  perceived  facts ; so  real,  that  to 
talk  of  complex  ideas  as  otherwise  complex,  is  wilful  perversion. 
Hence  his  admission,  as  quoted  in  a previous  chapter,  “that  our 
ideas  of  extension,  duration,  and  number,  do  they  not  all  con- 
tain in  them  a secret  relation  of  the  parts?  Figure  and  motion 
have  something  relative  in  them  much  more  visibly ; and  sensible 
qualities,  as  color  and  smell,  etc.,  what  are  they  but  the  powers  of 
different  bodies  in  relation  to  our  perception,  etc?  . . . Our 

idea  therefore  of  power  (which  includes  in  it  also  some  kind  of 
relation,  a relation  to  action  or  change),  I think  may  well  have  a 
place  amongst  other  simple  ideas,  and  be  considered  as  one  of 
them ,”42  His  notion  of  substances  as  facts,  and  not  mere  illusions 
and  deceptions,  involves  the  same  conclusion:  the  union  of  its 
parts  is  as  real  and  ultimate  as  the  parts  themselves.  In  fact,  in 
the  above  passage,  in  order  to  establish  the  reality  of  modes,  his 
deliberate  effort  and  lack  of  hesitancy  to  resolve  “sensible  quali- 
ties” themselves  into  sheer  relations  (no  mere  passing  procedure 
with  him)  must  appear  a very  interesting  procedure,  indeed,  to 
one  saturated  with  the  notion  that  Locke  is  fundamentally  a sen- 
sationalist and  not  a relativist. 

42.  Bk.  11,  ch.  21,  sec.  3.  Italics  are  mine. 


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CHAPTER  X 

DOCTRINE  OF  MEANING 

(“Ideas  of  Relation”) 

T.  H.  Green  laments  that  Locke  “in  his  account  of  our  complex 
ideas,  explains  them  under  modes,  substances,  and  relations  as 
if  each  of  these  three  sorts  were  independent  of  the  rest.”  That 
Locke  never  thoroughly  correlates  them  is  certainly  to  be  re- 
gretted, and  yet  I feel  that  Locke  in  actual  practice  is  far  from 
keeping  them  as  independent  of  each  other  as  he,  in  theory,  often 
struggles  to  do.  For  example,  I have  tried  to  show  that,  with 
Locke,  modes,  substances  and  relations  are  alike  constructs. 
Moreover,  in  our  account  of  mixed  modes,  we  might  have  asked 
wherein  their  declared  dependence  upon  so-called  Nature  kept 
them  distinguished  from  substances;  while  substances,  in  turn,  re- 
flected in  common  with  modes  and  relations  a dependence  upon  a 
very  complex  process  of  mind  operating  variously  under  very 
complex  conditions.  When  we  come  to  our  “ideas  of  relations” 
the  overlapping  and  interfusion  is  made  even  more  apparent. 
Not  only  does  all  distinction  between  mixed  modes  and  relations 
practically  vanish,  but  that  between  simple  modes  and  relations 
vanishes  as  well ; while  substances,  in  general,  become  identified,  as 
we  have  seen,  with  “powers;”  namely,  relations.  We  ought  not 
to  feel  surprised,  therefore,  if  in  his  account  of  “ideas  of  rela- 
tion” a unified  rather  than  a split-up  world  should  become  more 
or  less  clearly  foreshadowed.  No  man  is  more  dangerously  read 
in  snatches  than  Locke. 

In  a sense,  therefore,  our  present  chapter  may  be  regarded  as  a 
restatement  of  the  problem  canvassed  at  large  in  our  previous 
chapter ; namely,  the  interdependence  of  fact  and  idea ; the  sole 
difference  being,  that  there  we  were  supposed  to  be  more  narrowly 
concerned  with  the  sensuous  structure  of  an  object,  and  that  here, 
following  Locke,  we  are  to  be  more  narrowly  concerned  with  its 
abstract  structure  in  terms  of  space,  time,  causality,  etc.,  and  with 
its  value  structure  in  terms  of  the  “various  ends,  objects,  manners, 
and  circumstances  of  human  action,”1  whereby  such  distinctions 
are  acquired  by  them  as  “good,  bad  or  indifferent.”  The  term, 
‘meaning,’  in  our  common  use  of  it,  appears  the  one  best  employed 

1.  Bk.  II.,  ch.  28,  sec.  4. 


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75 


in  the  present  discussion.  By  adhering  to  this  term,  I in  no  way 
violate  Locke’s  account  and  avoid  considerable  confusion. 

Meaning,  with  Locke,  stands  primarily  for  an  interdependence 
of  objects  as  reflected  in  thought:  “Beside  the  ideas,  whether 
simple  or  complex,  that  the  mind  has  of  things  as  they  are  in  them- 
selves, there  are  others  it  gets  from  their  comparison  one  with 
another,”2  whereby  certain  distinctions  or  “denominations”  are 
acquired  by  them,  but  not  as  something  “contained  in  the  real 
existence  of  things,  but  something  extraneous  and  superinduced  ;”3 
that  is,  meaning  is  purely  mental  in  existential  status.  He  holds 
further,  “that  there  is  no  one  thing  . . . which  is  not  capable  of 
almost  an  infinite  number  of  considerations  in  reference  to  other 
things,”  and  that  meaning  therefore  “makes  no  small  part  of  men’s 
thoughts  and  words ; v.  g.,  one  single  man  may  at  once  be  con- 
cerned in  and  sustain  all  these  following  relations  [denominations, 
meanings],  and  many  more;  viz.,  father,  brother,  son,  grand- 
father, . . . friend,  enemy,  judge,  patron,  . . . servant, 
master,  . . . older,  younger,  like,  unlike,  etc.,  etc.,  to  an  almost 
infinite  number;  he  being  capable  of  as  many  denominations  as 
there  can  be  occasions  of  comparing  him  to  other  things.”4 

The  view  presented  contains  nothing  novel.  When  an  object 
is  said  to  have  meaning  it  is  not  uncommon  to  hear  it  spoken  of 
as  something  imported  into  the  object  from  without,  and  never, 
except  by  the  idealist  or  pragmatist  perchance,  viewed  as  an  inte- 
gral part  of  said  object.  But  we  often,  as  Locke  will  be  found  do- 
ing, notwithstanding,  begin  with  the  consideration  of  meaning  as 
actually  existing  in  an  object,  and  then,  in  virtue  of  its  more 
obtrusive  variability  and  diversity,  hold  it  up  as  something  more 
or  less  gratuitously  contributed  from  without.  Relativity  is  rarely 
a disputed  fact  in  this  realm.  What  is  disputed,  is  whether  mean- 
ing does  become  or  ever  can  become  an  integral  part  of  an  object. 
It  exists  in  thought  and  for  thought  only,  proclaims  the  realist ; 
it  is  a distortion  or  falsification  of  reality,  says  the  naturalist. 
But  to  establish  either  of  their  contentions,  a criterion  of  an  object 
is  presupposed.  What  that  is  in  their  case,  I leave  for  them  to 
decipher.  I accept  for  my  object  Locke’s  object  as  presented  in 
the  previous  chapter.  Locke,  too,  must  be  expected  consistently 

2.  Ibid.,  ch.  25,  secs.  1-7. 

3.  Ibid.,  sec.  8. 

4.  Ibid.,  sec.  7. 


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to  abide  by  the  conception,  and  the  doctrine,  just  outlined,  scanned 
in  the  light  of  it.  The  deviations  will  be  exposed. 

In  accord  with  his  notion  of  an  object  as  a construct,  we  were 
not  only  said  to  be  allowed,  but  constrained,  to  fix  upon  the  •specific 
character  of  our  object  with  a variation  of  content,  and,  when 
once  defined  and  articulated,  invited  to  deny,  if  we  choose,  that 
any  further  qualification  of  it  is  relevant.  But,  then,  in  denying 
such  relevancy,  as  we  were  further  shown,  another  ground  for 
deciding  the  matter  had  to  be  found  than  is  offered  in  the  variable 
and  potential  qualities  of  the  object  itself.  If  an  object,  in  accord 
with  relativity,  becomes  what  it  is  solely  in  and  through  its  relations 
to  other  objects,  and  such  relations  are  affirmed  to  be  indefinite,  if 
not  wholly  infinite,  then  the  modifications  manifested  in  an  object 
cannot  be  designated  as  real  and  valid  in  respect  to  its  so-called 
“powers,”  but  mere  appearances  and  superinductions  when  ac- 
quired in  the  character  of  meaning.  It  is  not  logic  to  blow  hot 
and  cold  with  the  same  principle.  Locke  cannot  revert  to  the 
dogmas  of  the  realist  or  naturalist  as  he  is  apparently  seen  to  do 
in  the  above,  nor  shall  we  be  found  under  any  special  obligation 
to  halt  with  that  view  of  the  matter. 

But  the  objection  may  be  raised  that,  in  respect  to  sorts,  the 
mutual  determination  of  objects  was  of  a mechanical  type;  where- 
as here  we  are  dealing  with  mutual  determinations  essentially 
mental.  To  this  objection  I need  only  subjoin  that  causality,  the 
so-called  mechanical  type  of  determination,  is  but  one  of  Locke’s 
general  types  of  relation  included  and  elaborated  in  this  particular 
division  of  his  work.  In  fact,  to  grasp  the  full  sweep  and  con- 
structive character  of  the  present  doctrine  in  Locke,  we  must  not 
fail  to  keep  in  mind  that  it  is  here  at  length  that  we  get  his  modes, 
whether  simple  or  complex,  correlated  with  substances.  And  thus 
considered,  is  it  necessary  to  ask  who  got  closer  to  Locke,  Kant  or 
Hume?  Locke’s  signal  contribution  however  consists  in  the  fact 
that  he  correlated  his  mixed  modes  with  substances  as  well  as  the 
simple  modes,  of  time,  place,  etc.  In  following  Locke  here,  prag- 
matism or  humanism  has  in  Locke  its  antecedent  in  modern 
thought. 

Leaving  mere  theory,  then,  for  the  moment,  let  us  instead 
direct  attention  to  the  facts  he  adduced  in  support  of  theory.  Inter- 
dependence of  fact  and  meaning,  is  the  contention  I seek  to  es- 


Relativity  and  Locke 


77 


tablish;  namely,  that  meaning  is  grounded  in  fact,  just  as  in  the 
previous  chapter  its  converse  constituted  our  thesis. 

OBJECTS  AND  MEANING  FOREIGN  TO  EACH  OTHER 

1.  “Relations  (denominations)  different  from  the  Things 
related.”5  Denominations  may  be  the  same  in  men  “who  have 
very  different  ideas  of  the  things  that  are  related,  or  that  are  thus 
compared ; v.  g.,  those  who  have  far  different  ideas  of  a man  may 
yet  agree  in  the  notion  of  a father ; which  is  a notion  superinduced 
to  the  substance,  or  man,  and  refers  only  to  an  act  of  that  thing, 
called  man,  whereby  he  contributed  to  the  generation  of  one  of  his 
own  kind ; let  man  be  what  he  will.”6  But  if  it  “refers  to  an  act 
of  that  thing,”  how  does  meaning  fail  to  constitute  an  integral 
part  of  it?  But  this  observation  by  the  way! 

2.  Hence,  “change  of  relation  (denomination)  may  be  without 
any  change  in  the  object, — Caius,  whom  I consider  to-day  as  a 
father,  ceases  to  be  so  to-morrow  only  by  the  death  of  his  son, 
without  any  alteration  made  in  himself.  Nay,  barely  by  the  mind’s 
changing  the  object  to  which  it  compares  anything,  the  same  thing 
is  capable  of  having  contrary  denominations  at  the  same  time; 
v.  g.,  Caius,  compared  to  several  persons,  may  truly  be  said  to  be 
older  and  younger,  stronger  and  weaker,  etc.”7 

3.  Meanings  seemingly  inherent  in  objects,  “conceal  a tacit 
though  less  observable  relation that  is,  show  a dependence  upon 
something  else ; hence  reduce  to  the  order  of  products ; reveal 
themselves  detachable ; and,  therefore,  can  in  no  way  properly 
belong  to  an  object.  I proceed  to  quote  from  the  text  without 
criticism  or  registered  protest.  That  is  to  follow. 

“Time  and  place  are  also  the  foundation  of  very  large  relations, 
and  all  finite  beings  at  least  are  concerned  in  them,  . . . but  it 
may  suffice  here  to  intimate,  that  most  of  the  denominations  of 
things  received  from  time  are  only  relations.  Thus,  when  any  one 
says  that  Queen  Elizabeth  lived  sixty-nine  and  reigned  forty-five 
years,  these  words  impart  only  the  relation  of  that  duration  to 
some  other,  and  mean  no  more  than  this,  that  the  duration  of  her 
existence  was  equal  to  sixty-nine,  and  the  duration  of  her  govern- 
ment to  forty-five  annual  revolutions  of  the  sun ; and  so  are  all 

5.  Ibid.,  ch.  25,  sec.  4. 

6.  Ibid.,  sec.  4.  Italics  mine. 

7.  Ibid.,  sec.  5. 


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words  answering,  How  long?”8  Such  words  as  young  and  old 
are,  ordinarily,  also  thought  to  stand  for  positive  ideas,  which, 
when  considered,  will  be  found  to  be  relative;  that  is,  they  intimate 
preconceived  ideas,  formed  under  specialized  and  limited  con- 
ditions. “Thus,  having  settled  in  our  thoughts  the  idea  of  the 
ordinary  duration  of  a man  to  be  seventy  years,  when  we  say  a 
man  is  young,  we  mean  that  his  age  is  yet  but  a small  part  of  that 
which  men  usually  attain  to ; and  when  we  denominate  him  old, 
we  mean  that  his  duration  is  run  out  almost  to  the  end  of  that 
which  men  do  not  usually  exceed.  And  so  it  is  comparing  the 
particular  age  or  duration  of  this  or  that  man,  to  the  idea  of 
that  duration  which  we  have  in  our  minds,  as  ordinarily  belonging 
to  that  sort  of  animal ; which  is  plain,  in  the  application  of  these 
names  to  other  things ; for  a man  is  called  young  at  twenty  years 
and  very  young  at  seven  years  old ; but  a horse  we  call  old  at 
twenty  and  a dog  at  seven  years,  because  in  each  of  these  we 
compare  their  age  to  different  ideas  of  duration  which  are  settled 
in  our  minds.”9 

That  meaning  is  an  aspect  in  objects  distinguishable  from  its 
sensuous  quality,  no  one  would  deny.  But  beyond  this  very  gen- 
eral distinction,  the  view  of  an  object  as  a construct  presupposes 
the  presence  of  intellectual  principles  at  every  point.  And  its 
saturation  from  this  source  penetrates  to  its  core  and  is  no  mere 
thing  sticking  loosely  at  the  surface,  ready  to  be  peeled  off  by  any 
such  process  as  was  instituted  above.  Meaning  comes  into  being, 
his  illustrations  would  denote,  by  the  consideration  of  some  posi- 
tive object  under  seme  specific  idea  or  other  “settled  in  our 
minds.”  That  is,  apart  from  some  abstract  idea,  no  meaning  in 
objects  is  possible.  This  we  will  grant,  but  only  after  being  in- 
structed where  those  “ideas  settled  in  the  mind”  originate.  They 
would  seem  to  arise,  judging  from  these  very  same  illustrations, 
from  more  or  less  definite  and  concrete  situations.  In  fact,  these 
illustrations  definitely  emphasize  the  point  that  age,  youth,  size, 
etc.,  are  pure  abstractions  where  it  is  not  the  age,  youth  or  size 
of  a particular  thing  in  a particular  situation  with  its  particular 
conditions  and  limitations  all  held  together  in  one  elaborated 
notion  or  construct.  Let  us  term  the  point  of  his  departure,  m 
this  general  analysis,  that  of  pure  objectivity,  and  then  let  any  man 

8.  Ibid.,  ch.  26,  sec.  3. 

9.  Ibid.,  sec.  4. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


79 


tell,  if  he  can,  where  the  contribution  made  by  any  of  its  abstracted 
elements  begins  or  ends  and  where  that  of  its  other  abstracted 
elements  begins  or  ends.  In  his  chapters  on  relation,  Locke 
moves  on  this  purely  objective  plane  of  existence,  and  seeks  to 
disrupt  it  by  the  introduction  of  his  abstract  realistic  object  on 
the  one  hand,  and  by  the  introduction  of  an  equally  depleted 
abstract  idea  on  the  other.  But  even  from  the  passages  quoted  'in 
this  chapter,  the  peculiar  novelty  of  them  all  lies  in  the  fact  that 
abstract  ideas  are  here  revealed  as  growing  out  of  concrete  sit- 
uations, “and  that  we  are  not  to  wonder  that  we  comprehend 
them  not,  and  do  so  often  find  our  thought  at  a loss,  when  we 
would  consider  them  abstractly  by  themselves,”  as  he  wrote  in 
connection  with  his  account  of  space  and  time  in  a passage  ad- 
duced above.10  Had  Locke  only  followed  out  this  notion  and 
continued  his  inquiry  from  it  and  from  these  admirable  beginnings, 
instead  of  pursuing  such  inquiry  from  the  abstract  standpoint  of 
particulars  and  thought  in  divorce ; or  from  his  abstractions  of 
simple  ideas  versus  complex;  or  from  the  still  further  abstractions 
within  complex  ideas ; namely,  those  of  simple  and  complex  modes 
versus  substances, — what  a length  of  needless,  fruitless  wander- 
ings Locke  might  have  spared  himself.  Furthermore,  he  might 
have  spared  the  identification  of  pure  objectivity,  among  some  of 
his  successors,  with  that  range  of  experience  of  which  we  might 
be  thought  susceptible  in  a protoplasmic  stage  of  existence. 

Now  there  is  no  doubt  that  “the  ideas  settled  in  our  minds” 
may  vary  with  each  other  in  two  fundamental  respects:  (a)  in 
their  degree  of  possible  generality,  and  (b)  in  their  degree  of 
response  to  “the  constant  and  regular  order  of  things”  or,  on  the 
other  hand,  in  their  degree  of  response  to  a more  or  less  arbitrary 
fancy  or  imagination.  But  however  much  ideas  may  differ  from 
each  other  in  these  respects,  in  one  respect  they  are  alike ; namely, 
that  the  possibility  of  ideas  or  objects  presupposes  in  all  cases  a 
thought-  process  and  its  control.  To  establish  the  fact  that  such 
is  Locke’s  contention  when  unfettered  by  false  theory,  I shall, 
in  addition  to  what  has  been  stated,  consider  two  fundamental 
types  of  relation ; that  of  cause  and  effect  and  that  of  morality. 

10.  Chapter  4. 


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ORIGIN  OF  OUR  PRECONCEIVED  IDEAS  AND  THEIR 
PROPER  CORRELATION  WITH  FACT-REALITY 

1.  CAUSE  AND  EFFECT 

“As  it  would  take  a volume  to  go  over  all  sorts  of  relations 
[preconceived  ideas],”  writes  Locke,  “it  is  not  to  be  expected  that 
I should  here  mention  them  all.”11  He  proposes,  however,  to 
consider  “the  most  comprehensive  relation,  wherein  all  things 
that  do  or  can  exist  are  concerned,  and  that  is  the  relation  of 
cause  and  effect.”  I -shall  in  my  account  of  this  relation  freely 
turn  to  every  part  of  his  text  where  this  subject  of  causality  comes 
up  for  discussion.  Space,  time,  identity  and  diversity,  quanti- 
tative, qualitative,  blood,  instituted,  moral,  civil,  and  divine  rela- 
tions, are  the  other  relations  he  touches  upon,  briefly  or  at  length, 
among  the  “innumerable  sorts”  which  “would  take  a volume”  to 
exhaust.  And  the  general  contention  that  concerns  us  i-s,  that 
relations  have  no  status  or  reality  in  objects,  and,  secondly,  leave 
them  accordingly  unaffected,  and  it  is  this  contention  I seek  to 
refute  in  Locke’s  own  words. 

“There  must  always  in  relation  be  two  ideas  or  things,”  writes 
Locke,  “either  in  themselves  really  separate,  or  considered  as  dis- 
tinct, and  then  a ground  or  occasion  for  their  comparison  ;”12 
namely,  all  relation  involves  three  distinct  factors.  Hence  in  the 
matter  of  cause  and  effect,  “taking  notice  how  one  (thing)  comes 
to  an  end  and  ceases  to  be,  and  another  begins  to  exist  which  was 
not  before,”13  . . . whatever  change  is  thus  observed,  the  mind 
must  collect  a power  somewhere  able  to  make  that  change,  as  well 
as  a possibility  in  the  thing  itself  to  receive  it.”14  Here  then  we 
have  ‘a,’  our  original  idea,  ‘b,’  a distinct  perception  of  something 
new  in  that  original  idea,  and  ‘c,’  the  need  of  the  mind  to  collect 
a power  somewhere.  My  aim  is  to  search  for  the  ground  of  that 
need,  as  scattered  passages  in  Locke  favor  its  articulation.  With- 
out the  ideas  ‘a’  and  ‘b’  discoverable  as  distinct,  as  “either  in 
themselves  separate  or  considered  as  distinct,”  the  possibility  of  a 
comparison  would  not  even  exist.  But,  then,  the  present  com- 
parison is  of  a kind  involving  something  unique.  That  element 

11.  Bk.  II,  ch.  28,  sec.  17. 

12.  Bk.  II,  ch.  25,  sec.  6. 

13.  Ibid.,  ch.  21,  sec.  1. 

14.  Ibid.,  sec.  4. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


81 


of  uniqueness  is  change.  Change  would  seem  to  be  a product  of 
thought  induced  by  the  fact  that  ‘a’  and  ‘b,’  although  distinct 
or  separate,  hence  Many,  are  yet  constrained  by  thought  to  be  held 
in  the  original  Oneness ; for  we  begin  with  ‘a,’  which  is  One,  and 
yet  are  forced  to  perceive  ‘b’  as  another  when  it  comes  “to  exist 
which  was  not  before.”  Yet  “we  never  finding  nor  conceiving  it 
possible,  that  two  things  of  the  same  kind  should  exist  in  the  same 
place  at  the  same  time,  we  rightly  conclude  that  whatever  exists 
anywhere  at  any  time  excludes  all  of  the  same  kind  and  is  there 
itself  alone.  . . . (But  further)  since  one  thing  cannot  have 

tzvo  beginnings  of  existence,  nor  two  things  one  beginning;  it  is 
impossible  for  two  things  . . . to  be  or  exist  in  the  same  in- 

stant, in  the  very  same  place,  or  one  and  the  same  thing  in  dif- 
ferent places.  That,  therefore,  that  had  one  beginning,  is  the 
same  thing;  and  that  which  had  a different  beginning  in  time  and 
place  from  that,  is  not  the  same,  but  diverse.”15  In  other  words, 
‘b’  having  broke  out  as  separate  and  distinct  from  ‘a,’  they  cannot 
as  two  distinct  things,  have  the  same  single  beginning  able  to  ac- 
count for  both  of  them ; hence  the  need  of  the  mind  to  collect  a 
beginning  for  ‘b’  somewhere.  But  where  turn  for  the  originating 
principle  when  “powers  are  relations  and  not  agents,”16  and  when 
the  “communication  of  motion  by  impulse,  or  by  thought  [the  only 
possible  agents]  is  equally  . . . obscure  and  inconceivable. 

. . We  have  by  daily  experience  clear  evidence  of  motion 

produced  both  by  impulse  and  thought ; but  the  manner  how, 
hardly  comes  within  our  comprehension ; we  are  equally  at  a loss 
in  both.  . . . For  when  the  mind  would  look  beyond  those 

original  ideas  we  have  from  sensation  or  reflection,  and  penetrate 
into  their  causes,  and  manner  of  production,  we  find  it  discovers 
nothing  but  its  own  shortsightedness ; . . . there  is  no  more 

difficulty  to  conceive  how  a substance,  we  know  not,  should,  by 
thought,  set  body  in  motion,  than  how  a substance,  we  know  not, 
by  impulse,  set  body  into  motion.”17  Yet  the  mind  is  constrained 
“to  collect  a power  somewhere,”  even  though  it  has  no  visible 
principle  to  rest  upon ; for  change  implies  a new  existence  in  space 
and  time,  or  in  time  only,  and  the  new  thing  ‘b’  must  somehow 
or  other  find  an  explanation  for  its  “beginning.”  The  need  is  as 

15.  Ibid.,  ch.  27,  sec.  1. 

16.  Ibid.,  ch.  21,  sec.  19. 

17.  Ibid.,  ch.  23,  secs.  28-29. 


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real  (1)  as  the  perception  of  ‘a’  and  ‘b’  as  distinct  existences  is 
real;  (2)  as  real  as  the  idea  of  change,  as  the  result  of  the  com- 
parison; (that  is,  as  real  as  the  original  unity  and  subsequent 
diversity  are  real)  ; (3)  as  real  as  the  principle  of  conservation; 
and  (4)  as  real  as  the  inherent  intellectual  need  for  unity  in  our 
experience.  In  a word,  the  notion  of  cause  and  effect  is  a thought 
construct,  involving  comparison  on  the  basis  of  a real  diversity 
in  unity,  and  the  postulate  that  every  new  existence  involves  the 
idea  of  a new  beginning ; something  cannot  come  out  of  nothing. 
Such  then  would  seem  to  be  the  origin  of  our  “preconceived  idea” 
of  cause  and  effect.  It  certainly  does  not  appear  as  if  generated  in 
a vacuum.  Rather  does  the  idea  appear  as  if  generated  in  an 
exceedingly  complex  situation,  wherein  the  interpenetration  of 
fact  and  idea  or  meaning  appears  so  complete  as  well  nigh  to  baffle 
analysis. 

‘Unity’  is  another  such  idea.  Shall  we  call  it  fact  or  meaning? 
And  if  meaning,  shall  we  hold  meaning  as  ungrounded  in  reality 
and  as  leaving  reality  unaffected,  “it  sufficing  to  the  unity  of  an 
idea  [object],”  as  Locke  writes,  “that  it  be  considered  as  one 
representation  or  picture,  though  made  up  of  ever  so  many  par- 
ticulars?”18 Under  conditions  then,  “an  army,  a swarm,  a city,  a 
fleet,”  are  “things  as  perfectly  one  as  one  ship  or  one  atom.”19 
That  reality  is  not  left  unaffected  by  the  idea  of  unity  is  here 
evident.  But  is  such  unity  real?  Yes,  if  it  serves  our  ends,  or 
works ; for  after  all,  as  Locke’s  recurrent  note  would  have  it : 
“God  has  fitted  us  for  the  neighborhood  of  the  bodies  that  sur- 
round us”20  . . . and  “it  will  become  us,  as  rational  creatures, 

to  employ  those  faculties  we  have  about  what  they  are  most 
adapted  to.”21  Ideas,  then,  that  work  successfully  in  our  efforts 
to  comprehend  the  world,  and  in  our  general  lack  of  others  or 
better,  are  real ; it  being  as  real  in  the  interest  of  some  ends,  to 
regard  a fleet  or  a city  as  One  and  not  as  Many,  as  in  the  interest 
of  other  ends  to  do  the  reverse.  Fact  and  meaning  are  one,  and, 
at  best,  distinguishable  aspects  only. 

18.  Ibid.,  ch.  24,  sec.  1. 

19.  Ibid.,  ch.  24,  sec.  2. 

20.  Ibid.,  ch.  16,  sec.  13. 

21.  Bk.  IV,  ch.  12,  secs.  10-11. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


83 


2.  MORAL  RELATIONS 

“Virtue  and  vice,”  writes  Locke,  “are  names  supposed  every- 
where to  stand  for  actions  in  their  own  nature  right  and  wrong.”22 
This  position,  in  harmony  with  his  general  contention,  Locke 
denies,  and,  in  turn,  sets  up  the  contention,  “that  moral  good  and 
evil  consist  in  nothing  but  the  conformity  of  our  voluntary  actions 
to  some  law ; which,  I think,  may  be  called  moral  relation,  as 
being  that  which  denominates  our  moral  actions  . . . which 

relation  as  a touchstone,  serves  to  set  the  mark  of  value  upon 
their  voluntary  actions.”23  The  following  illustration  sums  up 
his  whole  position : “Our  actions  are  considered  as  good,  bad,  or 
indifferent ; and  in  this  respect  they  are  relative,  it  being  their 
conformity  to,  or  disagreement  with  some  rule  that  makes  them 
to  be  regular  or  irregular,  good  or  bad.  . . . Thus  the  challeng- 
ing and  fighting  with  a man,  as  it  is  a certain  positive  mode,  or 
particular  sort  of  action  ...  is  called  duelling,  which,  when 
considered  in  relation  to  the  law  of  God,  will  deserve  the  name 
sin ; to  the  law  of  fashion,  in  some  countries,  valor  and  virtue ; 
and  to  the  municipal  laws  of  some  governments,  a capital  crime.”24 
That  is,  apart  from  our  preconceived  ideas,  no  moral  determina- 
tions exist  in  our  objects.  But  suppose  we  again  raise  the  counter 
claim : apart  from  determinations  of  some  kind  or  other  in  our 
objects,  can  we  attain  to  any  preconceived  ideas  at  all?  And  what 
we  find  is,  that  pure  objectivity  is  again  distorted  by  the  introduc- 
tion of  false  abstract  distinctions.  The  matter  is  easily  presented. 
Modes  embrace  the  moral  concepts  by  reference  to  which  actions 
acquire  the  moral  distinctions  of  good  or  bad.  But  how  do  these 
modes  originate?  His  answer  is:  modes  are  the  pure  products  of 
reason ; that  is,  a priori  determinable  and  independent  of  ex- 
perience. Hence  there  is  no  hope  of  freeing  his  doctrine  here  of 
an  abstract  conceptualism,  unless  Locke  abandons  his  purely 
theoretical  dogmatic  view  concerning  modes.  And  on  this  point, 
Locke,  in  theory  at  least,  concedes  nothing.  Until  such  a priori 

22.  Bk.  II,  ch.  28,  sec.  10.  Italics  are  mine. 

23.  Ibid.,  secs.  4,  5,  14. 

24.  Ibid.,  sec.  15. 


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pretensions  concerning  modes,  however,  are  abandoned,  the 
original  objectivity  of  our  experience  cannot  be  restored.25 

To  view  morality  as  a relation  of  actions  to  a law,  as  he 
does,  and  yet  not  find  that  law  in  those  actions  themselves  as 
their  expression  in  certain  fundamental  relations,  but,  instead, 
to  find  that  law  the  expression  of  an  abstract  Reason  divorced 
from  Experience,  reveals  anew  how  deep  Locke,  in  certain  aspects 
of  his  doctrine,,  remained  sticking  in  rationalism,  and  by  con- 
trast, reveals  the  vast  strides  made  by  him  in  those  other  phases 
of  his  doctrine.  If,  as  Ethics  tends  to  enforce,  a man  is  not  truly 
moralized  until  the  moral  values  are  worked  into  the  very  texture 
of  his  being,  I fail  to  see  how  values  as  a class  can  remain  distinc- 
tions “extraneous  and  superinduced.”  For  grant  that  the  “pre- 
conceived idea”  is  involved  at  every  point  in  an  object’s  determina- 
tion, as  Locke  insists  upon,  and  the  “preconceived  idea”  little  else 
than  a synthesis  of  a very  complex  situation,  as  Locke  seems  fur- 
ther to  maintain,  then  how  prove  the  validity  of  that  idea  or  its 
applicability  without  admitting  at  the  same  time  that  objects, 
in  some  form  or  other  of  their  constitution,  control  the  formation 
of  the  idea.  And  as  one  and  the  same  object  may  be  variously 
conceived  (the  outcome  of  a varied  analysis  and  synthesis),  the 
primacy  of  the  idea  and  the  object  is  of  necessity  found  to  inter- 
change. Thus,  if  an  artist  finds  an  object’s  particular  soul  and 
pulse  in  its  color,  who  will  prove  that  he  has  failed  to  get  its  soul 
and  pulse,  save  by  dogmatically  sticking  to  the  claim  that  we  to 
the  contrary,  in  some  other  equally  specialized  view  or  determina- 
tion, have  gotten  such  soul  or  pulse  of  the  objects  about  us, — 
objects,  by  theory,  variable  and  indefinite  in  their  determination 
and  signification.  And  if  this  be  true  of  their  more  distinctively 
sensuous  aspect,  how  much  more  so  of  their  meaning-aspect ; that 
is,  if  the  determination  of  substances  (in  Locke’s  terminology) 
depends  upon  our  ideas  of  them  variously  formed ; how  much 
more  so  in  the  case  of  the  modes  and  the  relations,  as  he  insists. 

25.  This  situation  represents  Locke’s  general  position ; but  fortunately 
it  is  not  an  expression  of  his  sole  utterance.  For,  if  “good  and  evil,”  as 
Locke  contends,  “are  nothing  but  pleasure  or  pain,  or  that  which  oc- 
casions or  procures  pleasure  or  pain  to  us”  and  our  state,  “as  fitted  for  the 
neighborhood  of  the  bodies  that  surround  us,”  giving  us  no  concernment 
beyond  either  to  know  or  to  be,  our  “preconceived  idea”  will  depend 
upon  a consideration  of  the  various  factors  able  to  produce  and  suffer 
pleasure  or  pain,  and,  as  thus  considered,  organized  into  a whole.  And  with 
this  degree  of  a suggested  reconstruction  of  such  elements  as  appear  in 
his  Essay,  I think  I may  let  the  matter  rest. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


85 


But  the  latter  are  merely  ‘extraneous  and  superinduced,’  the  realist 
may  persist  in  proclaiming.  Well,  then,  let  him  be  equally  ready 
to  maintain  that  civilization,  with  all  its  distinctions  and  achieve- 
ments, wrought  out  with  the  brain  and  hands  of  man,  and  grounded 
in  the  heart  and  stomach  and  skin,  as  well  as  in  other  assumed 
facts,  is  an  extraneous  superinduction  upon  a more  real  world.  The 
nihilist,  strange  to  say,  champions  the  same  creed,  and  to  him  art, 
morality,  government,  refinement,  culture,  science  are  but  specious 
falsification  of  reality.  If  this  is  not  the  logic  of  realism,  I have 
yet  to  learn  it ; and  if  such  is  not  its  logic,  then  its  logic  is  that 
of  Locke : “All  such  patterns  and  standards  laid  aside,  particular 
beings,  considered  barely  in  themselves,  will  be  found  to  have 
all  their  qualities  equally  essential ; and  everything  in  each  individ- 
ual will  be  essential  to  it,  or,  which  is  more,  nothing  at  all  ;”26 
namely,  the  truth  of  reality  is  ideality — “the  new  way  of  ideas.” 

CHAPTER  XI 

CONCLUSION 

The  primacy  of  the  idea  in  the  determination  of  our  objects 
culminates  in  the  claim  that,  apart  from  the  idea,  an  object  is  “at 
once  everything  or  nothing.”1  An  object  is  “everything,”  in  so  far 
as  it  “exists  in  nature  with  no  prefixed  bounds,”  and,  hence, 
may  with  equal  logical  validity  assume  this,  that,  or  the  other 
determination,  since  our  only  reference  in  its  formation  is  “the 
constant  and  regular  order,”  in  “the  changes  which  one  body  is 
apt  to  receive  from  or  produce  in  other  bodies  upon  due  appli- 
cation, which  exceed  far,  not  only  what  we  know,  but  what  we 
are  apt  to  imagine.”2  It  is  “nothing,”  for  the  reason  that  without 
some  more  or  less  specific  inclusion  and  exclusion  of  parts,  we 
deal  with  nothing  specific. 

Secondly,  Locke  insisted  upon  the  ultimate  character  of  the 
Self  and  its  unavoidable  implication  in  all  such  determinations ; 
and,  further,  insisted  upon  a radical  difference  in  the  constitution 
of  the  self  with  different  men.  Not  only  was  the  Self  held  as 
involved  in  the  production  of  the  secondary  qualities,  which,  under 
a conceived  difference  in  its  constitution  or  structure,  according 
to  Locke,  are  bound  to  reveal  things  very  differently,  but  our 
complex  ideas,  whether  substances  or  modes  or  relations,  were 

26.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  6,  sec.  5. 

1.  Bk.  Ill,  ch.  6,  sec.  35. 

2.  Bk.  II,  ch.  31,  sec.  10. 


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held  as  further  dependent  in  their  formation,  not  only  “upon  the 
minds  of  men,”  but  “upon  the  minds  of  men  variously  collecting 
them.”  Every  man,  then,  the  measure  of  his  own  truth!  “Our 
business  is  living” ; our  needs  are  ultimates ; “our  faculties  are 
suited  to  our  state” ; “men  determine  sorts”  and  determine  them 
variously — here  we  have  fundamental  tenets  in  Locke,  and,  taken 
together,  they  spell  relativity  of  the  Protagorean  type. 

On  the  other  hand,  Locke  strongly  emphasizes  the  fact  of  a 
common  standard  of  reference  in  the  “constant  and  regular  order” 
of  things ; he  also,  speaks  of  “unalterable  organs” ; and,  further, 
speaks  of  certain  common  ends, — language,  duty,  common  affairs, 
and  whatnot,  and  such  principles,  as  he  enforces,  make  for 
identity  in  our  perceptions  and  not  for  diversity.  But  even  within 
the  range  of  a common  knowledge,  Locke’s  emphasis  is  upon  in- 
dividual diversity;  that  such  differences  are  ultimate  and  are  no 
more  to  be  crowded  out  than  our  identity  with  others,  in  so  far 
as  we  are  identical,  is  to  be  eliminated.  We  perceive  as  we  are  con- 
ditioned to  perceive,  be  the  conditions  for  likeness  or  differences  in 
perception  what  they  may.  , 

His  philosophy,  therefore,  involves  the  relativistic  principle 
in  three  forms:  (a)  that  objects  are  determined  within  change 
which,  although  constant  and  regular  in  its  order,  remains  in- 
definite and  unprefixed  in  respect  to  its  quantity;  ( b ) that  the 
individual,  as  one  object  among  other  objects,  is  involved  in  that 
determination;  and,  (c)  that  different  individuals  are  unavoidably 
differently  involved. 

Does  this  spell  scepticism?  No,  not  any  more  so  than  it  can 
be  made  to  spell  phenomenalism.  Failure  to  perceive  this  truth 
lies  in  our  failure  properly  to  conceive  and  apply  the  principle  of 
relativity.  I shall,  therefore,  in  conclusion,  enlarge  upon  each  of 
the  three  forms  of  the  principle. 

A 

Consistently  hold  to  the  fact  (1)  that  objects  in  nature  exist 
with  no  “prefixed  bounds,”  and  (2)  to  the  principle  that  given 
conditions  give  a given  result — then  whatever  the  conditions,  the 
result  is  reality.  Break  up  that  result  into  parts,  if  you  choose,  or 
synthesize  the  given  results  with  other  results,  and,  together,  or- 
ganize them  into  a larger  result ; either  procedure  is  valid  and  in 
common  practice  found  to  be  a fact.  But  if  it  be  once  admitted 


Relativity  and  Locke 


87 


that  objects  exist  in  nature  with  no  prefixed,  natural,  or  inevi- 
table boundaries  of  their  own  (shall  we  exclude  the  elementary 
substances  of  Chemistry  or  the  electrons  of  Physics  from  this 
conclusion?),3  then  one  boundary  of  them  is  no  more  true  in  the 
abstract  than  another,  whether  we  proceed  by  the  way  of  analysis 
to  a pale  and  vapid  “quale,”  or,  by  way  of  a synthesis,  advance 
to  the  Absolute  of  our  objective  idealists.  Whatever  works  from 
a given  standpoint,  or  within  a given  situation  or  series  of  situa- 
tions, analyzed  and  synthesized  or  unanalyzed  and  unsynthesized, 
as  the  case  may  be,  is  real.  Hence,  if  valid  from  one  point  of 
view  to  turn  to  a sensationalism  or  to  some  “quale”  for  truth  or 
the  real,  no  viewpoint  could  be  more  astray  if  such  pale  and  ghostly 
types  are  offered  as  samples  of  “immediacy”  in  general.  Analysis 
carried  to  the  nth  degree  is  still  analysis  carried  out  to  a degree, 
and  except  from  some  restricted  aim  or  other,  no  more  capable  of 
uncovering  the  reals  than  synthesis  carried  to  the  Absojute  is  a 
thing  necessary  in  order  to  conceive  them.  Our  reality,  at  what- 
ever point  we  may  grapple  with  it  or  break  off  with  it,  is,  in  prin- 
ciple, still  complex — it  is  the  postulate  of  all  scientific  inquiry  thus 
to  conceive  the  matter.  For  the  fact  remains  (1)  that  reality 
never  reveals  itself  except  in  a more  or  less  circumscribed  situa- 
tion or  in  a series  of  them  held  together  in  an  idea;  and,  (2) 
whether  as  something  to  be  analyzed  or  synthesized,  reality  is 
never  considered  wholly  independent  of  all  viewpoints  nor  of  the 
available  technique  elaborated  within  any  such  viewpoint,  either 
practical  or  scientific.  Hence  the  violinist,  in  seeking  what  he 
calls  a “tone,”  does  not  turn  to  abstract  analysis  nor  to  an  Absolute, 
but  he  turns  to  his  instrument  held  intact  in  a complex  situation 
of  which  he  too  forms  a part.  And  when  that  tone,  to  which  he 
dedicates  years  and  his  developed  technique  in  achieving,  is  even- 
tually evolved,  then  he  claims  to  have  the  supremely  real  and  beau- 
tiful one  which  the  particular  soul  (circumscribed  context)  of  his 
instrument  seems  to  him  capable  of  producing.  He  seeks  the 
real  by  forging  ahead,  and  when  once  attained,  weaves  his  whole 
subsequent  network  of  tones  with  that  one  as  its  ultimate  ground 
or  basis.  And  his  experience  is  a very  common  experience  whether 
we  turn  to  science  or  to  life  in  general.  The  stripping-process,  so 
common  in  our  current  search  and  definitions  of  Immediacy  of 
Experience,  is  either  a search  for  a non-relative  real,  or  for  a 
relative  real  at  its  protoplasmic  stage  (which  even  at  this  stage, 
3.  See  pp.  31-32. 


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Heaven  knows  how  complex  it  may  be!).  It  would  be  like  the 
absurdity  of  a violinist  abandoning  instruments  entirely  for  get- 
ting a tone,  or,  in  the  other  case,  abandoning  the  violin,  let  us 
say,  for  a Jews-harp  or  some  possible  protoplasmic  instrument. 
In  either  event,  what  bearing  has  such  search  in  the  world  of  art, 
or  in  any  present  metaphysical  effort  to  determine  an  object? 
There  is  the  tree  before  me.  What  is  its  total  reality  or  meaning 
for  me?  Is  yours  likely  to  be  mine.,  or  mine  yours?  That,  says 
Locke,  depends  upon  our  complex  ideas  of  it  variously  formed 
under  varying  and  very  complex  conditions.  Science  would  yield 
the  fullest  account  of  it  no  doubt,  and  yet  the  artist’s  view  of  it 
need  not  be  primarily  the  view  of  the  scientist,  not  any  more 
so  than  the  psychologist’s  view  of  it  need  be  that  of  a botanist. 
Such  I consider  to  be  Locke’s  philosophy,  and  the  reductio  ad 
absurdum  of  his  own  sensationalistic  premises ! 

Lienee  neither  a Ding  an  Sich  nor  a phenomenalism  really  has 
any  meaning  from  a relativistic  standpoint.  A thing  is  what  it 
reveals  itself  to  be  in  any  given  situation,  or,  by  a process  of  con- 
struction, is  what  it  was  found  to  be  in  a series  of  situations, 
which  “exceed  far  not  only  what  we  know  but  what  we  are  apt 
to  imagine” ; and  it  logically  remains  entirely  beside  the  issue 
whether  a Self  constitutes  a part  of  each  one  of  such  situations  or 
whether  other  objects  do.  For  no  set  of  conditions  with  their 
specific  result,  in  the  abstract,  has  a prerogative  or  monopoly  upon 
so-called  reality. 

Adhering,  then,  to  the  current  terminology,  we  may  conclude 
this  division  by  saying:  whatever  works  is  real;  merely  adding 
thereto:  whatever  works  in  an  articulated  world  of  recognized 
and  established  values  ; a world  where  Mill’s  methods,  so  to  speak, 
are  found  efficient  in  producing  results,  and  where  art,  morality 
and  refinement  in  the  directions  given  to  them,  are  the  accepted 
directions  to  still  larger  growths  and  results.  Let  any  one  re- 
verse such  general  order  and  directions  if  he  choose.  But  if  he  does 
so  with  the  hope  of  getting  something  intrinsically  more  absolute, 
he  pursues,  he  knows  not  what — a shadow.  Whatever  works, 
is  real,  whatever  works  in  the  fully  articulated  world  of  generally 
accepted  science  and  values,  in  its  highly  diversified  and  elaborated 
directions  of  interest  and  activities,  and  not  merely  what  works, 
as  this  term  what  works  is  so  narrowly,  loosely,  and  vaguely 
defined  in  our  modern  use  of  it. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


89 


B 

If  empirical  relativity  stands  for  one  significant  fact,  it  is 
that  our  universe  is  not  only  a place  where  novelty  may  occur, 
but  a place  where  novelty  is  continually  occuring.  Things  are  and 
may  be  brought  into  conjunction  and  interaction  today  which  never 
before  have  been,  and  because  reality  manifests  itself  only  in 
circumscribed  situations,  all  of  which  never  have  and  never  will 
realize  themselves  in  one  single  moment  of  actual  existence, 
therefore,  one  such  manifestation  of  it  is  as  real  as  another,  and 
reality  itself  is  thus  continually  in  the  making.  I presented  this 
view  in  an  earlier  chapter  and  gave  reasons  in  support  of  it 
(chapter  II).  I now  wish  to  show  its  bearing  upon  the  fact 
that  the  individual,  as  one  object  among  other  objects,  is  involved 
in  a varying  degree,  from  nothing  to  much,  in  the  determination 
or  making  of  reality. 

If  philosophy,  in  opposition  to  the  physical  sciences,  has  one 
central  tenet,  it  is  that  the  individual  is  involved  in  and  contributes 
toward  the  determination  or  making  of  reality.  Its  interpretation 
of  this  fact  for  the  present  is  of  little  interest;  but  the  insistence 
it  puts  upon  this  fact  is  paramount.  The  physical  sciences,  on 
the  contrary,  have  as  insistently  affirmed  that  the  individual  stands 
outside  of  reality,  and  is,  in  his  invasion  of  reality,  a disturbing 
and  vitiating  factor.  The  scientist’s  point  of  view,  I take  for 
granted,  is  generally  understood ; it  is  the  every-day  view.  I 
shall  accordingly  confine  myself  to  the  outline  of  the  philosophical 
view.  Resting  its  case  upon  the  established  truths  within  the 
spheres  of  physiological  psychology  and  physics,  philosophy  con- 
cludes that,  in  respect  to  the  sense-qualities — sound,  color,  taste 
and  what  not — if  no  individual  exists,  then  there  are  no  sense- 
qualities.  To  this  extent,  then,  the  individual  is  inevitably  involved 
in  the  determination  or  making  of  reality.  But  this  is  far  from  the 
whole  story.  That  all  our  ideas  are  motor  in  character  and  con- 
stitution, and  not  merely  sensational,  one  of  the  most  significant 
contributions  to  the  field  of  thought  by  modern  psychology,  carries 
with  it  metaphysical  implications  that  are  simply  tremendous. 
Broadly  stated,  it  means  that  the  whole  man  contributes  in  the 
structure  and  constitution  of  his  ideas  (as  constructs  and  other- 
wise) and  not  merely  his  sense  organs.  Yet  man’s  ideas,  orgin- 
ating  as  they  may,  are  his  only  reality.  So  much  granted  the 
next  step  follows:  If  man  is  involved  in  the  determination  or 


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making  of  reality,  in  what  way  does  he  differ  from  any  other 
object  of  the  universe  in  the  give-and-take  process  existing  among 
all  other  objects?  And  I affirm,  that  he  does  not  differ  in  this 
respect  from  any  other  object  in  the  universe.  Hence  what 
is  true  of  other  objects  is  also  true  of  man.  As  has  been  stated; 
certain  objects  in  a given  situation  affect  each  other,  just  as  others 
in  the  same  situation  do  not.  Any  object,  therefore,  in  any  given 
situation  may  be  very  much  affected  by  other  objects,  but  the 
same  object  in  other  situations  may  neither  affect  other  objects 
within  those  situations  nor  be  affected  by  them.4  In  the  light  of 
such  facts,  then,  science  is  correct  in  its  claim  that  the  individual 
is  not  involved  in  the  determination  of  reality ; but  its  claim  re- 
mains correct  only  to  that  extent  in  which  it  can  find,  and  thus 
comes  to  deal  with,  objects  whose  interactions  with  the  psycho- 
physical organism  are  at  a minimum  or  more  or  less  constant 
and  uniform  in  their  effects. 

But,  then,  just  as  there  are  facts  and  situations  which  make 
possible  this  affirmed  objective  type  of  truth  of  the  physical 
sciences,  so  there  are  other  facts  and  situations  in  which  the  at- 
tainment of  truth  has  for  its  prescribed  ideal  the  inclusion  of 
just  that  individual  element  or  factor  which  the  other  ideal  seeks 
to  eliminate.  Psychology,  Ethics,  Aesthetics,  Economics  and  So- 
ciology may  be  cited  as  some  of  the  sciences  falling  within  the 
sphere  of  this  latter  ideal. 

But  when  all  has  been  said  in  proper  appraisement  of  either 
of  these  scientific  ideals,  the  ultimate  fact  remains,  that  they  are 
differences  of  degree  rather  than  of  kind ; for  with  the  world  of 
a structure  so  complex  as  to  involve  analysis  and  synthesis,  com- 
parison and  organization  at  every  turn,  the  role  of  the  individual 
in  the  making  of  reality  cannot  be  too  conspicuously  emphasized. 
For,  whichever  of  the  ideals  we  embrace,  the  fact  remains,  that, 
in  the  last  analysis,  the  worlds  we  come  to  know  and  inhabit  de- 
pend more  upon  a man’s  brain,  character,  and  training,  so  to 
speak,  than  upon  his  eyes.  Thus  Michael  Angelo  has  been  led 
to  say  that  a great  artist  paints,  not  with  his  hands,  but  with 
his  brain ; and  the  same  may  be  said  with  equal  truth  of  even  the 
most  objective  of  the  sciences;  the  research  student  sees  with  his 
brain  rather  than  with  his  eyes.  If  this  were  not  so,  what  need 
of  our  Newtons  to  discern  the  big  meaning  in  the  little  fact. 

4.  See  pp.  15-17  for  a fuller  account  of  this  principle. 


Relativity  and  Locke 


91 


If  reality  were,  indeed,  the  prefixed  thing  so  commonly  pre- 
sented in  our  abstract  theories  (and  those  of  common-sense  and 
science  are  only  too  frequently  the  most  abstract),  perhaps  the 
Self,  as  they  ordain,  would  be  rightly  excluded  from  this  or  that 
synthesis  of  the  world  and  from  the  role  it,  notwithstanding, 
stubbornly  enacts  therein.  Let  me  present  the  subject  of  this 
division  in  a slightly  different  light. 

It  is  admitted  that  all  our  thinking  proceeds  by  the  joint  pro- 
cess of  analysis  and  synthesis.  These  processes  may  go  on  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously.  Where  they  proceed  consciously,  as  in 
any  specific  scientific  sphere,  the  disclosure  of  a growing  world 
follows, — a world  that  becomes  ever  more  engrossing,  ramified, 
and  heterogeneous.  When  unconsciously  employed,  these  pro- 
cesses, notwithstanding,  impel  in  the  same  direction.  Worlds 
open  up  to  us  on  all  sides  whose  existence  involves  such  an 
interchange  of  elements,  that,  if  it  were  not  for  man,  these 
worlds  would  never  have  been  produced  nor  capable  of  a repro- 
duction. Literally  described,  they  are  human  constructs,  and 
to  enter  any  one  of  them  in  any  real  sense  demands  a step  by  step 
reproduction  or  reconstruction.  Are  these  varied  worlds  (those 
of  the  varied  sciences,  of  the  varied  arts,  of  business,  industry, 
social  relationships,  and  what  not)  fundamental  phases  of  reality 
or  mere  disfigurements  and  distortions  of  it?  Let  us  assume  the 
latter  view,  the  disfigurement  view.  In  the  adoption  of  any  such 
assumption,  however,  we  postulate,  whether  we  know  it  or  not, 
the  existence  of  a ready-made,  prefixed  world  capable  of  direct 
and  easy  apprehension.  But  the  notion  of  a ready-made  world 
precludes  the  idea  of  all  real  change  and  novelty  in  it,  and,  at  best, 
is  an  assumption  loudly  demanding  a proof.  In  the  second  place, 
if  the  world  were  capable  of  a direct  and  easy  apprehension  on  our 
part,  why  speak  of  analysis  and  synthesis  as  the  inevitable  mental 
processes  employed  in  its  apprehension,  and  of  the  different 
sciences  as  the  most  approved  and  inevitable  means?  We  cannot 
evade  the  issue.  Either  the  world  as  ready-made  involves  the 
most  delusive  kind  of  abstraction,  or  the  relative  and  diverse  views 
we  acquire  of  it,  and,  as  thus  more  or  less  variously  determined, 
held  to  as  fixed,  is  all  there  is  of  a world  for  us.  But  then,  uncon- 
sciously to  substitute  any  one  or  more  of  such  constructions  of  it 
for  the  world  is  about  as  legitimate  as  the  unknown  substitution  of 
a self-built  house  for  the  infinity  and  variety  of  the  universe.  Hence 


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two  facts  come  out  clearly:  (1)  that  the  individual  is  involved  in 
the  world  he  achieves;  (2)  that,  in  the  abstract,  one  such  world  is 
as  real  as  another.  The  next  division  of  this  chapter,  division  C, 
is  intended  to  enlarge  upon  this  second  point.  The  practice  to 
overlook  both  these  facts,  however,  is  so  ingrained  in  our  usual 
view  of  things  and  the  practice  itself  is  so  strikingly  presented  in  a 
fragment  of  a poem  by  Robert  Browning,  that  I shall  proceed  to 
quote  it  with  subsequent  comment. 

“The  common  problem,  yours,  mine,  every  one’s 
Is  not  to  fancy  what  were  fair  in  life, 

Provided  it  could  be  ; but,  finding  first 
What  may  be,  then  find  how  to  make  it  fair 
Up  to  our  means,  a very  different  thing! 

No  abstract,  intellectual  plan  of  life 
Quite  irrespective  of  life’s  plainest  laws, 

But  one,  a man,  who  is  a man  and  nothing  more, 

May  lead  within  a world  which,  by  your  leave, 

Is  Rome  or  London,  not  Fool’s  paradise. 

Embellish  Rome,  idealize  away, 

Make  paradise  of  London,  if  you  can ; 

You’re  welcome,  nay,  you’re  wise.” 

These  lines  taken  at  their  face  value  certainly  sound  plausi- 
ble ; but  things  are  not  always  what  they  seem.  He  advocates  a 
plan  for  a man  who  is  a man  and  nothing  more.  But  when  is  a 
man  a man  and  nothing  more?  Is  he  a man  when  we  conceive 
him  as  a natural  animal,  a noble  savage,  a Shakespeare,  a mass  of 
atoms,  a group  of  cells,  or  an  image  of  God?  The  fact  is  that  he 
assumes  a ready-made,  prefixed  existence  of  man,  to  apprehend 
whom,  it  would  only  appear  necessary  to  open  our  eyes  and  look, 
whereas  the  truth  remains  that  almost  any  conception  of  man  is 
possible;  that  the  whole  matter  remains  an  indeterminable  prob- 
lem, and  that  no  two  men  living  are  likely  to  agree  in  their  full 
conception  of  what  a man  is  or  should  be.  So  much  for  that! 
Now  let  us  turn  to  the  other  phase  of  the  poem.  He  demands  a 
plan  of  the  world  for  a man  destined  to  live  in  a Rome  or  a Lon- 
don, and  not  in  a fool’s  paradise.  Here  the  same  sort  of  error 
confronts  us.  Rome  or  London  is  represented  in  what  man’s 
view  of  them?  In  their  vast,  bewildering,  multiplicity  of  detail 
of  vast  and  most  diverse  relationship,  man-made  and  otherwise, 
what  man’s  segment  of  them  is  the  proper  one,  since  nothing 


Relativity  and  Locke 


93 


less  than  an  omniscience  could  possibly  exhaust  and  embrace  them 
all?  The  fact  is  that  every  man  inhabits,  and  in  his  own  complex 
nature  offers  additional  elements  for,  a segment  of  them  quite  his 
own,  and  to  substitute  this  segment  for  the  whole  is  to  convert  his 
more  or  less  concrete  segment  into  an  abstract  symbol, — a very 
facile  procedure,  but  one  easily  misleading  and  fraught  with  con- 
fusion. Rome  and  London,  then,  as  well  as  the  term  man,  as  used 
in  the  poem,  are  sheer  abstractions,  conceived  quite  irrespective 
of  the  plainest  laws, — ironically  to  re-phrase  Browning. 

The  principle  of  uniformity,  as  it  reflects  itself  with  specific 
terms  in  specific  and  circumscribed  relations,  is  the  only  thing  ap- 
proximating a fixity  that  is  absolute. 

C 

I shall  now  set  forth  the  claim  that  different  individuals  are, 
unavoidably,  differently  involved  in  the  determination  of  reality, 
with  its  outcome  for  philosophy.  I make  no  apology  for  again 
presenting  the  matter  in  the  concrete. 

Every  man  inhabits  a world  of  his  own  and  the  tongue  he 
speaks  is  not  always  the  tongue  others  speak.  Untrained  in  music, 
how  can  I begin  to  picture  that  world,  in  all  its  serious  interest, 
beauty,  and  significance,  in  which  a Beethoven,  a Wagner,  or  a 
Handel  really  had  his  being?  Unless  I have  felt  the  heart-throb 
of  nature  as  a Wordsworth  felt  it,  can  I really  understand  and 
appreciate  half  that  Wordsworth  writes  and  talks  about?  Keep- 
ing such  facts  in  mind,  we  are  in  a position  to  appraise  some  very 
general  convictions : among  artists,  that  men  have  eyes  yet  see 
not ; among  musicians,  that  men  have  ears  yet  hear  not ; among 
poets,  that  men  have  hearts  yet  feel  not ; and  among  thinkers, 
that  men  have  brains  yet  think  not.  They  forget  that  each  of  us 
and  each  of  them  has  his  special  and  conditioned  range  of  vision, 
and,  in  consequence,  his  particular  world,  and  that  we,  in  each 
case,  may  be  using  all  our  faculties  to  their  fullest  extent 
even  though  we  use  them  differently.  Thus  for  an  artist,  there 
is  no  object  in  nature  but  has  its  constantly  shifting  and  varying 
moods,  tints,  forms,  expression,  light  and  shade,  and  herein 
alone,  he  holds,  do  you  get  an  object’s  particular  -soul  and  pulse. 
He  sees  a thousand  shades  and  tints  where  we  see  none.  Hence 
we  go  reputed  as  blind.  But  even  if  the  botanist  fails  to  note 
this  rich  play  of  light  and  shade,  has  the  artist  necessarily  on  the 
other  hand  the  botanist’s  keen  perception  for  plant  structure, 


94 


University  of  Cincinnati  Studies 


or  the  physician’s  keen  perception  for  the  most  evanescent 
symptom  of  disease?  And  when  you  complicate  the  situation  by 
the  addition  in  each  case  of  interests,  aims,  standards,  and  con- 
ditions more  or  less  unique  with  the  general  world  of  each,  and 
with  each  individual  in  particular,  where  in  this  state  of  affairs 
is  one  man  likely  to  find  the  other  ? 

But  it  may  be  argued  that  the  difference  in  each  case  is  nothing 
compared  to  what  is  held  in  common.  If  the  world  of  the  artist, 
in  its  difference,  did  not  constitute  the  main  world  with  him,  why 
does  his  world  so  completely  fill  his  space,  that,  not  to  exercise  our 
eyes  and  faculties  as  he  does,  however  much  we  exercise  them  dif- 
ferently, is  nevertheless  by  him  viewed  as  not  using  them  at  all. 
“The  little  more  to  him,  and  how  much  that  is ; the  little  less,  and 
what  worlds  between !”  One  man  stands  by  an  accepted  fact  or 
truth  and  is  ready  to  die  for  it,  which  another  mocks,  but  mocks 
for  the  reason  that  he,  in  turn,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  stands 
by  some  other  accepted  fact  or  truth  which  the  former  man  may 
scorn.  Professor  James,  within  our  own  times,  has  rendered  this 
order  of  experience  an  emphasis  which  demands  a recognition  even 
larger  than  has  yet  been  accorded  to  it.  Yet  for  convenience,  I 
again  turn  to  Robert  Browning,  the  arch-relativist,  for  a trenchant 
formulation : 

“What  does  it  all  mean,  poet?  Well, 

Your  brain’s  beat  into  rhythm — you  tell 
What  we  felt  only ; you  expressed 
You  hold  things  beautiful  the  best, 

And  pace  them  in  rhyme  so,  side  by  side. 

’Tis  something,  nay  ’tis  much — but  then, 

Have  you  yourself  what’s  best  for  men? 

Are  you — poor,  sick,  old  ere  your  time — 

Nearer  one  whit  your  own  sublime 
Than  we  who  never  have  turned  a rhyme? 

“And  you,  great  sculptor — so  you  gave 
A score  of  years  to  art,  her  slave, 

And  that’s  your  Venus — whence  we  turn 
To  yonder  girl  that  fords  the  burn! 

You  acquiesce  and  shall  I repine? 

What,  man  of  music,  you  grown  gray 
With  notes  and  nothing  else  to  say; 


Relativity  and  Locke 


95 


And  thus  Browning  may  have  continued  through  the  whole 
range  and  sweep  of  human  interests  and  activities,  with  the  re- 
sult that  we  unfailingly  find  what  is  ultimate  in  reality,  within 
limits  divergently  affirmed  in  the  experience  of  different  men, 
and,  yet,  in  each  case,  affirmed  with  a finality  that  appears  to  him 
conclusive.  But  with  “our  business  living”  ; “our  needs  ultimate”  ; 
“our  faculties  suited  to  our  state”;  “our  objects  without  prefixed 
bounds”  ; how  justify  the  claim  that  divergency  in  our  views,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  fundamentally  divergent,  spells  scepticism  and  that 
concord  in  our  views,  unless  they  are  conditioned  to  be  in  con- 
cord, spells  truth?  I fail  to  see  the  logic  of  such  a contention, 
just  as  I failed  to  see  the  logic  of  a view  of  reality  that  would 
claim  to  know  reality  as  if  the  psycho-physical  self,  with  all  its 
varied  needs,  hopes,  aspirations,  defeats,  sense  of  life,  were  not 
directly  involved  in  its  constitution,  and,  from  a relativistic  stand- 
point, varying  in  its  significance,  like  things  in  general,  from 
much  to  little  or  from  little  to  much.  “God  has  made  the  in- 
tellectual world  harmonious  and  beautiful  without  us,”  writes 
Locke,  “but  it  will  never  come  into  our  heads  all  at  once;  we 
must  bring  it  home  piecemeal,  and  there  set  it  up  by  our  own  in- 
dustry, or  else  we  shall  have  nothing  but  darkness  and  chaos 
within,  whatever  order  and  light  be  in  things  without  us.”5 

The  solution  to  this  question  of  ultimate  differences  is  found  in 
pluralism ; namely,  that  from  a cosmic  point  of  view  the  psy- 
chical is  as  real  and  as  ultimate  as  the  physical  ;6  that  music  and  art 
are  as  compelling  in  their  reality  as  a stone  or  a house ; that  af- 
fections, friendship,  enmity  are  as  ultimate  as  the  atoms,  electrons, 
or  ions  of  science  and  far  more  concrete  and  definite  to  boot; 
that  civilization  may  be  and  for  us  is  more  full  of  reality  than 
crude  nature,  and  that  an  Aristotle  who  thus  finds  the  fulfill- 
ment of  life  in  its  developed  and  complex  forms  is  far  ahead  of  a 
Rousseau  who  would  find  it  in  his  noble  savage  and  in  the  return 
to  simple  life ; that,  in  the  last  analysis,  to  talk  of  a thing  as  real 
or  ultimate  or  rational  presupposes  some  standard  in  reference  to 
which  reality  and  rationality  acquire  whatever  meaning  we 
may  be  led  to  ascribe  to  them,  and  that,  apart  from  such 
standard  or  standards,  reality  and  rationality  remain  without  one 

5.  Conduct  of  the  Understanding,  sec.  38.  Italics  mine. 

6.  Reality  in  its  totality,  in  accord  with  the  principles  set  forth,  re- 
veals itself  in  circumscribed  situations,  each  manifestion  of  which,  in  the 
abstract,  is  as  real  or  unreal  as  the  other. 


06 


University  of  Cincinnati  Studies 


shred  of  sensible  meaning  attaching  to  them.  And  since  every 
single  fact  of  life  must  alike  conform  to  this  general  truth  of 
things,  let  the  materialist,  the  sensationalist,  the  champions  of 
conduct  (as  types  of  monists)  stand  by  their  ultimates  if  they 
will,  but  if  they  think  they  have  condensed  into  their  respective 
ultimates  a truth  and  reality  higher  or  better  than  the  accepted 
ultimates  of  some  other  possible  monist,  it  only  remains  necessary 
to  turn  them  all  over  to  some  sound  philosophical  student,  such 
as  our  Locke,  to  teach  them  individually  the  full  extent  of  their 
unconscious  dogmatism.  For,  as  I stated  in  a previous  chapter, 
the  question  is  not  so  much  whether  we  have  gotten  beyond 
Locke,  but  whether  we  have  caught  up  to  him.  And  in  conclusion, 
I content  myself  in  saying  that  the  present  accepted  understand- 
ing of  him  is  a travesty. 


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